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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three essays that examine issues relating to human capital, 
economic growth, and inequality within the framework of dynamic macroeconomic 
models. A common innovation followed in all of these essays is the consideration of 
alternative approaches to the modelling of technology and preferences not typically 
observed in the extant literature, with a view to gaining insights into the diversity of growth 
and inequality patterns across countries.  
The first study explores the properties of the variable elasticity of substitution 
production function, which is an appealing alternative to standard production functions 
considered in the literature, given that it is more general and nests several technological 
structures as special cases. It therefore has the potential to yield further insights on 
economic growth relative to existing studies. The dynamics of growth created by the 
variable elasticity of substitution production function is examined by incorporating it into 
an overlapping generations model à la Diamond (1965). We show that a certain technology 
parameter in the variable elasticity of substitution production function affects a number of 
features of the economy, such as the labour share in output, factor rewards, and capital 
intensity in production through the technical change it creates, and it may therefore provide 
a potential explanation for some of the changes in these features that have been observed 
in the recent growth literature. Growth dynamics are also determined primarily by this 
parameter. Depending on its value, the economy could reach a unique and stable steady 
state, fall into a poverty trap, or achieve an upper bound of capital stock per capita, as 
stipulated by the parameter restrictions associated with this particular form of production 
function. Hence, under the assumption of a variable elasticity of substitution production 
function, convergence towards a unique and stable steady state is not inevitable. The capital 
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biased technical change created by a higher value of this parameter is also shown to 
improve productivity in steady state, but causes an exacerbation of intergenerational 
inequality.  
In the second and third essays, the focus shifts to human capital. The second essay 
examines an important dimension of human capital, namely education, and explores its 
implications for economic growth. In this study, we develop an overlapping generations 
model to explore how the degree of aggregate substitutability between public and private 
education expenditures, as measured by the elasticity of substitution between these two 
types of expenditures, impacts long run macroeconomic outcomes. The use of a variable 
elasticity of substitution “education production function”, in which public and private 
education expenditures are the inputs, shows that greater aggregate substitutability between 
these two types of expenditure yields higher stocks of human and physical capital in the 
long run. Furthermore, the optimal tax rate is increasing in aggregate substitutability. 
Stability analysis reveals that the economy could reach a stable steady state characterised 
by either oscillatory or monotonic convergence, or display oscillatory divergence followed 
by the emergence of permanent endogenous cycles. The results of this study suggest that 
policies aimed at improving aggregate substitutability between public and private education 
expenditures could contribute towards improved long run macroeconomic outcomes. 
The third study considers another dimension of human capital, namely health, and 
explores the implications arising from expenditures on health within an overlapping 
generations model with heterogeneous agents. In this model, a person’s probability of 
survival into old age is determined by a variable elasticity of substitution health production 
function in which public and private expenditures are the inputs. Outcomes of this analysis 
are similar in spirit to the previous essay. Analytical and numerical results reveal that higher 
aggregate substitutability, as measured by the elasticity of substitution between private and 
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public expenditures, leads to higher long run wealth levels and lower inequality. 
Specifically, in the political equilibrium, higher aggregate substitutability is associated with 
higher public expenditure on health. This study also concludes that policies aimed at 
increasing the degree of substitutability between private and public health expenditures 
could yield better long run outcomes. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
 Introduction 
This thesis is an exploration of some of the issues relating to economic growth and 
inequality. Broadly, this thesis examines how technology, mechanisms for the 
accumulation of human capital, the political choices of citizens, and the initial distribution 
of wealth can affect an economy’s growth patterns, inequality, and other long run economic 
outcomes. The motivational relevance for this work stems from the importance of these 
issues in macroeconomics. Although there is a large body of literature, both empirical and 
theoretical, around these issues, the underlying causes of poverty and inequality, and 
mechanisms of growth remain unresolved. This is witnessed through the diversity in growth 
and development experiences of world economies, the extent of which is captured by 
Prichett (2000) as follows: 
 “While some countries have steady growth (hills and steep hills), others have rapid 
growth followed by stagnation (plateaus), rapid growth followed by decline 
(mountains) or even catastrophic falls (cliffs), continuous stagnation (plains), or 
steady decline (valleys).” ( p. 221) 
Given such diversity of growth experiences, a vast body of work exploring the factors 
that influence the process of economic growth and inequality has emerged over the past 
five decades or so. Much of this literature has been clustered around a number of prominent 
themes. For instance, the role and quality of institutions is an issue explored by, among 
others, Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) and 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005); while the role of geography has been the subject 
of studies such as Sachs (2001) and Olsson and Hibbs (2005). Authors including Glomm 
and Ravikumar (1992), Tamura (2006), and Galor (2011), on the other hand, consider 
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human capital to be a primary determinant of economic growth and inequality. Technology 
has been the focus of studies such as those by McIntosh (1986), Levy (1981), and 
Acemoglu (2002), while studies by Yuhn (1991), Klump and De La Grandville (2000) and 
Palivos and Karagiannis (2010), among others, have examined the manner in which the 
elasticity of factor substitution affects growth patterns. Furthermore, the manner in which 
the financial sector influences the process of economic development has been the subject 
of studies such as those by Levine and Zervos (1998) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992).  
While the list given above is not exhaustive, it demonstrates the fact that economic 
growth and inequality remain “open-ended” questions in the study of economics. Of the 
many determinants of growth and inequality, there has been considerable interest in the 
recent literature on technology, institutions, and human capital. This thesis considers some 
unexplored aspects of these dimensions. It consists of three studies that present theoretical 
perspectives on these matters through the development of approriate macroeconomic 
models. At the heart of the models presented in this thesis is a certain functional form called 
the variable elasticity of substitution (VES) production function developed by Sato and 
Hoffman (1968) and Revankar (1971). A version of this production function presented in 
Karagiannis, Palivos, and Papageorgiou (2005) is employed throughout the thesis. As it is 
a key building block in all of the models used in this thesis, the VES production function is 
essentially the common theme that binds these three studies together.  
The distinctive feature of the VES production function is that the elasticity of factor 
substitution is linear related to the capital stock per worker. Depending on the value of a 
certain parameter, which could take a range of positive and negative values, the elasticity 
of factor substitution could depend positively or negatively on the per capita capital stock. 
This results in the elasticity of factor substitution taking different values at different points 
on a particular isoquant. Given that a higher capital stock per worker is closely associated 
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with economic growth, the elasticity of factor substitution is endogenous in the VES form. 
Such endogeneity of the elasicity of factor substitution has been suggested by, among 
others, Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2007) and Yip and Xue (2013). As will be shown, 
this endogeneity enables the VES production function to be adapted to explore the 
macroeconomic outcomes associated with the public-private mix of merit goods such as 
health care and education.  
We now provide an overview of the three studies that constitute this thesis. The first 
essay introduces the VES production function, discusses its properties, and looks at the 
growth dynamics it creates in the context of an overlapping generations model á la Diamond 
(1965). The main motivation for the study is the empirical evidence in studies such as 
Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow (1961), Bairam (1989), and Duffy and Papageorgiou 
(2000), which point to considerable variations in the value of the elasticity of factor 
substitution between countries and industries. In view of such evidence, as suggested by 
Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2007), the elasticity of factor substitution may be an 
endogenous variable that may be linked to the level of economic development of a country. 
The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function and its special case, the 
Cobb Douglas form, which are usually used in most theoretical and empirical studies on 
growth and inequality, cannot take such endogeneity into account, as the elasticity of factor 
substitution remains static over time and input combinations in these functional forms. 
Hence, there is a need to consider more flexible, alternative forms of production function 
such as the VES form. In the VES form, the elasticity of factor substitution depends on the 
capital to labour ratio used in production, and its value therefore varies along different 
points of an isoquant. As the capital to labour ratio is directly linked to an economy’s rate 
of growth, the VES form creates a link between the elasticity of substitution and economic 
growth.  
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Further motivation for the study emerges from some of the recent observations 
relating to economic growth, such as the global decline in the labour share and the increase 
in the returns to capital, for which the standard Solow-Swan growth model under the 
assumption of a CES production function cannot provide adequate explanations. The 
central parameter in the VES production function referred to earlier, which is labelled 𝑏 
throughout the thesis following Karagiannis et al. (2005), provides a potential explanation 
for such recent observations relating to the growth experiences of countries.  
In particular, in the spirit of Acemoglu (2002), we show that this parameter is a source 
of biased technical change. Specifically, a higher value of 𝑏 causes the marginal product 
of capital to rise, while the marginal product of labour falls concurrently. These movements 
result in greater bias in production, which in turn influences the elasticity of factor 
substitution. In the VES form, a positive value of 𝑏 yields an elasticity of substitution above 
1, and a negative vaue of 𝑏 being associated with an elasticity of substitution between 0 
and 1. The value of 𝑏 also influences relative factor shares, with higher values of this 
parameter leading to a higher share of capital in total output. Given that this parameter is a 
key determinant of a number of characteristics of the economy it can be interpreted as an 
important structural parameter. A higher value of 𝑏 essentially represents a technology that 
enables greater factor substitution, and is hence determined by a number of factors, such as 
the power of trade unions, the attitudes of the government towards investments in different 
factor inputs, as well as developments in the financial sector that determine investments in 
new technology.  
Upon exploring the properties of the VES production function, we proceed to apply 
it to an otherwise standard Diamond overlapping generations model, where agents live for 
two periods, working during the first and spending the second in retirement. Agents save 
in the first period in order to finance their old age consumption, and these savings make up 
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the capital stock of the next period. The key results of this exercise are that a positive value 
of the parameter 𝑏 is always associated with a unique and stable steady state analogous to 
that associated with the standard Solow-Swan model. When the value of 𝑏 is negative, 
however, there are three possible long run outcomes: the economy could achieve a stable 
steady state, fall into a poverty trap, or reach an upper bound of per capita capital stock. 
The VES form cannot produce unbounded growth given the parameter restrictions that are 
imposed to ensure that the elasticity of factor substitution and the marginal product of 
capital are positive.  
We show that a higher value of the parameter 𝑏 enables the economy to produce a 
higher level of output per capita at steady state with a lower per capita capital stock. Hence, 
a higher value of this parameter creates an efficiency effect. However, in the presence of 
competitive factor markets where the reward for each factor input is equal to its marginal 
product, a higher value of this parameter, by causing the marginal product of capital to rise 
and marginal product of labour to fall, can lead to an exacerbation of intergenerational 
inequality, as the old generation owns the capital and the young generation supplies the 
labour needed for production in a Diamond overlapping generations model. 
The second and third studies of the thesis are applications of the VES production 
function in the contexts of education and health respectively. In these studies we examine 
how the degree of substitutability between public and private expenditures on education 
and health can impact on long run macroeconomic outcomes. The functional form and 
properties of the VES production function enables easy adaption to explore these issues. In 
the second and the third studies, the VES is adapted to define health and education 
“production functions” in which public and private expenditures form the inputs. The use 
of the VES production function in the extant literature has been restricted primarily to 
“standard” contexts where two inputs are employed to produce a consumer good. To our 
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knowledge, this is the first time the VES form has been used to study the accumulation of 
human capital and the resulting dynamics.  
Much of the extant literature dealing with public-private mix of expenditures in 
markets like health care and education assumes either rigid complementarity or perfect 
substitutability between these two inputs. The key motivation for the second and third 
studies is the fact that, in practice, the degree of substitutability between these two inputs 
does not admit to either of these extremes. The extent to which they are substitutable or 
complementary to each other would depend on a range of cultural and institutional factors. 
Furthermore, the degree to which an individual perceives these inputs to be substituable or 
complementary would also depend on several other factors such as the person’s income, 
location, and access to information. Only a handful of extant studies, such as Bearse, 
Glomm, and Patterson (2005), Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007), Osang and Sarkar (2008), 
Lahiri and Richardson (2009), and Li, Moslehi, and Yew (2012) have considered the 
impacts on growth, inequality, and political economy outcomes arising from different 
levels of substitutability between public and private expenditures in the contexts of health 
and education.  
It is this strand of literature that is of direct relevance to the second and third studies 
of this thesis. The use of the VES form enables us to consider a range of intermediate values 
of the elasticity of substitution between public and private expenditures in these markets. 
A further advantage of using the VES form is that it improves the analytical tractability of 
our results.   
In the second study, we consider a three period overlapping generations model where 
the agent spends her childhood acquiring human capital, her adult age working and her old 
age in retirement. In adult age she gives birth to a single offspring. The offspring’s 
education is funded by the government, which imposes a tax on the adult agents of the 
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economy in order to finance the public education system, as well as by the parents. We 
define an education production function of the VES type in which these public and private 
expenditures form the inputs.  
In this context, the parameter 𝑏 captures a number of institutional and cultural factors 
that influence the degree of substitutability between public and private education 
expenditures. As elaborated in Chapter 4, these factors involve the cultural emphasis on 
educational attainment, which might motivate parents to supplement public education with 
private expenditures in order to allow their children to achieve better academically, as well 
as the actual quality of the public education system and the various regulations relating to 
private sector involvement in the education industry. Given that it captures a number of 
such considerations, we refer to the parameter 𝑏 as the aggregate substitutability 
parameter. This parameter can also be viewed as a representation of the relative uniformity 
between public and private education expenditures in comparison to private education, with 
a higher value of 𝑏 being associated with a greater degree of uniformity between public and 
private education expenditures. A higher value of this parameter therefore indicates greater 
comparability of these two inputs in relation to coverage, access, and quality.  
 The agent’s adult age human capital is assumed to depend on the education she 
acquired in childhood, as well as her parent’s human capital, according to a Cobb-Douglas 
specification with increasing returns to scale. Production in this economy also follows a 
Cobb-Douglas form, with human and physical capital forming the inputs.  
We show that the steady state stocks of human and physical capital are rising in the 
value of 𝑏, and that a higher value of this parameter enables the economy to converge to 
the steady state faster. Hence, greater substitutability between public and private education 
expenditures is desirable for the economy. It is also interesting to note that the ratio of 
physical to human capital rises in the aggregate substitutability parameter.  
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We carry out stability analysis to gain insights into the different transition dynamics 
that could occur. This analysis reveals that the economy could display monotonic or 
oscillatory convergence towards the steady state or display oscillatory divergence away 
from the steady state followed by the emergence of permanent endogenous cycles. 
The third essay uses the VES form to extend the idea of substitutability between 
public and private expenditures to the context of health. It examines how the degree of 
substitutability between public and private health expenditures influences wealth dynamics 
and political economy outcomes. In this study, we consider a two period model where 
agents have heterogeneous initial endownments of wealth.  In both youth and old age, they 
earn exogenous wages. In youth, the agent gives birth to a single offspring and the youthful 
agent also inherits a bequest from her parent. The government charges a proportional tax 
on the bequests received by young agents. A certain proportion of the total tax revenue is 
used to finance public health care, while the remainder is redistributed equally among 
agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer. Young agents use their net income to fund 
private health expenditures and savings. Public health expenditure and the spending on 
health undertaken by agents in youth determine the stock of health capital an individual 
possesses at the end of her youth according to a VES form, and this stock of health capital 
determines her probability of survival into old age. This survival probability function is a 
non-convex function of health capital. If the agent safely survives through old age, she 
allocates her income from work and her savings that accumulate an exogenous interest on 
consumption and bequests for her offspring. If the agent does not survive through old age 
safely, her offspring inherits the gross value of her parents’ savings as an unintended 
bequest. We assume that savings or unintended bequests are always less than intended 
bequests for all agents in the economy.  
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When applied in this context, the parameter 𝑏 captures all of the aggregate-level 
factors that affect the ease with which an individual can substitute between private and 
public health care expenditures. Along a similar vein to the second essay, it is an indicator 
of the comparability of the public and private components of a health care system, with a 
higher value of 𝑏 being associated with a greater degree of similarity between public and 
private health expenditures along dimensions such as quality and access. The degree of 
substituability at the aggregate level naturally improves an individual’s ability to substitute 
between public and private health expenditures. However, using the VES form allows the 
individual’s ability to substitute between public and private health expenditures to also 
depend on the actual ratio of public to private health expenditures she undertakes, which is 
directly dependent upon her wealth. The heterogenous agents framework considered 
enables us to make a distinction between both aggregate and individual substitutability of 
health expenditures. Hence, we make a novel contribution to the literature by directly 
incorporating micro-level considerations relating to heterogeneity in substitutability into 
our model, and examine how these aggregate and micro-level factors can affect wealth 
inequality and macroeconomic performance in the long run. 
The main results of this study are as follows: higher aggregate substitutability 
between public and private health expenditures is associated with higher average wealth 
levels and lower inequality. This outcome occurs due to the political economy 
determination of the proportion of tax revenue that agents desire to be allocated towards 
public health care. In the presence of greater aggregate substitutability, agents vote for a 
higher proportion of tax revenues to be allocated towards public health care, which enables 
agents to achieve a particular survival probability by undertaking less private health 
expenditure and leave more bequests (intended or unintended) for their offspring. Hence, 
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higher public health care expenditure acts as a mechanism for the redistribution of wealth 
in the economy. 
Another interesting dimension explored in this study is how the political economy 
outcomes compare with the alternative determination of public health spending by a 
benevolent social planner who wishes to maximise the welfare of agents. To this end, the 
political economy outcome is compared to the social welfare maximising outcomes based 
on the utilitarian and Rawlsian paradigms. It can be seen that for a large range of parameter 
values, the political economy, Rawlsian, and utilitarian outcomes coincide in the long run. 
In the instances they do not, the political economy outcome converges to either the 
Rawlsian or utilitarian outcome, suggesting that the political economy outcome is generally 
a socially desirable one. This comparison is another interesting contribution of the study, 
through which the welfare implications of the political economy outcomes along the 
economy’s transition path are ascertained by comparing them against two opposing 
perspectives on welfare.  
The diverse explorations carried out in the three essays provide interesting insights 
into the underlying factors that determine the manner in which growth, inequality, and 
political economy outcomes evolve in an economy over time. This thesis makes several 
novel contributions to the extant macroeconomics literature. The explorations of the first 
study aim to contribute towards the recent growth literature, especially the strands of 
literature that deal with the manner in which the elasticity of factor substitution affects 
growth outcomes and the direction of technical change. In particular, the VES form 
provides a means of capturing the variations in factor substitutability that has been 
documented in a large number of empirical studies. Furthermore, this thesis reinforces the 
beneficial impacts of a higher elasticity of substitution demonstrated in the extant literature, 
albeit through a different channel: through its influence on the direction of technical change 
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in the economy the parameter 𝑏 has an impact on the elasticity of factor substitution, and 
in turn the dynamics of growth.  
The second and the third studies contribute towards the literature on human capital 
accumulation, economic growth, and inequality. In the second study, the VES education 
production function is used to explore the dynamics of physical and human capital 
accumulation in the economy. One of the few studies that have explicitly looked at the issue 
of substitutability in the context of education is Bearse et al. (2005). However, in contrast 
to their study, which looks at the political economy outcomes, our focus on the dynamics 
of human and physical capital accumulation, enables us to make an interesting addition to 
the growth literature. In the third study, the use of the VES health production function 
enables a distinction between individual and aggregate substitutability in this context, 
which is an aspect extant studies exploring this issue, such as Bhattacharya and Qiao 
(2007), Lahiri and Richardson (2009) and Li et al. (2012), have not taken into consideration. 
Furthermore, the comparison of the political economy outcome for the proportion of tax 
revenue to be allocated towards providing public healthcare with the value selected by a 
social planner under both the Rawlsian and the utilitarian paradigms makes an important 
contribution to the implications on welfare that emerge from the issue of substitutability 
between public and private expenditures in the context of health.  
This thesis also carries several policy implications. In general, the thesis highlights 
the beneficial impacts associated with a higher degree of substitutability between factor 
inputs, as well as between public and private inputs in health care and education. In all of 
the contexts considered in this thesis, government policies directed towards raising the 
value of the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 can yield better long run outcomes. With 
regard to the standard form of the VES production function considered in the first essay, as 
noted previously, the parameter 𝑏 represents a technology that, through the capital bias it 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 12 
creates, enables greater factor substitution. Hence, in this context, certain government 
policies could influence the value of 𝑏. For instance, certain political parties may promote 
capital bias by encouraging investments that raise the relative price of capital. Furthermore, 
as a higher value of 𝑏 is associated with a lower share of capital in output, the power of 
trade unions could also be a key determinant of its value, as trade unions typically attempt 
to maintain the share of labour at a high level. Hence, reforms aimed at reducing the power 
of trade unions could also contribute towards raising the value of the parameter 𝑏. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that a while a higher value of the central parameter enables 
the economy to reach a higher value of output per capita at steady state, this occurs at the 
expense of higher intergenerational inequality. Hence, a government that is especially 
concerned about the worsening inequality created by a higher value of this parameter may 
settle for a set of policies that keep this parameter at a comparatively lower level.  
In the contexts of education and health, as mentioned earlier, 𝑏 captures a range of 
cultural and institutional factors that affect peoples’ perceptions regarding the extent to 
which public and private expenditures are substitutable for each other. Hence, policies 
directed towards these factors could help raise the value of the parameter 𝑏. In the case of 
education, these policies could include derregulation of the industry to enable private 
providers to provide high quality education services in countries where there is 
considerable competition for publicly provided education. Nevertheless, in contexts where 
a private education is perceived to be of a superior quality, improving the quality of public 
education could improve the comparability of these two types of inputs. In the case of 
health, encouraging private participation in heavily regulated markets and improving the 
quality of public healthcare, especially in developing countries where publicly provided 
health services are of a considerably lower quality relative to their private counterparts, 
could also help raise the value of the aggregate substitutability parameter. 
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However, with both health and education, it is important to bear in mind that many 
of the factors, especially cultural ones, that affect the aggregate substitutability parameter 
are typically sticky, and the influence government policy could exert upon them could be 
limited. Through further empirical investigation of the key outcomes of our work, it may 
be possible to develop more specific and comprehensive policy recommendations that 
could potentially play an important role in improving long run economic outcomes in these 
contexts. 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews some literature 
related to the studies included in the thesis. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 contain the first, second 
and third essays respectively, and the concluding remarks are provided in Chapter 6. Proofs 
and derivations are relegated to the Appendices. 
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 Related Literature 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on a number of themes of relevance to the studies that 
constitute this thesis. Given that this thesis consists of three independent essays, the 
issues that are of immediate relevance are reviewed in each study separately. The aim 
of this chapter is to provide an overarching background that connects themes appearing 
in the individual essays. As the first essay explores the VES production function in the 
context of a model of economic growth, a survey of the recent literature that looks at 
patterns of economic growth, overall growth trends, as well as certain regional and 
country level growth experiences is an apt starting point for this chapter. This brief 
account of growth patterns comprises Section 2.2. Given that economic growth was 
regarded as an “open-ended question” in the Introduction, exploring the causes of 
economic growth is obviously an important consideration. Hence, a number of 
different causes of economic growth are examined in Section 2.3. As the second and 
third studies of this thesis examine issues relating to growth and inequality in the 
contexts of education and health respectively, we define human capital and discuss its 
different components in Section 2.4. In particular, attention is directed towards the idea 
that, like education, health is also an important type of human capital. Section 2.5 
investigates some of the intricate linkages between human capital, inequality, and 
economic growth. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.  
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2.2   GROWTH PATTERNS AROUND THE WORLD 
 The Industrial Revolution is often considered to be one of the most important 
landmarks in modern economic history. While the period beyond this point has been 
characterised by notable improvements in average incomes and living standards, the 
fact that Europe and its offshoots grew richer while many countries lagged behind 
caused the emergence of large global income inequalities (Baldwin, Martin, & 
Ottaviano, 2001; C. I. Jones, 2001). European countries enjoyed an even greater boost 
to their growth rates after World War II, and this era also marked the emergence of 
Japan as a world economic superpower, as it rapidly caught up with the original leaders 
in the world economy (Abramovitz, 1990; De la Fuente, 1997). In the 1980s, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, better known as the Asian Tigers, 
embarked on a speedy trajectory of growth and joined the most economically powerful 
nations in the world. 
In recent years, with its remarkable growth rate averaging around 10% per 
annum, China has cemented its position as a powerful entrant into the catch-up game 
(Crafts, 2004). India has also been a powerful force in the world economy; until the 
1980s India’s trend rate of growth was around 3% per annum, but by 2007, this rate 
had increased to approximately 9.7% (Bollard, Klenow, & Sharma, 2013). If they 
continue their impressive growth trajectory, China will become the second largest 
economy in the world by 2016, and India is projected to become the world’s third 
largest economy by 2035 (Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008).    
Alongside a number of older and more recent success stories, there are many 
other countries that have experienced modest, if not negative, growth. This is 
illustrated by Temple (1999), who uses data for the 1960-1990 period to distinguish 
between “growth miracles,” which are countries that enjoyed continuous 
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improvements in per capita income during the time period considered and “growth 
disasters,” which are countries that experienced a decline in per capita income. 
According to his classification, South Korea, Japan, Botswana, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Malta, Cyprus, Seychelles, and Lesotho are growth miracles; while Ghana, 
Venezuela, Mozambique, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Zambia, Mali, Madagascar, Chad, 
and Guyana are growth disasters.1 With regard to such a classification of countries, C. 
I. Jones (1997) notes that in recent decades, growth miracles have been more common 
than growth disasters, and therefore predicts that a marked improvement in the income 
levels of people in many countries would occur in the long run.  
A more elaborate and extensive classification of growth patterns covering a large 
number of countries is provided by Pritchett (2000). He distinguishes between growth 
paths that resemble hills, steep hills, plateaus, cliffs, mountains, plains, and valleys. 
Hills and steep hills represent steady growth over time, plateaus capture a scenario 
where a country experiences rapid growth followed by stagnation, a cliff is a 
catastrophic fall in income levels, a mountain is rapid growth and subsequent decline, 
plains capture stagnation of growth, “accelerators” are countries that experience little 
or no growth at first but then display accelerated growth, while valleys capture a steady 
decline in growth over time. Pritchett’s classification of countries based on this 
analogy is provided in Table 2.1.  
                                               
1 As this classification is based on an older dataset, it does not apply well in the recent context. 
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Table 2.1: Pritchett’s classification of countries 
Group   Countries 
Steep hills Japan, Thailand, Cyprus, Ireland, Taiwan, South Korea, Botswana, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Malta, and Hong Kong 
Hills Australia, Austria, China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Israel, Tunisia, 
Barbados, Tanzania, Belgium, Canada, Philippines Pakistan Turkey 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Mexico, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United States 
Mountains United Kingdom Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Algeria, Egypt, 
Argentina, Cameroon, Congo, Iran, Iraq, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Guyana, Gabon, Liberia, Syria, 
Honduras, Mozambique, Jamaica, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Panama, Togo, Paraguay, Peru, Zaire, Zambia, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago 
Plateaus Iceland, Morocco Brazil, Ethiopia, Netherlands, Dominican Republic, 
Gambia, Guinea Bissau, New Zealand, Sweden, Bissau, Kenya, El 
Salvador, Lesotho, Malawi, Guatemala, Swaziland 
Accelerators Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Chile, Uruguay Ghana, Mauritius 
Plains  Nepal Haiti, Republica Angola, Burundi, Benin, Central African 
Republic, Venezuela, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe 
Adapted from Pritchett (2000) 
The fact that Pritchett’s (2000) analysis does not classify any countries in the 
cliffs and valleys categories projects some optimism in relation to growth prospects of 
the countries considered. Nevertheless, this classification is based on older data, and 
the growth experiences of certain countries have changed since, thereby prompting the 
need to interpret it with caution. For instance, as a country that was severely affected 
by the global financial crisis, Greece’s growth rates have been consistently negative 
since 2008, although in 2014 its growth rate was 0.77%, which projects a slight 
recovery (World Bank, 2015). Hence, in recent years, Greece’s economic growth 
pattern has borne a closer resemblance to a mountain than a hill. Another example is 
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Syria; the World Bank has provided no growth data for Syria from 2008 onwards, but 
since the civil conflict erupted, Syria’s growth pattern may well have changed from a 
mountain to a cliff. Such experiences demonstrate that the growth patterns of an 
individual country may display considerable variations over time. Such changes in 
growth paths in a particular country over time have been studied, for instance, by 
Jerzmanowski (2006), who builds a Markov-chain model drawing on Pritchett’s work 
to show that countries may switch between growth regimes over time, with the 
probability of such transitions being determined by the quality of institutions. His 
model comprises of four growth regimes: stable growth, miracle growth, stagnation, 
and crisis. Low institutional quality diminishes a county’s ability to sustain stable 
growth. Adding to this sub-strand of literature, Kerekes (2012) interprets economic 
growth as a “sequence of transitions between different growth regimes that countries 
visit with different frequencies” (p. 167) and builds a Markov-chain switching model 
using data from 82 countries covering the period 1962 to 2003 to demonstrate that 
countries switch between regimes of stable growth, miracle growth, stagnation, and 
crisis. She attributes a successful growth record to initial conditions prevailing in a 
particular country, policies undertaken by authorities, and institutional quality.    
When reflecting on these diverse growth patterns that can be observed between 
and within countries over time, an important question one should ultimately ask is 
whether the developing countries can ever attain the levels of economic growth and 
living standards of their developed counterparts. To provide a prelude to this matter, 
the average annual growth rates for 27 OECD countries, the BRICs and a large number 
of less developed countries for the period 1991-2014 are presented in Table 2.2. It is 
interesting to note that only a few OECD countries, namely Ireland, Chile, South 
Korea, and Israel, have been able to maintain average growth rates above 4% during 
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this period. Compared to this, China’s phenomenal average growth rate of 10.09% and 
India’s growth rate of 6.56% lends support to the notion of catch-up or “convergence”. 
This is because, if they continue to maintain such growth rates, they could, in the long 
run, reach levels of economic development comparable to those of industrialised 
countries. As Bollard et al. (2013) suggest, such a catch-up process could have 
implications for development and welfare globally; given the large populations and 
the high prevalence of poverty in India and China, the high economic growth rates in 
these two countries could help transform the lives of a marked proportion of the 
world’s poor.2  
 
  
                                               
2 Given that China and India contain 20% and 17% of the world’s population respectively, their growth 
has a marked impact on the global economy as well. Hence, studying their growth experiences requires 
one to deviate from the “small economy” assumption usually made in growth models (Kaplinsky & 
Messner, 2008)  
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Table 2.2: Annual average growth rate of GDP between 1991 and 2014 
Country 
Average annual 
growth rate of 
GDP Country 
Average annual 
growth rate of 
GDP 
OECD countries   LDCs 
Australia 3.11 Burundi 1.34 
Austria 1.91 Benin 4.34 
Belgium 1.70 Burkina Faso 5.83 
Canada 2.39 Central African Republic 0.40 
Chile 5.03 Comoros 2.21 
Czech Republic 1.70 Eritrea 3.73 
Germany 1.45 Ethiopia 6.57 
Denmark 1.47 Guinea 3.13 
Spain 2.00 Gambia, The 3.26 
Finland 1.71 Guinea-Bissau 1.97 
France 1.52 Liberia 9.08 
United Kingdom 2.01 Madagascar 2.30 
Greece 1.03 Mali 4.69 
Ireland 4.35 Mozambique 6.73 
Iceland 2.65 Malawi 4.15 
Israel 5.05 Niger 3.77 
Italy 0.65 Nepal 4.45 
Japan 0.92 Rwanda 5.79 
Korea, Rep. 5.12 Sierra Leone 3.84 
Luxembourg 3.58 Chad 6.58 
Netherlands 1.91 Togo 2.88 
Norway 2.47 Tanzania 5.18 
New Zealand 2.74 Uganda 6.72 
Poland 3.70 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.98 
Portugal 1.25 Zimbabwe 0.24 
Sweden 2.05   
United States 2.48   
BRICs   
Brazil 2.98   
China 10.09   
India 6.56   
Russian Federation 0.95   
South Africa 2.60   
Source: World Bank data 
It is also encouraging to observe that certain less developed countries, such as 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Chad, Mozambique, and Burkina Faso, have been able to maintain 
average growth rates above 5% during the period considered in Table 2.2, which points 
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to an improvement in the living standards of the citizens of these countries during the 
period. Evidence suggesting that such economic growth can be pro-poor is provided 
by Ravallion (2001), who uses data from 47 developing countries to show that a 1% 
increase in mean income leads to a 2.5% reduction in the proportion of people living 
on less than $1 a day. 
 However, many countries, such as Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Russia have displayed sluggish growth during this 
time, suggesting that income disparities between these countries and the developed 
world are only widening. 
At the heart of these diverse growth experiences lies the convergence debate—
the question of whether poorer countries are catching up with their rich counterparts, 
which, according to Romer (1994) is the issue that has been most extensively explored 
by growth economists in recent times. Over the past few decades, three major 
perspectives on convergence have emerged in the empirical and theoretical growth 
literature: absolute convergence, conditional convergence, and club convergence.  
The idea of absolute convergence propagates the view that, regardless of initial 
conditions, all economies will converge to a common level of per capita income in the 
long run. For instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) evidence an absolute 
convergence of incomes among the states in the US, as well as in a sample of 48 
countries. Much of the earlier empirical literature estimated that developing economies 
were converging with their developed counterparts at a rate of around 2% per annum 
(Quah, 1996), suggestive of an absolute convergence of incomes on a global scale.3 
                                               
3 However, Quah (1996) suggests that this may be a technical artefact emerging from the possible 
presence of unit roots in the time series regressions considered in these studies.  
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The conditional convergence hypothesis is based on the standard model of 
economic growth developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), which predicts that, 
under certain standard assumptions, an economy always monotonically converges to 
a unique and stable steady state.4 This steady state value is conditional in that it is 
determined by the rates at which population growth, technological progress, savings, 
and depreciation of the capital stock occur in a particular country. Once the economy 
reaches steady state, output per effective worker remains constant, implying that the 
output per worker increases at the rate at which exogenous technological growth 
occurs. Empirical evidence to support the conditional convergence hypothesis has 
been provided by, among others, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer, 
and Weil (1992), and Islam (1995).   
The third perspective is the idea of club convergence, which proposes that 
countries with similar initial incomes and structural features will cluster around the 
same per capita income in the long run, leading to polarisation of cross country 
incomes (Galor, 1996). A large number of studies have suggested that the highly 
industrialised countries (i.e., the OECD member countries) experienced a convergence 
of productivity and incomes during the period between 1870-1990, while less 
developed countries fell far behind their developed counterparts, with the ratio of 
average incomes of the richest and poorest nations of the world rising nearly five-fold 
during the period (Pritchett, 1997). This observation demonstrates a clear segregation 
of countries into a developed group and a developing one, and thereby provides 
support for the club convergence hypothesis. This view is further expounded by Quah 
(1996), who provides empirical evidence that shows a gradual polarisation of cross 
                                               
4 These standard assumptions are continuity, differentiability, diminishing marginal products, constant 
returns to scale, and that the Inada conditions are satisfied. 
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country incomes that leads to two distinct clubs: one consisting of rich countries and 
the other consisting of poor countries. 
 The presence of empirical evidence to support all three perspectives on 
convergence means that much debate remains around this issue among 
macroeconomists. However, summing up the current state of affairs, Piketty and 
Goldhammer state that: 
“A global convergence process in which emerging countries are catching up 
with developed countries seems well under way today, even though 
substantial inequalities between rich and poor countries remain.” (2014, p. 72) 
The reduction in cross-country inequalities resulting from the global 
convergence process is likely to transform the lives of millions of people worldwide. 
However, the substantial inequalities that still persist may mean that the fruits of 
economic growth are unlikely to ever be distributed equitably, both across and within 
countries. Hence, inequality is naturally intertwined with economic growth. The 
subject of inequality is revisited in greater depth in Section 2.5.  
Nevertheless, if these variations and diversities in economic growth rates 
between and within countries are averaged out and a “very long run” perspective is 
adopted, the global growth in per capita income has actually been very modest. 
Picketty and Goldhammer’s (2014) calculations of the average annual growth in per 
capita output over the past two millennia, which are summarised in Table 2.3, show 
that for the first 1700 years of modern human history, output remained stagnant. The 
best global economic performance occurred in the period 1913-2012, when average 
annual output grew at a rate of 1.6% on average. The data is supportive of the view 
that economic growth is a relatively recent phenomenon that came into existence as 
late as the 19th century. Despite these modest values however, it is important to 
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appreciate that an annual growth rate of 1.6% can culminate into a very large increase 
in income per capita over a long period of time, thereby demonstrating the extent to 
which economic growth can make a positive contribution towards enriching the lives 
of people on a global scale.  
Table 2.3: Average annual growth in per capita output 0-2012  
Years Average annual growth 
rate of per capita output 
(%) 
0-1700 0 
1700-1820 0.1 
1820-1913 0.9 
1913-2012 1.6 
Adapted from Piketty and Goldhammer (2014, p.73) 
2.3  ECONOMIC GROWTH: PROXIMATE AND FUNDAMENTAL 
CAUSES 
In the Solow-Swan model, a country’s growth rate is determined by the rate at 
which it accumulates human and physical capital and its technology progresses. This 
close relationship between economic growth and these variables posited by the Solow-
Swan model is an empirical regularity that has been observed in many contexts. There 
are several perspectives on estimating the contributions of these three variables. For 
instance, growth accounting estimates the growth rate of output implied by growth 
rates in physical and human capital, and attributes the difference between the implied 
and actual rates of growth to total factor productivity (TFP), or the “Solow residual” 
as it is commonly known in the growth literature (Baier, Dwyer, & Tamura, 2006). 
TFP is a measure of how efficiently human and physical capital are used in production, 
and therefore captures the long run technical change in an economy. On the other hand, 
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endogenous growth theory assumes that human capital is the key driver of economic 
growth, as a country’s stock of human capital affects the growth process through the 
contributions it makes towards technological development (Benhabib & Spiegel, 
1994).  
Despite the major focus in the growth literature on technological progress, 
human, and physical capital, Acemoglu (2008) asserts that they are only proximate 
causes of economic growth, because investments in these factors undertaken by people 
and governments are governed by certain “deep” characteristics, which he refers to as 
the fundamental causes of economic growth. He identifies these fundamental causes 
of growth as: luck, institutions, geography and culture. One of the first proponents of 
some of these factors as fundamental determinants of growth were Nelson and Phelps 
(1966), who noted that the technology parameter in the Solow growth model 
encapsulates institutions, soil quality, and natural resource endowments, among other 
things. The next sections discuss these fundamental causes of growth and then examine 
a number of additional factors identified in the recent growth literature as closely 
related to growth. 
2.3.1 The luck hypothesis 
As discussed previously, the varied patterns of growth observed in practice are 
suggestive of the idea that, unlike in the Solow-Swan model, which predicts 
conditional convergence towards a unique and stable steady state, countries are 
actually confronted with multiple equilibria in practice. In the presence of multiple 
equilibria, small differences between countries with largely similar characteristics 
could yield very different long run growth paths.  
To demonstrate this more elaborately, Figure 2.1 shows a growth trajectory with 
multiple equilibria. A country that starts with a per capita capital stock below 𝑘1 falls 
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into a poverty trap, while a country with an initial capital stock between 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 
achieves a steady state capital stock of 𝑘2. Finally, a country that has an initial capital 
stock above 𝑘2 will be able to enjoy unbounded growth.  
 
Figure 2.1 Economic growth with multiple equilibria 
           Adapted from de la Croix and Michel (2002, p. 33) 
Acemoglu (2008) makes a distinction between models with multiple equilibria 
and those with multiple steady states with history dependence. In the former case, a 
change in the beliefs and behaviours of people can enable a nation to transition from a 
sub-optimal equilibrium path towards a Pareto efficient one, while in the latter 
instance, once a country embarks on a particular growth trajectory, digressing from it 
is impossible. In the case of multiple steady states with history dependence, the long 
run outcomes that transpire depend on the initial stock of capital (human or physical) 
that a country possesses. Hence, if the dynamics depict vastly different outcomes, the 
history dependence view suggests that the fortunes of a country depend entirely upon 
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its initial stock of capital. Such a dependence on historical factors may account for the 
persistent differences in incomes between countries. On the other hand, growth 
miracles, such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and more recently, the impressive 
growth rates recorded by China and India, point towards the possibility of transition 
from one equilibrium to another. However, growth models with multiple equilibria 
shed no light on the factors that force a country to remain trapped in a sub-optimal 
equilibrium or enable it to escape from such an equilibrium. The other fundamental 
causes of growth could potentially provide explanations for such issues.  
2.3.2 The geography hypothesis 
The geography hypothesis proffers that geographical, climatic, and topological 
conditions can be a primary determinant of a country’s growth experience. Soil quality 
and climate can have a direct impact upon agricultural productivity, and a country 
endowed with mineral resources may be able to use the revenue from the sale of these 
extracts to support industrial development (Acemoglu, 2008). For instance, Canada 
has a climate that helps to contain the spread of diseases and is conducive to 
agricultural production, is bordered with a prosperous trading partner, and is sea-
navigable. These geographical characteristics may be a possible explanation for 
Canada’s emergence as one of the richest countries in the world (Easterly & Levine, 
2003). 
Jeffrey Sachs, a pioneer of the geography hypothesis asserts that, “Perhaps the 
strongest empirical relationship in the wealth and poverty of nations is the one between 
ecological zones and per capita income. Economies in tropical ecological zones are 
nearly everywhere poor, while those in temperate ecological zones are generally rich.” 
(Sachs, 2001, p. 1). In relation to this point, he notes that the only developed countries 
located in the tropics are Hong Kong and Singapore. Furthermore, climatic conditions 
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affect the spread of diseases. For instance, there are many diseases like dengue, 
malaria, and yellow fever that are specific to tropical climates, and their prevalence 
can have an adverse impact on productivity.  
The location of a country may also affect its growth potential. This is 
demonstrated by MacKellar, Wörgötter, and Wörz (2000), who reveal that, on average, 
the growth rate of a landlocked country is about 1.5 percentage points lower than that 
of a sea-navigable country. Landlocked countries are often also at a disadvantage in 
international trade, as their ability to transport the goods produced domestically to the 
rest of the world is heavily dependent upon the transport infrastructure of transit 
countries, as well as the maintenance of amicable international relations with these 
countries. The fact that landlocked countries engage in less international trade is 
highlighted by Limão and Venables (2001), who use World Bank data to show that in 
1995, landlocked countries’ share of imports in gross domestic product was around 11 
percent, while it was 28 per cent for coastal economies. Furthermore, during the period 
1965-1990, none of the top 15 exporter of non-primary products were landlocked 
nations. Nevertheless, the potential benefits that regional integration can provide to 
landlocked countries have been demonstrated by the economic success achieved in 
recent times by landlocked countries of Western and Central Europe such as Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovakia, 
and Switzerland (Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999).  
From a historical perspective, the presence of animals and plants suitable for 
domestication enabled societies to transition from the hunter-gatherer stage to 
agricultural societies, and empirical evidence suggests that such prehistoric 
biogeography is an initial condition that supports a country’s modern economic 
development (Olsson & Hibbs, 2005). For instance, J. Diamond (1997) identifies nine 
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regions in the world where domestication of flora and fauna occurred independently 
and three more where local food production was initiated by “founder” crops with their 
origins in other regions, while a number of other regions never adopted agricultural 
production until they were compelled to so in modern times. The earlier onset of 
agricultural production enabled certain regions to achieve greater economic 
development in modern times.  
2.3.3 The culture hypothesis 
The third fundamental cause of economic growth identified by Acemoglu (2008) 
is culture. In the economics literature, culture is often defined as “individual and 
collective beliefs, social norms, and various attributes of individuals’ preferences that 
are somehow influenced by their environment, but typically slow moving.” (Aghion 
& Howitt, 2009, p. 421).  
That culture is a primary determinant of economic progress is a view more than 
a century old. For instance, in his iconic book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, first published in 1904, Max Weber argued that the Protestant Reformation 
had a major influence on the spread of capitalism in Western Europe and the region’s 
economic prosperity. This hypothesis has been empirically tested by a number of 
authors. For instance, that Protestant countries in the OECD perform better on a 
number of dimensions such as economic growth, investment, capital stocks, and 
labour-force growth than their Catholic counterparts has been empirically 
demonstrated by Desdoigts (1999). In attempting to unearth the causes for the 
phenomenal success of East Asian economies, Kahn (1979) notes that a possible 
explanation may lie in the cultural commonalities rooted in the teachings of Confucius 
that these countries shared.  
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2.3.4 The institutions hypothesis 
In recent times, institutions have been perhaps the most extensively researched 
cause of economic development. The view proposed by North (1989), that institutions 
are the primary cause of development, led to the birth of the new institutionalism/new 
institutional economics school of thought, which attributes the inability of many 
developing countries to escape the vicious cycle of poverty to poor institutions, which 
are themselves endogenous (Przeworski, 2004).  
New institutionalism equates institutions to rules. This is clear from the 
following definition by North (1989): 
“Institutions are rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that 
structure repeated human interaction.” (p. 1321) 
Hence, the new institutionalist paradigm regards institutional reform as changes 
in the rules governing human interactions (H. J. Chang, 2011). Typically, the cost of 
measuring compliance to rules may be a major impediment to the effectiveness of 
institutions (North, 1989). This is further emphasised by H. J. Chang (2011), who notes 
that institutions are expensive to establish and maintain. This observation projects the 
presence of a reverse causality in the relationship between institutions and 
development, in that countries need to achieve a certain level of economic 
development before they can establish costly institutions like democracy, intellectual 
property rights, bankruptcy laws, security regulations, etc. Given that these institutions 
are strongly established in many developed countries, developing countries can 
establish superior institutions at a much lower cost, thereby enjoying a notable 
latecomer advantage (H. J. Chang, 2011).  
The primacy of institutions in the development process is demonstrated by 
Rodrik et al. (2004), who estimate the contributions of institutions, trade and 
 Chapter 2: Related Literature 32 
geography towards determining a country’s income level. They show that when 
institutions are controlled for, the effect of geography on income is weak and trade has 
an insignificant effect on income.  Acknowledging that the poor quality of institutions 
is a major obstacle to economic development, many international organisations and bi-
lateral and multi-lateral donor schemes now impose conditions upon recipient 
countries, which requires them to improve the quality of their institutions so as to 
establish good governance (H. J. Chang, 2011). The Washington Consensus, for 
instance, was based on the view that all economies are inherently similar, and that, 
since people respond to incentives, a particular policy would yield the same results 
everywhere (Kenny & Williams, 2001). However, in practice, implementation of 
institutional reforms that have proven to be successful in one country/culture may not 
necessarily lead to desired results in another place. Emphasising this point further, 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) note that “Western” institutional reforms 
need to be adapted to suit local conditions when they are implemented in developing 
countries. Przeworski (2004) considers the case of an independent judiciary in this 
regard; simply enforcing independence upon the judiciary would not lead to 
transparency if judges receive low salaries.  
Much of the evidence on institutions as a primary cause of development is based 
on macro-level empirical analyses. However, the results of these studies need to be 
regarded with caution, as they are subject to aggregation errors, and they fail to take 
into account a number of micro-level institutions, such as land tenure systems, out-
grower agreements and the management of individual projects funded by donor aid, 
which can influence human behaviours and exchange (Kimenyi, 2011).  
Furthermore, the claim made by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), that 
“differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in 
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economic development” has been challenged in some contexts. For instance, in the 
case of India, reforms such as industrial de-licensing, tariff reduction, financial 
liberalisation, and the promotion of small scale industries can only account for about 
a third of the 5% per annum increase in manufacturing productivity that occurred 
during the period 1993 to 2007 (Bollard, Klenow, & Sharma, 2013). Even more 
compelling is the evidence provided by Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2004) who demonstrate that human capital is a more fundamental cause of 
growth than institutions. Furthermore, as these authors, as well as numerous others 
have pointed out, there are several examples in recent economic history of countries 
that have achieved phenomenal economic growth under dictatorial regimes and 
subsequently adopted democracy and other institutions needed for good governance.  
2.3.5 Technology and the elasticity of factor substitution as causes of economic 
growth 
As technical change and the elasticity of factor substitution are considerations at 
the heart of the first essay, a brief survey of these factors as causes of economic growth 
is provided here. Neoclassical growth economists assume that economic growth 
primarily takes place due to advancements in technology and changes to the 
organisation of production activities (Hulten, 2001). Despite the key role played by 
technological progress, it is an exogenous process in the neoclassical growth 
framework (Mata & Louçã, 2009). Specifically, in the neoclassical model of economic 
growth proposed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), technology is perceived to be a 
public good that can be freely used by all countries (Fagerberg, 1994), and 
technological progress therefore occurs at the same rate all over the world (Kenny and 
Williams, 2001). If the extant pool of technology was indeed available to all countries, 
it would result in the absolute convergence of per capita incomes. However, the 
persistent gaps in income and growth rates between countries shed doubts on this 
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assumption. The need to find explanations for these diversities led to the birth of 
endogenous growth theory that links these differences to processes relating to human 
capital accumulation and learning by doing. We provide a discussion of endogenous 
growth theories in Section 2.4.  
With regard to the role of technology in economic growth, as noted previously, 
the Solow residual is often regarded to be a measure of technological change in an 
economy. However, in recent years, there has been increasing scepticism among many 
economists as to whether the Solow residual actually measures technological change. 
In relation to this concern, Lipsey and Carlaw (2000) distinguish between three 
alternative interpretations of TFP found in the extant literature: some economists 
accept TFP as a measure of technological progress; some believe that TFP is not a 
measure of technological progress, but is rather a measure of the free lunches emerging 
from scale effects and spill-overs, in that technological advancements enable people 
who are not directly involved in their creation to enjoy an improvement in income 
which is independent of the growth of output in the economy; finally, a third group 
doubts if it measures anything meaningful at all. Adding to this debate, Hulten (2001) 
points out that TFP does not only measure technological progress; it captures all of the 
factors commonly encompassed within a residual term in a regression equation such 
as measurement errors, model misspecification, and the effect of omitted variables. 
Hence, its value should be interpreted with much caution.  
The institutional framework in a country is a primary determinant of 
technological progress. According to Boulhol (2004), institutions affect how 
efficiently technology is employed, the rate at which this efficiency improves, as well 
as the pace at which technology is diffused. Inventors and innovators will be unwilling 
to develop new technologies if they cannot reap profits from them. Hence, the presence 
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of patents, copyrights, and other protection for inventors and innovators is a key 
determinant of technological progress. Overall, government policy plays a key role in 
determining the pace of technological development in a country, not only in relation 
to fostering innovation, but also with regard to directing firms to adopt the most 
appropriate and socially efficient technologies and negotiating better terms and 
conditions for adopting foreign technologies locally (Dahlman, Ross-Larson, & 
Westphal, 1987). 
The view that the diffusion of new technologies is made possible through 
structural change was proffered by authors like Schumpeter (1934) and Chenery 
(1959). In particular, Schumpeter looked at a particular form of structural change that 
occurs when new industries gradually replace old ones, a process which he referred to 
as “creative destruction.” For instance, the industrial revolution created significant 
changes in the structure of economic activity and social organisation, and these 
changes in turn provided a foundation upon which new inventions, such as the steam 
engine and the spinning jenny, could be widely diffused. The direction of technical 
change is another influential strand in this body of literature, which was pioneered by 
Acemoglu’s (2002) paper, Directed Technical Change. Acemoglu (2002) makes a 
distinction between factor augmenting technical change and factor biased technical 
change. In a standard production function 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐴) where 𝐾 denotes capital, 𝐿 is 
labour and 𝐴 is a technology index, technology augments, say capital, if the production 
function takes the form 𝑓(𝐴𝐾, 𝐿). On the other hand, the technology parameter is 
biased towards capital if it satisfies the condition 𝜕
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿
⁄
𝜕𝐴
> 0. The extent to which 
technology is biased towards one factor depends on the elasticity of substitution 
between factors. In the context of the CES production function, Acemoglu (2002) 
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demonstrates that capital augmenting technical change is also biased towards capital 
when capital and labour are gross complements. However, when the two factors are 
gross complements, capital augmenting technology is actually biased towards labour.  
The explanation for the opposing directions of the two types of technical change under 
gross complementarity is that an increase in the productivity of one factor (due to 
technical change which augments this factor), causes the demand for the other factor 
to increase more than proportionately, which raises its marginal product.  
Given its critical influence on the direction of technical change is the economy, 
the elasticity of factor substitution is generally considered to be a “deep” growth 
parameter (Acemoglu, 2002; Mallick, 2012a). Nonetheless, the question of how the 
elasticity of substitution between factors affects economic growth forms a burgeoning 
literature in its own right. Pitchford (1960) was one of the earliest studies dedicated to 
exploring this issue. In this paper, the author demonstrates that the economy’s growth 
rate and steady state level of output depends on the elasticity of factor substitution 
between capital and labour. Nevertheless, the increased interest in this issue in recent 
years emerged due to the findings of De La Grandville (1989) and Klump and De La 
Grandville (2000), who demonstrate that a country with a higher elasticity of factor 
substitution could always achieve a higher rate of growth in transition, as well as a 
higher level of output per capita at steady state. Adding to these findings, Klump and 
Preissler (2000) show that in a Solow-Swan model with a CES production function, a 
higher elasticity of factor substitution improves the potential for an economy to 
achieve sustained growth in the long run, and concurrently reduces the possibility of 
the emergence of poverty traps.  
A number of empirical studies have revealed that the elasticity of factor 
substitution could indeed be a strong explanatory variable in cross country growth 
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regressions. For instance, in a comparative study involving the US and South Korea, 
Yuhn (1991) shows that South Korea’s higher elasticity of factor substitution was a 
key reason behind the impressive growth rates the country was able to register over 
several decades. In a more recent study, Mallick (2012b) uses data from 90 countries 
to show that the elasticity of factor substitution can account for about 20% of the 
variation in growth rates between Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia.  
2.3.6 Other causes of economic growth 
There are some other causes of growth that have received considerable attention 
in the recent literature. Before concluding this section, we provide a brief overview of 
a few of these factors. 
According to Lucas (1988), trade is also a major determinant of economic 
growth. He notes that the marked increase in exports was a key driver of the rapid 
economic development experienced, first by Japan, and later by South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore. The interest in trade and openness to international trade 
as determinants of economic growth occurred due to the diverse policies relating to 
international trade exercised by different regions during the latter part of the 20th 
century; on the one hand, Latin American countries followed a policy of import 
substitution, while on the other, East Asian countries actively pursued the outward-
looking policy of export orientation. While Latin America lagged behind, the export 
orientation of East Asian economies enabled them to acquire technological knowhow 
from foreign firms quickly, which allowed them to achieve spectacular growth (Zhou, 
2008). However, as Zhou (2008) notes, the export-led growth of East Asia occurred 
within a particular geopolitical structure that those countries shared, and openness to 
trade may not necessarily be a universal recipe for success.     
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Nevertheless, contrary to the view that free trade promotes growth, Yanikkaya 
(2003) provides empirical evidence that shows that developing countries may actually 
benefit from trade restrictions. Furthermore, Dollar and Kraay (2003) reveal that trade 
barriers have little impact on trade volumes in some countries. Hence, despite being 
an important dimension, there is no consensus in the literature that free trade is 
necessarily a primary reason for a country’s development.  
Migration is another important determinant of economic growth and 
development. The ways in which both temporary migration for purposes such as 
employment and education, as well as permanent migration affects growth in both the 
host and the source country have been extensively researched by growth/development 
economists over several decades. With regard to temporary migration, remittances by 
migrant workers account for over 1% of GDP in around 60 developing countries. 
Hence, remittances are considered to be a source of long run growth by a number of 
authors such as Ziesemer (2012), Barajas, Chami, Fullenkamp, Gapen, and Montiel 
(2009) and Chami et al. (2008). However, Rao and Hassan (2011) show that, through 
the contribution they make to the development of the financial sector, remittances may 
have an indirect rather than direct impact on long run growth in developing countries. 
Such a positive association between remittances and financial sector development is 
also shown by Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Pería (2011).  Nevertheless, some 
empirical evidence suggests that the impact of remittances on economic growth is at 
best a modest one. For instance, the dynamic panel estimates obtained by Catrinescu, 
Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and Quillin (2009) suggest that the effect of remittances upon 
long run economic growth is quite weak.  
Some studies also suggest that remittances may affect growth negatively. For 
instance, Abdih, Chami, Dagher, and Montiel (2012) use a theoretical model and 
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supporting empirical evidence to demonstrate that increased remittances could hinder 
growth by contributing towards a deterioration of institutional quality though two 
channels: firstly transfers received by households increase their consumption and 
thereby the tax base, which encourages government officials to misappropriate 
resources; secondly, these households are less likely to demand public services such 
as health care and education, as they can afford to pay for alternative services offered 
by the private sector, which reduces government expenditure on public goods and 
thereby encourages misappropriation. Further empirical evidence suggesting that 
remittances may hinder economic growth has been provided by, among others, Le 
(2009).  
Permanent migration is also an issue that has enjoyed sustained attention in the 
growth literature over several decades. The emigration of educated professionals, more 
commonly known as brain drain, is a serious challenge that many developing countries 
face. Brain drain potentially has an institutional explanation because the poor state of 
democracy, the lack of independence of the judiciary and the poor quality of education 
and health care often motivate educated people to go in search of greener pastures. 
Nevertheless, the decision to emigrate is also primarily an economic one, because 
people make this decision with the expectation of earning higher wages abroad.  
That permanent emigration may be detrimental for growth in the source country 
was the key outcome emulating from much of the earlier literature on the subject.  
These studies suggest various channels through which brain drain can adversely 
impact growth in developing countries. Some of the older studies dealing with this 
theme include Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), C. A. Rodriguez (1975a) and C. A. 
Rodriguez (1975b). Some recent theoretical works on this subject include a model 
developed by Di Maria and Stryszowski (2009), in which the expectation to migrate 
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results in individuals in developing countries acquiring skills that are not appropriate 
for their country, which results in these countries being unable to converge to the 
technological frontier of their developed counterparts. In a study by Bénassy and 
Brezis (2013), the authors use a dynamic growth model with positive externalities to 
illustrate that, in a country where skilled workers form a small proportion of the 
population initially, their resulting wage will be lower, which encourages them to 
emigrate. Hence, such countries may become trapped in a history dependent poverty 
trap characterised by low human capital and high emigration. In accordance with these 
theoretical findings, the empirical evidence presented in Docquier, Lohest, and 
Marfouk (2007) shows that developing countries located close to OECD countries and 
those with colonial origins face a marked brain drain effect. Di Maria and Lazarova 
(2012) use a sample of developing countries to demonstrate that approximately 70% 
of the people in these countries suffer due to the adverse impact on growth resulting 
from the migration of skilled workers.  
However, as noted by Lien and Wang (2005), there has recently been a notable 
shift in the literature towards highlighting the beneficial effects of permanent 
emigration. Along this vein, a number of theoretical studies such as Mountford (1997), 
Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997), Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001), and 
Stark and Wang (2002) have argued that emigration, or the expectation to emigrate, 
may lead to a “brain gain” for the source economy. The mechanism suggested in these 
papers is roughly as follows: emigration prospects encourage people to invest in 
human capital, which results in a brain gain for the source economy. However, as not 
all of these individuals actually subsequently migrate, the extent of the brain drain is 
determined by the proportion of people who actually migrate. The source economy 
benefits from a higher average level of human capital and higher productivity, as long 
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as the gain effect dominates the drain effect. Empirical evidence suggesting the 
presence of such a gain effect for developing countries is provided by Beine, Docquier, 
and Rapoport (2008) and Beine, Docquier, and Oden-Defoort (2011). In addition to 
the beneficial impacts on human capital development revealed in these studies, 
Skeldon (2008) notes that emigrants from China and Vietnam play a pivotal role in the 
development of their countries of origin through the large sums of money they remit 
and the active role they play in infrastructure development through the investments 
they undertake.  
Many studies have also shown that developments in the financial sector are 
closely associated with economic growth. For instance, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) use theoretical and empirical evidence to demonstrate the adverse impacts on 
growth resulting from efforts made primarily by Latin American governments and 
monetary authorities in the 1970s to repress the financial sector, primarily by keeping 
interest rates artificially low and the strict state control of the banking sector in order 
to lower the cost of servicing government debt and exercise strict control over money 
supply. Using data for 47 countries covering the period 1976 to 1993, Levine and 
Zervos (1998) demonstrate that both stock market liquidity and the level of 
development of the banking sector display a robust positive association with capital 
accumulation and the growth of productivity and output. Odedokun (1996) use a 
sample of 71 developing countries to show that financial intermediation promotes 
economic growth in about 85% of the countries included in the study. De Gregorio 
and Guidotti (1995) also find a strong positive correlation between long run economic 
growth and financial development for a large cross country sample, and attribute this 
relationship to efficiencies in investments created through the development of the 
financial sector.  
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The mechanism through which the financial sector creates such growth 
promoting efficiencies is explained by Levine and King (1993) in the context of an 
endogenous growth model in which financial institutions screen and fund innovative 
entrepreneurs. These authors argue that as financial institutions are typically more 
efficient than individual investors at evaluating and monitoring projects, they 
contribute towards reducing the cost of productivity improvements, which in turn 
boosts economic growth.  
2.4 HUMAN CAPITAL AS A SOURCE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Despite being regarded as a “proximate” cause of economic growth by 
Acemoglu (2008), human capital as a source of growth is a topic that has attracted 
persistent interest among academics and policymakers for several decades. As the 
second and third studies of the thesis explicitly deal with issues relating to human 
capital, we provide  a brief overview of its definition, components, and relationship to 
economic growth in this section.  
Research on human capital was pioneered by works such as Lewis (1954), 
Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961), Becker (1962), and Ben-Porath (1967). These authors 
emphasise that, unlike physical capital, human capital cannot be immediately obtained 
in the form of a final good. Ben-Porath (1967) notes that the creation of human capital 
is a task that an individual must undertake himself. Undertaking investments in human 
capital, typically in youth, causes an individual to forego potential earnings, but 
acquiring human capital enables her to enjoy higher earnings later in life. Such 
individual investments in human capital contribute towards improving the aggregate 
stock of human capital, which enables an economy to achieve a higher growth rate of 
output. However, such positive externalities are not taken into consideration by 
individuals, resulting in underinvestments in human capital (Stark, 2004). 
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Such positive externalities lie at the heart of endogenous growth theory. For 
instance, in Romer’s (1986) model, long run growth is endogenously determined by 
the accumulation of knowledge. Later on, Lucas (1988) introduced a model in which 
long run economic growth was determined through human as well as physical capital. 
Generally, these authors used a production function of “AK” type to introduce non-
diminishing returns to scale. By considering the term K to be a composite of both 
human and physical capital, these authors argued that the positive externalities 
emanating from investments in human capital, as well as physical capital, could 
generate sustained long run economic growth (Pack, 1994). Stemming from the 
attention paid to the centrality of human capital for economic growth by these 
pioneering authors, it has been the subject of large number of studies including Tamura 
(1991), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Tallman and 
Wang (1994), and more recently Arcalean and Schiopu (2010), and Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2012). 
Given the key role played by the individual in the creation of human capital, the 
production process associated with its formation is one that is non-standard (in 
comparison to the traditional production functions that depict the production of 
standard consumption goods), and characterised by considerable complexity. The 
plethora of factors governing the production of human capital is captured in the 
following definition of the human capital production function provided by Ben-Porath: 
“The technology which the individual faces when he makes decisions about 
investing in himself is a complicated system of technical and institutional 
relationships covering a wide spectrum of activities including formal 
education, acquisition of skills on the job, child care, nutrition, health, etc…” 
(1967, p. 359) 
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Much of the early work on human capital equated it to education and training. 
For instance, Mincer (1958) refers to it as training required to perform a particular job. 
Despite adopting such a narrow definition to facilitate simplicity of analysis, there has 
always been a consensus among researchers that the concept of human capital involves 
much more than education and on the job training. This is patently illustrated by 
Becker (1994) who notes that human capital refers to a person’s knowledge, abilities, 
state of health and values which, as opposed to physical or financial capital, cannot be 
separated from the owner. 
However, Becker (2007) notes that when compared to the plethora of studies on 
human capital dealing with education and training, the studies focusing on health form 
a relatively small volume of literature. Nevertheless, as this thesis consists of 
explorations of both health and education, some further exploration regarding the 
importance of health as a form of human capital is believed to be warranted.  
In the original framework for studying investments in human capital pioneered 
by economists like Gary S. Becker and Yoram Ben-Porath, improvements in 
knowledge and skills through investments in human capital entail a cost to the 
individual in terms of time and consumption expenditures. However, such investments 
improve a person’s market and non-market productivity, thereby enabling her to obtain 
a higher wage and produce more goods for household consumption. Although Becker 
(1964), for instance, claimed that his framework, which was developed with a 
particular focus on on-the-job-training, could be used to analyse investments in 
alternative types of human capital, Grossman (1972) argued that health capital is 
different from knowledge and skills in that it affects the amount of time a person can 
spend in income generating activities. He therefore maintained that investments in 
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health cannot be studied within the traditional framework developed for studying 
human capital, and developed an alternative model for studying investments in health. 
Delving further into the characteristics of health as a form of human capital, it 
comprises of the characteristics of both a consumer good and a producer good. Health 
is a producer good because it leads to improved labour productivity, which contributes 
towards higher economic growth, and in turn, improvements in technology (Stevens, 
1977). However, good health is also an end in itself as it adds to a person’s utility. For 
instance, in Grossman’s (1972) model for the demand for health, this dual nature of 
health is captured by assuming that health affects the individual’s preferences; poor 
health is a form of disutility. Concurrently, it acts as a producer/invesment commodity, 
because it is a determinant of the total number of days the individual might be unwell 
and unable to work, and as a result it affects his income. Health may affect growth 
directly or have an indirect impact on growth by influencing educational outcomes 
(Hazan & Zoabi, 2006). 
Nevertheless, health and education are intrinsically related, as both are “joint 
investments made in the same individual” (Mushkin, 1962, p 130). The notion that 
they are joint investments might induce one to assume that the causality between health 
and education is bi-directional. However, the view that education leads to better health 
rather than the other way around seems to have emerged in the literature over time 
(see, for example, Mirowsky and Ross 1998, and Cipriani and Blackburn, 2002). 
Regardless of the causality of this relationship, they are both equally important forms 
of human capital. Perhaps the best embodiment of the equal importance of both health 
and education is the Human Development Index, which measures the progress of a 
country along three equally weighted dimensions: health, education, and income 
(Beraldo, Montolio, & Turati, 2009). The bulk of this thesis is grounded in the view 
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that both of these types of human capital can contribute to economic growth and also 
determine how inequality in an economy evolves over time.  
2.5 INEQUALITY: PATTERNS, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
When exploring the distribution of income across countries, there are two 
dimensions of divergence that are often emphasised. The first is the idea of β-
divergence, which captures the fact that the growth rates of poor countries have 
remained lower than those of their richer counterparts (Sala-i-Martin, 2002). The 
second is σ-divergence, which refers to the observation that inequalities in the 
distributions of incomes between countries have increased over time (Sala-i-Martin, 
2006). However, inter-country income differences do not constitute the only 
dimension that is worthy of exploration in a discussion of inequality. Neither is income 
inequality the only type of inequality that deserves attention. Hence, in this section, 
we provide a brief discussion of inter and intra-country inequalities in income and 
wealth as well as the inequalities that prevail in other aspects such as human capital 
accumulation and land.   
The dynamics of the world income distribution is a topic that has received 
substantial attention in the recent macroeconomics literature. According to Quah 
(1997), the world income distribution changed from a unimodal distribution in the 
1960s to a bimodal one by the 1990s. Using data for the period 1960-1988, C. I. Jones 
(1997) also confirms this gradual polarisation of the world income distribution. As 
noted in Section 2.2, a twin-peaked global distribution of income supports the idea of 
convergence clubs, as countries cluster around one of the peaks, leading to the 
formation of two groups of countries—one rich and the other poor, which is associated 
with greater 𝛽-divergence. In contrast however, Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) suggest 
that the world income distribution has remained fairly stable since 1960. Although 
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neoclassical growth literature attributes such stability to diminishing marginal 
products and technological spillovers, these authors suggest that international trade 
could also be a channel for stabilisation of incomes. Export prices decline in countries 
that accumulate capital faster, which results in a fall in the returns to capital, as a result 
of which capital accumulation in those countries reduces. However, such capital 
accumulation enables such countries to import more, which causes the returns to 
capital in other countries to increase, resulting in greater capital accumulation 
elsewhere, and the susequent decline in the returns to capital in those countries as well. 
These international trade induced diminishing returns to capital contribute towards 
stabilising the world distribution of income.  
We now discuss how income distribution evolved in some individual countries. 
In the case of the USA, the distribution of income remained fairly stable from the 
1940s to the 1970s. This relative stability of the income distribution resulted in 
researchers paying less attention to issues relating to inequality during this period 
(Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997). However, from the 1970s to the 1990s, there was an 
exacerbation of income inequality in the US, which could be mainly attributed to 
differentials in earnings attached to education and experience.  
Reiterating this observation, Picketty and Goldhammer (2014) point out that 
from the mid-1980s onwards, income inequality in the US rose rapidly, with the labour 
income earned by the top income decile rising from around 30-35% of national income 
in the 1970s to around 40-50% by the 2000s (p.298-299). Commenting further on the 
reasons for such an exacerbation of income inequality the the US, Goldin and Katz 
(2009) observe that the wage gap between graduates and workers with only a high 
school education diminished until the 1970s, only to record a steep increase after the 
mid-1980s. Around the same time that this change occurred, there was a slowdown in 
 Chapter 2: Related Literature 48 
the number of people completing a university education. In a context where tertiary 
education is unaffordable to many, the continued demand for highly skilled workers 
coupled with stagnant supply caused a rise in the wages commanded by educated 
workers, and inequality increased as a result. Hence, the increase in income inequality 
in the US is primarily attributable to inequalities in the accumulation of human capital. 
Such experiences demonstrate the need to establish more egalitarian education 
systems.  
A similar increase in income inequality was also seen in the UK, Canada, Japan, 
Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands during this period (Gottschalk & Joyce, 1998). 
Furthermore, an increase in income inequality was oberved in Russia in the period 
following the introduction of free market reforms (Akhmedjonov, Lau, & İzgi, 2013). 
Such disparities in income, attributable to a large number of factors, such as 
differences in human capital, infrastructure, and attitudes of regional governing bodies, 
can also be observed between different states in India (see Ghosh, Ghoshray, & Malki, 
2013, and references therein).  
In contrast, however, between 1976 and 1993, the income Gini coefficient in 
South Korea fell by 27%, implying that miracle growth also concurrently led to a 
marked reduction in inequality (Fields & Yoo, 2000). The primary reason provided by 
these authors for this observed decline in income inequality is the reduction in the 
wage premium attached to higher educational levels and job tenure and the reductions 
in the gender wage gap. Such experiences point at the possibility that higher economic 
growth and lower income inequality can be achieved concurrently.  
In a broad investigation of income distributions within and between countries, 
Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) decompose world income inequality into inter and 
intra-country components, and make overall comparisons between inter and intra-
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country inequalities for five continents: Asia, Africa, Western Europe, North America 
and Oceania, and Eastern Europe. In Asia, they find that inter-country inequality 
accounts for a greater proportion of overall inequality in the region than intra-country 
inequality, while in Latin America and Africa, the contribution made by inter-country 
inequality is quite small in comparison to the big intra-country inequalities that pervail.  
For the transition economies of Eastern Europe the two types of inequality seem to 
posit a similar contribution towards overall inequality. In the case of North America 
and Western Europe, both inter and intracountry inequalities are quite low. 
Given that income inequality is inextricably linked to economic growth, the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth is also an issue that has 
enjoyed sustained interest among development and macroeconomists for over half a 
century. One of the earliest explorations of the relationship between economic growth 
and income inequality was undertaken by Kuznets (1955), who observed an increase 
in the rate of economic growth and a concurrent reduction in income inequality in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Germany since the 1920s. The Kuznets curve 
suggests that income inequality would increase during the early phases of 
development, remain stable for some time, and then start to decline as the economy 
reaches an advanced state of development.5 The Kuznets curve paved the way to a 
large volume of literature dedicated to exploring the link between economic growth 
and income inequality. Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) reveal that there is evidence 
to support the presence of a Kuznets curve for a number countries including England, 
Sweden, Germany, France, Columbia, and Brazil. In contrast, there is evidence of a 
continuous decline in inequality in Norway, the Netherlands, South Korea, Japan, and 
Taiwan. In general, the literature is inconclusive about the relationship between 
                                               
5 Kuznets (1955) refers to this process as a “long swing” rather than an inverted U shape. 
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economic growth/development and income inequality; while some studies have 
identified an inverse U-shape, others have unearthed positive, negative, or 
inconclusive relationships (see Shin, 2012 for a detailed discussion). 
Income inequality may be characterised by persistence. An early exploration of 
such persistent income inequality was undertaken by Kuznets (1955), who showed that 
in the United States, the top income decile undertook almost all of the household 
savings. He pointed out that higher savings would enable richer households to hold 
more income bearing assets, thereby potentially leading to a persistence of income and 
wealth inequality across time and generations. An interesting explanation for the 
persistence of such inequalities in income across generations is provided in a 
theoretical model developed by Durlauf (1996). In this framework, the neighbourhood 
parents select to live in exerts an important influence on the education, and hence, 
income of their offspring. Under the assumption that education funding is determined 
through a majority vote, the children of parents located in more affluent 
neighbourhoods that allocate more funds for education will become more educated and 
productive due to a positive “neighbourhood externality”, while others will be less 
educated, resulting in the persistence of income inequality across generations. 
However, the persistence of income inequality may be the result of government policy.  
The initial distribution of income can be a major determinant of how poverty and 
inequality in an economy evolves over time (Ravallion, 1997). However, Deininger 
and Squire (1998) empirically demonstrate that the initial distribution of land—which 
can be a proxy for the initial distribution of assets—is more strongly related to 
subsequent growth than the initial distribution of income. In particular, they show that 
an initial unequal distribution of assets reduces the economy’s ability to achieve 
subsequent growth. They provide two potential explanations for this observation. 
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Firstly, agents possessing less assets are unable to obtain credit to make economically 
viable investments in activities such as education, which is evident from the 
observation that high initial land inequality leads to lower subsequent educational 
attainments among the population of a country. The other is a political economy 
explanation, whereby an individual’s holdings of assets affects her ability to participate 
in the voting mechanism. This is also evident from the observation made by the authors 
that in democratic regimes, initial asset inequality is not a significant determinant of 
subsequent growth.  
Much of the recent growth literature has focused considerable attention towards  
providing explanations for the similar persistence of inequalities in human capital 
across generations. Given the broad definition of human capital adopted throughout 
this thesis, persistence of human capital inequality could occur when the offspring of 
educated parents acquire higher levels of education, while offspring of uneducated 
parents remain uneducated themselves, or when good/poor health persists across 
generations. The extant literature suggests numerous mechanisms through which such 
persistence of inequalities in human capital manifest themselves. For instance, 
Castelló-Climent and Doménech (2008) demonstrate that low parental human capital 
reduces the life expectancy of their offspring. Their lower lifespan discourages the 
children of poor agents from investing in education, as a result of which these dynasties 
remain trapped in a state of poverty. Another explanation for persistent human capital 
inequality is provided by Galor and Zeira (1993), who suggest that in the presence of 
indivisibilities in human capital investment combined with credit market 
imperfections, wealth inequality affects human capital investment and thereby 
economic growth in the long run.  
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A number of studies have also suggested that the initial distribution of wealth in 
a country may be the primary cause of such persistent inequalities in human capital. 
Studies such as Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Ray and Streufert (1993), Deaton 
(2003), and more recently, Chakraborty and Das (2005), Das (2007), Sarkar (2008),  
and McDonald and Zhang (2012) demostrate that inequalities in the distribution of 
income and wealth could lead to unequal investments in human capital, which in turn 
could lead to a persistence of income and wealth inequality in across generations. 
In particular, inequalities in wealth or human capital can affect an economy’s 
growth trajectory through the political economy process. The political economy 
process is the means by which the interests of different individuals in society can be 
incorporated into policy decisions (Persson & Tabellini, 1994). The preferences of 
individuals regarding policies are typically often dependent upon their income, wealth, 
or human capital. Hence, the distribution of income and wealth in the economy could 
be a major determinant of political economy decisions upon which the economy’s long 
run outcomes hinge. For instance, Alesina & Rodrik (1994) develop an endogenous 
growth model in which taxation on capital is determined through majority voting to 
demonstrate that under a more equitable distribution of capital the median voter would 
be better endowed with capital, and a lower rate of capital taxation prevails in the 
economy, which accelerates economic growth. 
Whether inequality supports or hinders growth is a question that has attracted 
considerable attention in the growth literature. There is mixed evidence in both the 
theoretical and empirical growth literature regarding this direction of causality. For 
instance, a notable theoretical contribution in this regard is the study by Galor and 
Moav (2004), where they use a unified growth model to show that in the early stages 
of development, when the accumulation of physical capital drives economic growth, 
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wealth inequality leads to a rise in savings, which translates into the accumulation of 
physical capital, thereby leading to higher economic growth. However, given a 
complementarity between capital and skills, this expansion of the capital stock 
encourages investments in human capital. In the later stages of the development 
process, when human capital becomes the key driver of growth, however, a more equal 
distribution of income and wealth is needed to encourage credit constrained 
individuals to undertake optimal investments in human capital. Hence, their theory 
argues that in the early stages of development, inequality is conducive to growth, while 
in the later stages, when human capital replaces physical capital as the primary engine 
of growth, inequality may impede growth. Along a similar vein, Galor and Tsiddon 
(1997) observe that a child’s human capital is positively related to parental human 
capital, which they refer to as a home environment externality, while an economy’s 
technological process is accelerated by the average level of human capital, a process 
they refer to as the global technological externality. If the home environment 
externality dominates the global technology externality, polarisation of the distribution 
of human capital occurs, as a result of which the segments of society that initially 
possess higher levels of human capital undertake high investments in human capital, 
while those dynasties with lower stocks of human capital invest less on acquiring 
human capital. However, at the aggregate level, the economy’s average stock of human 
capital rises and this induces higher growth. This increase in the average stock of 
human capital ultimately causes the global technology externality to become 
dominant. By improving the returns to human capital, this reversal of impacts 
encourages the poorer members of society to invest more in human capital, ultimately 
leading to long run equality and prosperity.  
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However, some studies project the more pessimistic view that inequality may be 
a persistent, irreversible process. For instance, one argument suggests that in the 
presence of imperfect credit markets, the poor will not be able to borrow to invest in 
growth promoting activities. Given that the marginal product of capital is decreasing, 
this leads to a greater loss in output of the poor agents in an economy, thereby 
exacerbating inequality further and retarding growth (Ravallion, 2001). Empirical 
evidence in support of this inverse relationship between inequality and growth has 
been provided by, among others, Clarke (1995), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Birdsall 
and Londono (1997), and Lopez, Thomas, and Wang (1998). 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 This chapter provided a broad overview of some of the themes of direct and 
tangential relevance to the three studies that constitute this thesis. We looked at some 
cross country patterns of economic growth, explored a variety of causes of economic 
growth that have been suggested in the extant literature, looked at inequality primarily 
along the dimensions of income, wealth and human capital, and briefly discussed the 
intricate links between growth, human capital, and inequality. While this chapter is not 
meant to be a comprehensive survey of these macroeconomic issues, it provides an 
overall motivation of the ideas presented in the rest of the thesis.
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 Technical Change, 
Variable Elasticity of 
Substitution and economic 
growth 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is an important 
determinant of an economy’s long run performance. Ever since de La Grandville 
(1989) used a CES production function to demonstrate that a country with a higher 
elasticity of substitution could achieve a higher rate of economic growth and a higher 
value of income per capita at steady state, there has been a considerable increase in the 
volume of research, both theoretical and empirical, on this theme (see, for instance, 
Karagiannis et al., 2005; Klump & De La Grandville, 2000; Klump & Preissler, 2000; 
Mallick, 2010, 2012b; Miyagiwa & Papageorgiou, 2007; Palivos & Karagiannis, 2010; 
Yip & Xue, 2013; Yuhn, 1991). 
In what was perhaps the earliest empirical study on the elasticity of factor 
substitution, Arrow et al. (1961) observed that factor substitutability can vary between 
industries and across countries. More recently, this view has been expounded by a 
number of studies that have concluded that the elasticity of factor substitution, 
typically assumed constant in standard growth models, could instead be an endogenous 
variable related to the level of economic development of a country (see, for example, 
Miyagiwa & Papageorgiou, 2007). For instance, Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) use 
cross-country data to show that generally, richer countries have an elasticity of factor 
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substitution above 1, while poorer countries have an elasticity of factor substitution 
below 1. Most extant studies that have explored the way in which the elasticity of 
factor substitution could impact on the long run behaviour of the economy have used 
the CES production function, first discussed in Solow (1956). In the CES production 
function, the value of the elasticity of substitution remains constant across different 
input combinations and over time. Hence, it cannot take into account the variations in 
the elasticity of substitution estimates revealed in the studies referenced above.  
The variety of estimates for the elasticity of factor substitution available in the 
CES literature is suggestive of a possible mis-specification of the underlying 
production function, which creates the need to consider alternative, more flexible 
production functions that can capture the differences in factor substitutability between 
developed and developing countries and between different industries that are revealed 
in the extant literature. In this regard, the variable elasticity of substitution (VES) 
production function, first discussed by Sato and Hoffman (1968) and Revankar (1971), 
is an appealing alternative to the CES production function. Much of the properties and 
dynamics associated with the VES production function are determined by a technology 
parameter labelled 𝑏. The value of this parameter is a crucial determinant of a number 
of key features of the economy such as capital intensity, the direction of technical 
change, and the share of capital in output. Through the technical change it generates, 
this parameter relates the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital linearly 
to the capital stock per worker. Positive values of 𝑏 result in an elasticity of substitution 
above 1, while negative values lead to an elasticity of substitution below 1. Thus, the 
elasticity of substitution is endogenous, in that it is driven by the parameter 𝑏 and the 
economy’s capital-labour ratio. Differences in the value of this parameter may 
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therefore provide a potential explanation for the empirically observed differences in 
the elasticity of factor substitution between countries and industries.  
The empirical relevance of the VES form has been demonstrated in a number of 
studies that have suggested that the VES production function can be a better 
specification than the CES production function. For instance, in the case of urban 
housing construction, where there are considerable variations in the ratio of land to 
non-land inputs, authors such as Sirmans, Kau, and C. F. Lee (1979) and Färe and 
Yoon (1981) show that assuming a VES production function allows the elasticity of 
substitution between land and non-land inputs to depend on relative land intensity, and 
results in a better specification when compared to other forms of production function. 
Using data for Japan covering the period 1878-1938, Bairam (1989) demonstrates that 
the capital-labour ratio, as well as the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour increased during this time, suggesting that the VES form is the correct 
functional specification of the production function for the Japanese economy during 
this period. Using data on Indian manufacturing industries, Kazi (1980) demonstrates 
that the elasticity of factor substitution varies between industries, and that assuming a 
CES production function leads to an upward bias of the estimate of the elasticity of 
substitution, and thereby concludes that the VES production function is the correct 
functional specification to account for these variations in factor substitutability. 
Despite the appealing properties and empirical relevance of the VES production 
function, it has received limited attention in the theoretical growth literature. To the 
best of our knowledge, within the theoretical literature exploring the long run 
macroeconomic outcomes associated with the elasticity of substitution, there have 
been only two studies that employed the VES production function. The first is by 
Karagiannis et al. (2005), who incorporate a VES production function into an 
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otherwise standard Solow-Swan model and demonstrate that an economy can display 
unbounded growth if the elasticity of factor substitution exceeds a certain minimum 
value. The other is a paper by Brianzoni, Mammana and Michetti (2012), who consider 
the VES production function in the context of a discrete time one sector Solow–Swan 
growth model with differential savings and demonstrate that small values of the 
elasticity of substitution, resulting from negative values of the parameter 𝑏, could 
result in the emergence of complex dynamics. 
In view of the interesting features and empirical relevance of the VES production 
function, the first aim of this paper is to explore the properties of the VES production 
function in greater depth. This exercise enables us to discuss the properties of the VES 
production function in the context of a number of stylised features of economic growth 
that have been observed in the recent literature. Secondly, the VES production function 
is applied to an otherwise standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations (OLG) 
model. This analysis is warranted because extant theoretical applications of the VES 
production function mentioned in the preceding paragraph apply it in the context of 
the Solow-Swan model. The overlapping generations model, by taking into account 
the life cycle aspects of a consumer’s utility maximising problem, possesses the ability 
to provide potentially deeper insights into long run outcomes and transitional dynamics 
than the Solow-Swan model. In contrast to the literature on the CES production 
function, which concentrates on the various macroeconomic effects associated with 
the elasticity of substitution, this paper focusses on the effects upon the long run 
behaviour of the economy created by the technology parameter 𝑏 and investigates a 
hitherto unexplored aspect of the VES production function, which is the manner in 
which the technical change generated by this parameter impacts on the mechanisms of 
growth.   
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This exploration of the properties of the VES production function reveals a 
number of interesting results. It demonstrates that the technology parameter 𝑏 
influences the marginal products of capital and labour capital differently, with the 
marginal product of capital rising in the value of 𝑏, while the marginal product of 
labour is falling in it. By influencing relative marginal products, the parameter 𝑏 
determines the direction of technical change in the economy. A higher value of  𝑏 leads 
to capital biased technical change by raising the relative marginal product of capital.6 
We are also able to show that a higher value of the parameter 𝑏 is associated with 
steeper long run expansion path, implying that it leads to a higher capital intensity in 
production.  
The VES production function is also a flexible functional specification that can 
potentially provide an explanation for the movements in factor shares experienced by 
many countries by tracing them back to changes in the technology parameter 𝑏. Figure 
3.1 below shows that the labour share in output has displayed considerable movements 
in different countries. Countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Australia 
have experienced an upward trend in the labour share in recent years, while nations 
that were significantly affected by the global financial crisis, such as Greece and 
Ireland, have seen noticeable declines in labour share in recent times.   
                                               
6 As per the definitions presented in Acemoglu (2002), capital biased technical change is identified by 
a rise in the marginal product of capital to relative to the marginal product of labour. Ceteris paribus, 
this would alter the optimal input mix towards the utilisation of more capital. In equilibrium, however, 
outcomes depend not only on this ratio (which is the marginal rate of technical substitution), but also 
the ratio of prices of these two inputs. 
  
 Chapter 3: Technical Change, Variable Elasticity of Substitution and economic growth 60 
 
Figure 3.1: Movements in the labour shares in selected countries since 1991  
          Source: ILO (2014)  
Noticeable movements in aggregate factor shares within and across countries 
such as those seen in Figure 3.1 have been observed by a number of authors (see, for 
instance, Acemoglu, 2003; Boldrin, 1995; Durlauf, 1995; Gollin, 2002; Solow, 1997; 
Young, 2010). However, despite evidence of such diversity in the movements of 
labour shares, recent research such as Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), F. Rodriguez 
and Jayadev (2010), ILO (2013), and OECD (2012b), that cover a large number of 
countries, suggests that there has been a global decline in labour share.7 8 Adding to 
such observations, Piketty and Goldhammer (2014) warn of the extent of the potential 
increases in the share of capital of income by noting that, “It is quite possible that 
                                               
7 For a current and comprehensive discussion about the declining trend in the global labour share, we 
direct the reader’s attention to pages 67-74 of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). 
 
8 The findings of these recent studies are in contrast to the observations in Acemoglu (2003), who uses 
US and French data for the periods 1929-1997 and 1913-1997 and argues that, despite considerable 
movements, factor shares have remained fairly constant in these countries. The assumptions of a Cobb-
Douglas production function and labour augmenting technical change are both consistent with 
Acemoglu’s observations. However, the more recent evidence presented in the studies cited above 
motivates a further exploration of these issues. 
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capital’s share will increase in coming decades to the level it reached at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century.” (p. 223). In the VES production function, a higher value of 
the parameter 𝑏 is associated with a declining share of labour in output. Hence, the 
VES form provides a possible explanation for the decline in labour share experienced 
by many countries by attributing it a rise in the value of the parameter 𝑏.9 
Upon exploring these features of the VES production function, we proceed to 
apply it to a Diamond OLG model. We are able to show analytically that for positive 
values of the technology parameter 𝑏, which lead to elasticity of substitution which is 
greater than 1, the economy always reaches a unique and stable steady state. When 
0b , which results in an elasticity of factor substitution that is between 0 and 1, the 
economy could either be characterised by no non-trivial steady state, or two steady 
states, of which one is stable and the other is not. However, when 0b , the range of 
values of the capital stock per capita in which the VES production function displays 
standard properties of a production function is bounded from above. Hence, under the 
assumption of a VES production function, the Diamond model could display three 
possible growth trajectories: monotonic convergence towards a stable steady state, the 
emergence of a poverty trap, or a movement towards the upper bound of the per capita 
capital stock.10 Therefore, in our model, conditional convergence towards a unique 
                                               
9 The literature referenced in the paragraph attributes the decline in labour share to technological change, 
the falling price of investment goods, increased globalisation, developments in the financial sector, and 
the deterioration of labour market institutions and the welfare state. However, the assumption of a VES 
production function explains the falling share solely in terms of the capital biased technical change 
captured by a higher value of the parameter 𝑏. 
 
10 Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2003), who apply a normalised CES production function to an 
otherwise standard Diamond model, show a similar result. However, in their model, the dynamics are 
directly linked to the (constant) elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, and hence, entail 
an interpretation that differs from our results. In our model, the dynamics are driven by the biased 
technological change created by the parameter 𝑏. 
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steady state like that observed in the context of a standard Solow-Swan model is not 
inevitable.  
We also prove that the steady state capital stock is falling in the technology 
parameter 𝑏, but that steady state output is positively related to it. Hence, a higher 
value of the parameter 𝑏 is associated with greater productivity at steady state. This 
outcome demonstrates that although a higher value of 𝑏 is associated with greater 
capital intensity, the equilibrium quantity of capital per worker used is determined by 
marginal products, as well as market prices. Hence, capital-biased technical change 
does not necessarily imply that more capital will be used in equilibrium. In fact, in our 
model, capital biased technical change is manifested at steady state through the ability 
of the economy to produce a higher output with less capital per worker.   
In the presence of competitive factor markets, the reward for each factor is equal 
to its marginal product. Given that a higher value of the technology parameter 𝑏 is 
associated with a higher marginal product of capital and a lower marginal product of 
labour, it leads to an exacerbation of inequality. This worsening of inequality is an 
artefact created by the heterogeneity intrinsic to the Diamond model, viz factor shares 
associated with capital and labour are owned by different agents—the old and the 
young respectively. The benefits of capital biased technical change generated through 
a higher value of 𝑏 then accrue to the old, who are the owners of capital.11  
Rather than merely exploring the link between the elasticity of factor substitution 
and economic growth that has been the central objective of many extant studies, the 
aim of this paper is to explore how the parameter 𝑏 impacts on the optimal capital 
                                               
11 According to Irmen and Klumpp (2009), a higher elasticity of substitution is also likely to lead to 
higher intergenerational inequality in the case of the CES production function, although the result can 
be more explicitly demonstrated in the context of a VES production function. 
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intensity in the economy, the rewards and relative marginal products of factors, the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, and thereby the economy’s 
transition dynamics and productivity in the long run. Such a shift in focus is 
necessitated firstly by the fact that 𝑏 has a direct impact on the direction of technical 
change in the economy, and secondly because the elasticity of factor substitution is an 
endogenous variable driven by this parameter. As such, our study is related to the idea 
of directed technical change put forward by Acemoglu (2002). The use of the VES 
further provides the advantage of greater tractability relative to CES, in addition to the 
flexibility implied by the endogeneity of the elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, the 
explicit exploration of how changes in factor substitutability stemming from the biased 
technical change created by the parameter 𝑏 can impact on intergenerational inequality 
also contributes to an aspect that has received sparse attention in the extant literature. 
The rest of the essay is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides a discussion 
of the VES production function and its properties, the model and analysis is provided 
in Section 3.3 and the chapter concludes with Section 3.4. A number of proofs and 
derivations are given in the Appendices. 
3.2 THE VES PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND ITS PROPERTIES 
The VES production function was introduced by Sato and Hoffman (1968) and 
Revankar (1971).  Many of the properties of the VES production function have been 
established by Karagiannis et al. (2005). We first provide a detailed discussion of these 
properties before moving on to discuss the dynamics created by the VES production 
function in the context of a Diamond overlapping generations model. 
In this paper the form of the VES production function proposed by Karagiannis 
et al. (2005), which is expressed as:  
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    aa abKLAKY 1
      (3.2.1) 
In (3.2.1) above, 0  is the returns to scale parameter and 0A  captures 
Hicks-neutral technological change. In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the 
production function displays constant returns to scale so that 1 and we also assume 
without loss of generality that .1A   Being the exponent of 𝐾, the parameter 𝑎 can be 
considered as the “pure” share of capital in the production function. The parameter 𝑏, 
as we will see shortly, is an important technology parameter that impacts on the 
direction of technical change in the economy.  
The VES form embeds three special cases. In equation (3.2.1), when 1a , the 
VES production function takes the Harrod-Domar fixed coefficients form, more 
commonly known as the AK form, as output is linearly related to the stock of capital. 
Similarly, when 0a , output is linearly related to the quantity of labour. Finally, 
when 0b , the VES production function takes the Cobb Douglas form, and for this 
reason, it is regarded as a generalised form of the Cobb Douglas production function.12  
The intensive form of the production function, where 
L
Yy  and ,
L
Kk   can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
    aa abkkkfy  11
      (3.2.2) 
The parameters must conform to the range 10  a , and if 0b , the per capita 
capital stock is bounded from above such that .1
b
k   These restrictions are 
necessary to ensure that the VES form is characterised by the standard properties of a 
                                               
12 The fact that this particular form of the VES production function is a Cobb Douglas generalisation 
adds to its analytical tractability, and is one of its most appealing properties (Bairam, 1989). 
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production function. First note that   0' kf  and   0'' kf  are standard properties 
of the intensive form production function. These derivatives are as follows:  
 
 
 
 aa
'
abkk
bka
kf



 1
1
1
      (3.2.3)  
and, 
       12'' 11   aa abkkaakf      (3.2.4) 
From (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) above, we can see that the standard properties of a 
production function, which are   0' kf  and   0'' kf , are satisfied only when 
.10  a 13 Furthermore, for the condition   0' kf  to be satisfied when ,0b we 
need ,1
b
k   which is always satisfied since the capital stock in any given period 
must be real and positive. When 0b , this condition is satisfied if .1
b
k  14  
Note that (3.2.3) above is the marginal product of capital  KMP . By 
differentiating (3.2.1) with respect to L, we get the marginal product of labour  LMP  
which is: 
   
 
a
L
abk
k
a
L
Y
MP 










1
1
    (3.2.5) 
 
                                               
13 Although the inequality signs should technically be strict in this instance, as explained below, we 
include equality in order to incorporate the special cases of perfect substitutes and the Harrod-Domar 
fixed coefficient.  
 
14 Note that this range is different to that given in Karagiannis et al. (2005), who do not take into account 
the effect on the inequality created by the negative sign in front of 𝑏. Revankar (1971), on the other 
hand gives the range correctly, although it is expressed differently from ours.  
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The value of 𝑏 affects the marginal products of labour and capital differently. 
From equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.5) we have: 
Lemma 1: A higher value of 𝑏 is associated with a lower marginal product of 
labour but a higher marginal product of capital.  
While it is clear from (3.2.5) that that LMP  is monotonically decreasing in 𝑏, 
we show in Appendix A that KMP  is always increasing in 𝑏. Since KMP  is rising in 
𝑏 and LMP  is falling in 𝑏, a higher value of 𝑏 is associated with a steeper isoquant. As 
will be demonstrated shortly, this has important implications for the direction of 
technical change, as a higher value of the parameter 𝑏 is associated with capital biased 
technical change. In a competitive market, the price of each factor will be equal to its 
marginal product. Thus, 𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 𝑤 and 𝑀𝑃𝐾 = 𝑟, where 𝑤 and 𝑟 are the wage and 
interest rates respectively. Therefore, a higher elasticity of substitution, caused by a 
higher value of 𝑏 is associated with a lower reward for labour and a higher reward for 
capital. As mentioned in the Introduction, this observation has important implications 
for intergenerational inequality in the context of a Diamond model, where the stock of 
capital is owned by the old generation while the young generations supply labour in 
return for a wage. This is a consideration we will return to in Section 3.3.  
The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, which we denote with 
σ, is given by the formula 
 







L
K
MP
MP
d
L
Kd
ln
ln
 . In the VES production 
function the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is: 
 bk 1         (3.2.6) 
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From equation (3.2.6) above, we can see that when 𝑏 > 0, the condition 
b
k 1  
must be satisfied to ensure that 0 . On the other hand, when  𝑏 < 0, the required 
condition is 
b
k 1 . These conditions are analogous to those identified earlier as 
necessary for a positive first derivative. 
Note that the value of σ rises with the capital-to-labour ratio if 𝑏 > 0 and falls if 
𝑏 < 0.15 Therefore, in the VES production function, the value of σ changes along a 
given isoquant. As the capital-labour ratio is constant along a particular ray from the 
origin drawn through a map of isoquants, this feature implies that, for a particular value 
of 𝑏, the elasticity of substitution will be identical only at points along a ray from the 
origin (Revankar, 1971). This feature is in contrast to the CES production function in 
which σ remains constant at all points on an isoquant map. To illustrate these features, 
in Figure 3.2 below, we plot the isoquants associated with different values of 𝑏 when 
the value of the parameter 𝑎 is 0.5, given an output of 10 units. From the intensive 
form of the VES production function given in equation (3.2.2) it is evident that output 
is monotonically increasing in the value of 𝑏. In terms of the isoquant, this implies that 
a higher value of 𝑏 enables the firm to produce a particular level of output with less 
inputs, resulting in the isoquant shifting inwards as the value of 𝑏 rises, as shown in 
Figure 3.2.16 This inward shift of the isoquant resulting from a higher elasticity of 
                                               
15 This strict monotonicity in the behaviour of  with respect to capital intensity is considered to be a 
shortcoming of the VES production function (Bairam, 1989). 
 
16 In the CES literature, the technique of normalisation, which was introduced by de La Grandville 
(1989), is usually employed to ensure that isoquants relating to different values of the elasticity of 
substitution share a common point of tangency, which allows one to analyse the pure effects of the 
elasticity of substitution upon growth. No normalisation of the VES production function is carried out 
in this paper, because, rather than a narrow focus on the dynamics created by the elasticity of 
substitution, our objective is to explore the dynamics of growth generated by the parameter ,b which 
influences a number of features of the economy, of which the elasticity of substitution is only one.   
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substitution is a characteristic the VES and the CES production functions share in 
common.17 
 
Figure 3.2: VES Isoquants associated with different values of b  given 10Y and 5.0a  
 
Another interesting feature of the VES production function is that capital is the 
essential input in the production process: i.e. 𝑌 = 0 when 𝐾 = 0. On the other hand, 
when 𝑏 > 0, even when 𝐿 = 0, a positive level of output can be produced as long as a 
positive quantity of capital is employed in production. As is evident from Figure 3.2, 
this feature results in the isoquant having an intercept on the capital axis when 𝑏 > 0. 
                                               
17 Extant theoretical studies utilising the VES, such as Karagiannis et al. (2005) and Brianzoni et al. 
(2012) do not use any normalisation technique in their studies either. Note that the particular variant of 
the VES production function we consider is a Cobb-Douglas generalisation. CES generalisations of the 
VES production function do exist (see, for instance, Kadiyala, 1972; Lu & Fletcher, 1968), although 
they have remained in relative obscurity in both the theoretical and empirical spheres, possibly due to 
their complicated nature. Normalising such production functions may be possible, and is a potentially 
fruitful avenue for future research in the area. 
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While assuming one input is essential may appear restrictive, interpreting our capital 
term as a composite input comprising of both human and physical capital like in Romer 
(1986) is more plausible from a practical point of view.  
However, as demonstrated by Karagiannis et al. (2005), this essential input 
feature causes one Inada condition to be violated.18 As shown by these authors, the 
limiting properties of the VES production function are as follows:  
When 𝑏 > 0, 
lim
𝑘→0
𝑓(𝑘) = 0, lim
𝑘→∞
𝑓(𝑘) = ∞, lim
𝑘→0
𝑓′(𝑘) = ∞ and lim
𝑘→∞
𝑓′(𝑘) = 𝐴(𝑎𝑏)1−𝑎  (3.2.7) 
When 𝑏 < 0, 
lim
𝑘→1 |𝑏|⁄
𝑓(𝑘) =
𝐴(1−𝑎)1−𝑎
|𝑏|𝑎
 and lim
𝑘→1 |𝑏|⁄
𝑓′(𝑘) =
𝐴(1−𝑎)1−𝑎
|𝑏|𝑎
   (3.2.8) 
Hence, the per capita capital stock in any given period is strictly bounded from 
below when 𝑏 < 0. The essential input feature of the VES production function causes 
one of the Inada conditions to be violated, as it means that even when labour 
approaches zero, the economy can produce a positive level of output.  
We have already seen that the parameter 𝑏 is instrumental in determining the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the VES production function. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in contrast to the CES literature, where the 
discussions are generally centred around the elasticity of substitution σ, in this study, 
we shift our attention to 𝑏. In order to understand the mechanism underlying the 
influence the parameter 𝑏 exerts on the value of the elasticity of substitution, the 
                                               
18 This result is further confirmed by Irmen and Maußner (2014) who establish that the Inada 
conditions hold only when both inputs in the production function are essential. 
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manner in which 𝑏 affects the direction of technical change in the economy must be 
explored. For this purpose, the shares of labour and capital LS  and KS are given below: 
 
abk
a
y
w
Y
wL
SL



1
1
       (3.2.9)  
abk
abka
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SK



1       (3.2.10) 
It is evident from equation (3.2.9) that a higher value of the technology parameter 
𝑏 causes the share of labour to fall. On the other hand, from equation (3.2.10), the 
derivative of the capital share with respect to the parameter 𝑏 is given by 
 
 21
1
abk
aak


, 
which is always positive. As mentioned in the Introduction, recent growth literature 
suggests a global decline in the share of labour in total output. Therefore, in terms of 
the VES production function, such a decline in the share of labour, and a concurrent 
increase in the share of capital, can be attributed to an exogenous rise in the value of 
the technology parameter 𝑏.   
After having looked at how factor shares are affected by 𝑏, we next note that 
capital intensity is not fixed. Rather, it is optimally chosen by a firm or economy 
conditional on input prices and the production plan. To look at how the value of 𝑏 
influences capital intensity, we obtain the economy’s long run expansion path by 
minimising the cost function associated with producing a certain level of output .Y  
Thus, for given factor prices 𝑤 and 𝑟, we minimise total cost: 
 rKwLC          (3.2.11) 
Subject to the constraint: 
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  aa abKLKY  1
       (3.2.12) 
Solving this problem yields the following long run expansion path: 
b
r
w
a
a
r
w
L
K



1
       (3.2.13) 
We can see from (3.2.13) that a higher value of the parameter 𝑏 is associated 
with a higher capital to labour ratio and thereby a steeper long run expansion path. In 
other words, a higher elasticity of substitution yields greater capital intensity in 
production. This result can be expected because it was shown earlier that a higher value 
of 𝑏 causes KMP  to rise and LMP  to fall. Hence, a higher value of 𝑏 naturally 
encourages firms to substitute labour with capital, which is the relatively more 
productive input. Furthermore, as noted previously, capital is the essential input in the 
production process. Therefore, we observe that as the value of 𝑏 rises, firms prefer to 
raise the quantity of capital, which is also the essential input in the production process. 
We have seen that the value of the parameter 𝑏 is a key determinant of the 
optimal capital-to-labour ratio/capital intensity in this economy. Hence, the parameter 
𝑏 influences the value of the elasticity of substitution in two ways: directly, by 
appearing on the right hand side of equation (3.2.6) above, as well as indirectly, by 
acting as a determinant of the capital per worker/capital intensity 𝑘. Thus, a higher 
value of 𝑏, while leading to a higher elasticity of substitution in its own right, also 
exerts a secondary incremental effect on the elasticity of substitution by contributing 
towards greater capital intensity.  
It is also worth commenting on the fact that higher value of the parameter 𝑎 is 
also associated with a higher capital to labour ratio. The greater capital intensification  
 Chapter 3: Technical Change, Variable Elasticity of Substitution and economic growth 72 
associated with this parameter lends support for our earlier interpretation of it as the 
“pure” share of capital in the production function.  
Acemoglu (2002) suggests that under the assumption of a CES production 
function, even in the presence of an abundant supply of capital, as long as the elasticity 
of factor substitution is above a threshold value which falls between 1 and 2, the 
rewards to capital would rise, leading to capital-biased technical change. To explore 
what connotations the VES form holds for the direction of technical change, we define 
the factor bias as per Acemoglu (2002), who defines it as the ratio of marginal 
products. Hence, for the VES form, the capital bias, denoted by  , is given by: 
 








 b
ka
a
MP
MP
L
K 1
1
       (3.2.14) 
From equation (3.2.14), it is clear that   is falling in the capital intensity 𝑘, as 
would be expected due to the substitution effect, which yields a negatively sloped 
relative demand curve for capital (Acemoglu, 2002), but it is rising in the parameter 
𝑏. Hence, equation (3.2.14) demonstrates that a higher value of the parameter 𝑏 leads 
to capital biased technical change, which can be interpreted as a situation where an 
exogenous increase in the value of 𝑏 enables an economy to produce more output with 
the same amount of capital. This has some interesting and profound implications upon 
the long run behaviour of the economy, which are explored in the next section, where 
we present the model and discuss its dynamics.  
Many extant studies assume that the elasticity of substitution is an exogenous 
determinant of the technical change in the economy (Mallick, 2012b), and only a few 
studies, such as Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2007) and R. W. Jones (2008), have 
explored the issue of endogeneity of the elasticity of factor substitution. The VES 
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production function connects with the latter view, as the elasticity of substitution is a 
result of the directed technical change created by the value of the parameter 𝑏. Further 
to this point, it often concurred that distinguishing between the impacts associated with 
the elasticity of substitution and those resulting from non-neutral technical change may 
be difficult, particularly when the elasticity of substitution is different from 1 (see 
León-Ledesma, McAdam, & Willman, 2010, and references therein). However, 
assuming that the economy is characterised by a VES production function removes 
this fuzziness by presenting a clear cause and effect relationship between non-
neutral/biased technical change and the elasticity of substitution, as the capital biased 
technical change emanating from a higher value of 𝑏 leads to a rise in the elasticity of 
substitution in this instance. 
The connection between capital deepening, the elasticity of substitution, and the 
share of capital created by the parameter 𝑏 is of empirical relevance. For instance, 
Rodrik and Chen (1998) observes that East Asia experienced capital deepening and a 
simultaneous rise of the share of capital in total production over the decades of fast 
economic growth the region experienced, and points out that the growth literature often 
attributes these effects to either the higher elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital or labour saving technical progress. However, such observations are typically 
made under the assumption that the underlying production function takes the CES 
form, which, as mentioned in the Introduction, cannot capture the endogeneity and 
variability of the elasticity of substitution highlighted in many studies. If, according to 
authors like Kazi (1980) and Bairam (1989), the VES form is indeed the correct 
functional specification of the production function, the contention of the CES 
literature—that capital deepening and a higher capital share are consequences of a 
higher elasticity of substitution—may be spurious and should therefore be viewed with 
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caution. The alternative interpretation provided by the VES production function is that 
capital deepening, a higher share of capital in output, as well as a higher value of the 
elasticity of substitution are all the results of a higher value of the parameter 𝑏. 
Having seen that 𝑏 is an important technology parameter that determines the 
direction of technical change, the optimal capital-to-labour ratio and size of input 
shares, this discussion is incomplete without inquiring into what this parameter might 
represent. Essentially, it can be considered an institutional parameter that encapsulates 
a number of factors that might affect the direction of technical change in the economy. 
In the case of the CES production function, Mallick (2012b) provides a comprehensive 
treatment of the determinants of the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour, noting that “…the possible determinants of σ are technological progress, 
innovations, financial and other institutions, openness to trade, degree of unionisation, 
and the country’s inclination towards socialist ideas.” (p. 685). While the factors that 
that determine the value of σ in the CES production function are likely to be analogous 
to the characteristics the parameter 𝑏 represents, the fact that the parameter 𝑏 affects 
factor shares, factor intensity, and the direction of technical change warrants some 
further discussion on this matter.  
 C. I. Jones (2005) notes that a country can achieve a high elasticity of 
substitution only if it has access to the appropriate technology to support such a choice. 
Hence, a higher value of 𝑏 primarily captures a technology that enables greater 
substitution between capital and labour. However, as a higher value of 𝑏 leads to 
capital biased technical change, government policy relating to investment is likely to 
be an important determinant of the value of 𝑏. Government policy could sometimes 
distort the direction of investment and create an artificial bias towards one factor. For 
example, Yuhn (1991) points out that, in the 1970s, the South Korean government’s 
 Chapter 3: Technical Change, Variable Elasticity of Substitution and economic growth 75 
tax policy led to massive investments in capital, which raised the capital per worker. 
In the context of the VES production function, such a change could be captured 
through a higher value of 𝑏. Typically, the ideals of the ruling party may affect the 
value of 𝑏 and thereby the direction of technical change in the economy. Usually, 
conservative political parties might encourage capital-biased technical change by 
encouraging investments that raise the relative price of capital, while more liberal 
political parties that favour equity are unlikely to advocate a decline in the labour share 
and would thereby discourage capital-biased technical change. Moreover, Macpherson 
(1990) shows that the size and density of trade unions is positively related to the share 
of labour. Powerful trade unions could exert pressure on governments and the private 
sector to maintain the share of labour in production at an artificially high level, thereby 
preventing a decline in wages created by a falling share and marginal product of labour. 
In the context of the VES production function, this contributes towards a reduction of 
the value of 𝑏.  
 Having discussed the properties of the VES production function, and explored 
the role and importance of the parameter 𝑏 in determining a number of key features of 
the production side of the economy, we apply the VES production function to a 
Diamond model in the next section.  
3.3 THE VES PRODUCTION IN A DIAMOND OVERLAPPING 
GENERATIONS MODEL 
We consider a standard two period overlapping generations model where the 
agent works during youth and spends her old age in retirement. Population in each 
period is normalised to 1. Time is discrete and is given by t=0,1,2,…. The utility of an 
agent born at time 𝑡 is given by:  
   ,cβucuU ttt 1  10        (3.3.1) 
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In (3.3.1) above, the consumer derives utility from youthful consumption tc  and 
old age consumption 1tc . The parameter β is the discount factor.  
In youth, the agent supplies one unit of labour and earns a wage tw  which she 
utilises on consumption tc  and savings ts . The agent finances old age consumption 
1tc  with her savings which accumulate a gross interest of 1tR . She faces the 
following budget constraints in youth and old age respectively: 
 ttt wsc          (3.3.2) 
 ttt sRc 11           (3.3.3) 
The agent’s utility maximisation problem yields the following standard FOC: 
      1
'
1
'
 ttt cuRcu         (3.3.4) 
If we assume log utility such that    ii ccu ln  for 1,  tti ; we get the 
following optimal solutions for consumption in both periods and savings: 
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The intensive form production function for this economy is given by: 
  at
a
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1
1        (3.3.8)  
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During youth the agent supplies a single unit of labour within a competitive 
labour market and receives a wage tw  such that: 
   
 
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The gross rate of return on capital is given by: 
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Using the fact that ,sk tt 1  we can now derive the evolution of the per capita 
capital stock for this economy which is given by: 
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At steady state, kkk tt 1 . Therefore, the steady state capital stock is defined 
by the following implicit equation: 
   
 
0
1
1
1
1





β
aβ
kabk
aa
      (3.3.12) 
 The details of stability analysis carried out by linearising equation (3.3.11) and 
using equation (3.3.12) are provided in Appendix B. This analysis yields the following: 
Proposition 1: When 0b , the steady state is always unique and stable. 
Our analysis in Appendix B shows that the steady state is unique and stable for 
𝑏 > 0. Nevertheless, since the VES production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form 
when 𝑏 = 0, and it is well-known that the Cobb-Douglas  always yields convergence 
towards a stable steady state in the Diamond  model, we can conclude that as long as 
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long as 𝑏 ≥ 0, an economy characterised by a VES production function always 
converges to a stable steady state.  
When 𝑏 < 0 there are three possible outcomes: there could be no non-trivial 
steady state, there may be a single stable steady state, or there could be two steady 
states, of which one is stable and the other is not. The number of non-trivial steady 
states depends on the value of 𝑎 such that when 
2
1a , one or two non-trivial steady 
states always exist. However, when 
2
1a , either there is one non-trivial steady state, 
or it may be possible that there is no non-trivial steady state. 
Proposition 1 is rather similar to the result obtained by Miyagiwa and 
Papageorgiou (2003), who demonstrate that in the context of a standard two period 
Diamond model with a normalised CES production function, for ,1 there is a 
unique steady state capital stock while for 1  there can be two or no steady states. 
Like in Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2003), in the case of the VES form, a positive 
value of 𝑏, which results in 1 , is always associated with a unique and stable steady 
state.  
The fact that the per capita capital stock has an upper bound of 
b
1  has 
important implications on the economy’s long run growth trajectory in that it 
completely blocks the possibility of unbounded growth. Our analysis in Appendix B 
reveals that the parameter 𝑎, which was interpreted earlier as the pure share of capital 
in the production function, is a crucial determinant of the existence and the number of 
steady states. We are able to show that when 2
1a , the economy may have one or 
two steady states. If only one steady state exists, we demonstrate that it is a stable one. 
If two steady states exist, we demonstrate in Appendix B that only the lower value of 
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the two is stable. Given the upper bound on the per capita capital stock, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.3 below, if the economy starts off with an initial capital stock 
which is above the unstable steady state value, its capital stock will continue to grow 
until the upper bound is reached.   
 
  
Figure 3.3: Growth trajectory when initial capital stock is above 
*
k 2  
 
On the other hand, when 
2
1a , the economy could either have a single stable 
steady state, or it may be characterised by no non-trivial steady state value, which takes 
a value below 
b
1 . If a non-trivial steady state does not exist, it implies that the 
economy converges to the trivial steady state at 0k . In other words, the economy 
falls into a poverty trap in the long run, implying that a negative value of ,b  when 
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coupled with a value of a  below ,
2
1  could have a potentially detrimental impact on 
the economy. 
Thus, in summary, a negative value of 𝑏 presents three possible trajectories for 
the economy: it could fall into a poverty trap, converge towards a stable steady state, 
or achieve the upper bound of capital stock. The upper bound on the capital stock 
suggests that an economy to achieve unbounded growth. However, recall that the AK 
form is a limiting case of the VES production function that occurs when 1a . As 
discussed, for instance, in Romer (1986, 1987) and Lucas (1988), when one adopts a 
broader interpretation of capital to include both human and physical capital, the AK 
form can yield unbounded growth in the Diamond model. Hence, the ability of an 
economy to achieve unbounded growth under the assumption of a VES production 
function crucially depends on the value of the parameter 𝑎  
In relation to other related extant literature, our results are different from those 
of Klump and Preissler (2000), who demonstrate that when the CES production 
function is applied to a Solow-Swan model, the resulting steady state is always unique 
and stable. Furthermore, our results also differ from the findings of Karagiannis et al. 
(2005) who show that when the VES production function is applied to a standard 
Solow-Swan model, the economy could display unbounded endogenous growth for 
the case 𝑏 > 0 if the condition   nbasA a 1  is satisfied, where 𝑠 is the savings rate, 
A  is an exogenous technological parameter and n is the rate of population growth. 
These authors note that when the elasticity of factor substitution is greater than 1, and 
hence, the marginal product of capital is bounded from below, it is possible for the 
economy to display unbounded endogenous growth. On the other hand, when 𝑏 < 0 
Karagiannis et al. (2005) show that the economy could either reach a unique steady 
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state when   nbasA a 1  or reach a corner solution where b/k 1  when 
  .nbasA a 1 19 A possible reason for the differences in the outcomes may emerge 
from the use of different frameworks. While in the Solow-Swan model, a fixed 
proportion of output per capita is saved, in the Diamond model with logarithmic 
preferences, the agent saves a fixed proportion of wage income. Although labour is the 
non-essential input in the VES production function, within an overlapping generations 
framework with logarithmic preferences, the accumulation of capital—which is the 
essential input—entirely depends on the wage received by the agent. Hence, these 
dynamics could introduce instability into the system. 
Next we present another proposition, the proof of which is supplied in Appendix 
C: 
Proposition 2: For any non-trivial, locally stable steady state, the per capita 
capital stock ?̅? is falling in the value of the parameter 𝑏. However, for any feasible 
steady state, regardless of whether it is stable or not, steady state output ?̅? is rising in 
𝑏. 
Proposition 2 shows that there is a pronounced benefit accruing to an economy 
due to a higher value of 𝑏 as it enables the economy to achieve a higher output per 
worker at steady state with a lower capital stock. This result ties up with, and in fact 
accentuates, the capital biased technical change created by a higher value of 𝑏, which 
was discussed in detail in Section 3.2. While capital biased technical change would 
typically mean that the economy can produce more output with the same amount of 
capital as before, at steady state, the capital bias caused by a higher value of the 
                                               
19 An observation overlooked by Karagiannis et al. (2005) is that when ,b 0  the expression   abasA 1  
takes a complex value, and the economy may therefore be incapable of achieving a steady state at all.  
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parameter 𝑏 actually allows the firm to produce more output using less capital per 
worker. Proposition 2 is similar in spirit to Klump and De La Grandville (2000), who 
demonstrate that under the assumption of a CES production function, a higher 
elasticity of substitution enables the economy to produce a higher level of output per 
capita. This result also supports the idea put forward by Kazi (1980), who argues that 
a low elasticity of factor substitution might be a reason for slow growth and 
development in many developing economies. However, as discussed in the 
Introduction, the elasticity of factor substitution can vary between industries belonging 
to a particular industry too. Given such heterogeneity within a particular economy, 
Kazi (1980) suggests that the economy’s productivity would rise if investments are 
geared towards industries with a higher value of factor substitutability.  
However, it is important to note that in Section 3.2, we demonstrated that a 
higher value of 𝑏 results in a steeper long run expansion path, implying that the capital 
stock per capita increases. This can be referred to as the intensification effect. At the 
same time, it results in an inward shift of the isoquant, implying that an economy 
characterised by higher value 𝑏 could produce a given level of output with less capital 
and labour, resulting in a productivity effect. At steady state, a higher value of the 
technology parameter 𝑏 results in the economy producing a higher output with a lower 
steady state capital stock, implying that the productivity effect dominates over the 
intensification effect.  
 Another interesting observation in our study relates to intergenerational 
inequality. As shown in Section 3.2, in the VES production function, KMP  is 
increasing in 𝑏  while LMP  is falling in it. In the presence of competitive factor markets, 
factor rewards are KMPr  and LMPw   respectively. In the context of a standard 
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Diamond model, where the young agents supply labour in return for a wage and the 
old agents are the owners of capital. Hence, the ratio ,
L
K
MP
MP
  which was 
defined earlier as the capital bias, is also a measure of intergenerational income 
inequality. Furthermore, from equations (3.3.5) and (3.3.6), the ratio of the 
consumption of the old to that of the young is given by: 
  11
1 1 
  tt
t
t kfββR
c
c
      (3.3.13) 
From Lemma 1, we know that  1 tkf  is increasing in 𝑏, implying that a higher 
value of 𝑏 exacerbates intergenerational consumption inequality too. Hence we have: 
Proposition 3: Intergenerational income and consumption inequality are rising 
in the value of .b  
Therefore, in this economy, the higher output per capita associated with a higher 
value of 𝑏 comes at the cost of higher inequality. In fact, Proposition 3 provides a 
potential explanation for the possible divergence in inequality created by increases in 
the returns to capital suggested by Piketty and Goldhammer (2014). In the context of 
our model, the capital biased technical change created by a higher value of 𝑏 leads to 
a redistribution of relative factor rewards in favour of the owners of capital, thereby 
exacerbating inequality.  
Delving further into the mechanism behind this outcome, in the case of the CES 
production function, Irmen and Klump (2009) distinguish between three effects arising 
due to a change in the elasticity of substitution: the efficiency effect, distribution effect 
and acceleration effect. In the context of the normalised CES production function, the 
authors define the efficiency effect as the effect of the elasticity of substitution on 
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output, i.e.  
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝜎
. The distribution effect is defined as the effect of the elasticity of 
substitution on the share of capital in production i.e.
𝜕𝑆𝑘
𝜕𝜎
. The efficiency and distribution 
effects combine to create the acceleration effect, which is the way in which the 
elasticity of substitution affects the speed of capital accumulation in the economy. 
 In the case of the VES form too, similar effects are present, but they can be 
analysed in a more straightforward manner to manner relative to 𝑏. The efficiency 
effect in the VES form occurs when a higher value of 𝑏 directly results in a higher 
output for any given per capita capital stock and, as demonstrated in Proposition 2, it 
is also associated with a higher output per capita at steady state, i.e. 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝜎
> 0 and 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝜎
>
0. The distribution effect occurs because a higher value of 𝑏, through its impact on 
factor rewards and shares, causes a redistribution of factor incomes from labour to 
capital. The positive efficiency and distribution effects lead to a clear positive 
acceleration effect i.e. a higher value of 𝑏 improves the rate of capital accumulation in 
the economy. In contrast, in the case of the Diamond model with CES technology, as 
pointed out by Irmen and Klump (2009) with reference to the discrete time version 
Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2003) and the continuous time version by Irmen (2003), 
there is no guarantee of a positive acceleration effect. Even though the efficiency effect 
is always positive in the Diamond model, the decrease in the labour share resulting 
from a higher elasticity of factor substitution leads to a negative distribution effect. It 
may be possible that the negative distribution effect dominates the positive distribution 
effect, leading to a negative acceleration effect.  
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3.4  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we incorporate a VES production function into an otherwise 
standard Diamond model. We explore how the value of an exogenous parameter, 
labelled 𝑏, which affects the direction of technical change in the economy and is a 
determinant of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, affects the 
dynamics of growth. We observe that for positive values of the parameter 𝑏, which are 
associated with an elasticity of substitution between labour and capital that is greater 
than 1, the economy can always reach a unique and stable and steady state, which is 
feasible with the condition that the associated elasticity of substitution is positive. As 
such, when the value of 𝑏 is positive, the behaviour of the economy, both during 
transition and at steady state, is identical to that associated with the standard Solow 
growth model. On the other hand, for negative values of 𝑏, for which the elasticity of 
substitution is between 0 and 1, we show that the economy could either fall into a 
poverty trap where the capital stock per worker is zero, or there could be two steady 
states of which one is stable and the other is not. For negative values of 𝑏, there exists 
certain upper bound for the per capita capital stock, which implies that, if the 
economy’s initial capital stock is above the unstable steady state value, the capital 
stock would continue to grow until it reaches this upper bound and remain fixed at this 
level thereafter.  
We also observe that a higher elasticity of factor substitution enables the 
economy to produce a higher level of output at steady state with a lower per capita 
capital stock. These results lead to the conclusion that a positive value of the 
technology parameter 𝑏 yields multiple benefits upon the economy by ensuring a stable 
steady state and enabling it to achieve higher productivity. However, a higher value of 
the technology parameter 𝑏 entails an efficiency-equity trade-off, as intergenerational 
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inequality is rising in the value of this parameter. Hence, whether a higher value of the 
technology parameter 𝑏 can indeed be perceived as desirable depends on how one 
weighs the benefits accruing from a high elasticity of substitution in the form of 
efficiency and stability against the loss inflicted upon the economy due to the 
exacerbation of inequality.  
 A potential direction for future research would be obtaining cross-country 
estimates for the value of 𝑏 using non-linear regression techniques. Such estimates for 
individual countries could provide new cross-country estimates for the extent of 
capital-biased technical change experienced by countries, as well as estimates for the 
values of the elasticity of substitution for different countries, and supply rich insights 
into the heterogeneity in factor shares and rewards observed in practice. Some of the 
potential theoretical offshoots of this study include considering an alternative 
functional form of the VES production function in which labour is the essential input, 
and exploring the possibility of the political economy determination of an “optimal” 
value of 𝑏.
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 Public and Private 
Education Expenditures, 
Variable Elasticity of 
Substitution and 
Economic Growth 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given conventional wisdom regarding the positive externalities associated with 
education, its provision by the state is often regarded as desirable. In addition to the 
state, parents also play a critical role in educating their children. According to Article 
26 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights “parents have a prior right to 
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children” (T. James, 2004). 
Generally, most decisions about a child’s education, at least until the tertiary level, are 
made by parents.20 The importance of parental expenditure in financing children’s 
education is also highlighted by Becker (2009, pp.367-369) and Bräuninger and Vidal 
(2000), who note that in the presence of borrowing constraints, children cannot resort 
to the market to finance their education, and hence, have to rely on their parents for 
funding. This means that parental altruism is a key determinant of private education 
expenditure. Such private spending on education can exacerbate inequality, as more 
affluent parents can typically incur greater private expenditure on their children’s 
education. Hence, both public and parental educational expenses can have important 
                                               
20At the tertiary level, in some contexts, the presence of higher education income contingent loans, an 
arrangement that originated in Australia and was adopted by many other countries successfully over 
time (Di Gropello, 2012), enables a child to exercise considerable if not sole decision-making power 
relating to her educational choices.  
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implications on the accumulation of human capital in an economy. Therefore, in 
addition to considering the role of state provision, Glomm (1997) and Das (2007) note 
that a modelling construct exploring the macroeconomic impacts of education 
spending should ideally take into account the role played by parents in financing their 
children’s education.   
 Studying public and private expenditures in conjunction with one another 
naturally brings into play another dimension of relevance to this issue: namely the 
degree to which agents view these expenditures as substitutable or complementary to 
each other. Much of the extant theoretical literature exploring the public-private mix 
of education expenditures and its impact on economic growth and political economy 
outcomes typically assumes that the two types of expenditure are either gross 
substitutes or complements, and sparse attention has been paid to the issue of how 
variations in the degree of substitutability between the two types of expenditure can 
affect macroeconomic outcomes. For instance, a number of studies have explored the 
public versus private education divide (see Glomm & Ravikumar, 1992; Epple & 
Romano, 1996a; de la Croix & Doepke, 2004; Goldhaber, 1999, among others). These 
studies perceive publicly and privately funded education to be alternatives/substitutes 
to one another. On the other hand, private supplementation of publicly provided goods 
like education and health care, where public and private expenditures are regarded as 
complements, has been the focus of studies such as Epple and Romano (1996b) and 
Gouveia (1997). Another dimension of complementarity between public and privately 
funded education can emerge from an arrangement where publicly provided primary 
and secondary education is a prerequisite for undertaking tertiary education, which is 
privately financed, either by parents or through loans that students are liable to repay 
once they obtain employment. This arrangement has been explored in studies such as 
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Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Blankenau, Cassou, and Ingram (2007), and Arcalean 
and Schiopu (2010). 
 A possible reason for the paucity of research on the macroeconomic impacts 
associated with the degree of substitutability between public and private education 
inputs is the lack of empirical evidence relating to this issue (Bearse et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, Bearse et al. (2005) make a notable contribution to the theoretical 
literature on this subject by explicitly exploring the political economy ramifications 
associated with different values of the elasticity of substitution between public and 
private education inputs. These authors incorporate publicly and privately provided 
educational services into a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) education 
production function. For the special case of perfect substitutes, their model reveals that 
parents do not enrol their children in private schools at all. In the general CES case, 
they demonstrate that a higher elasticity of substitution between public and private 
education expenditures results in everybody selecting public schooling. However, as 
the relative efficiency of the private sector declines, although public school enrolment 
diminishes, agents vote for a higher tax rate to fund public education, resulting in 
higher public education expenditure per student. 
While Bearse et al. (2005) provide a number of interesting insights into the issue 
of substitutability between public and private education expenditures, especially the 
political economy outcomes, they do not specifically explore the associated long run 
macroeconomic impacts. Therefore, in this paper, our aim is to explore how the degree 
of substitutability between public and private education can affect the dynamics of 
human and physical accumulation, as well as optimal policy in an economy in the long 
run. To this end, we consider a three period overlapping generations model in which 
an individual’s adult age human capital is determined by the education she receives in 
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childhood and her parent’s human capital. Output in this economy is produced using a 
standard, constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function in 
which physical and human capital are the inputs. A key point of distinction in our 
model is that education is “produced” using a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) 
education production function in which the inputs are public and private expenditures. 
The VES specification, originally discussed in Sato and Hoffman (1968) and Revankar 
(1971), when applied to the context of education, provides a tractable functional form, 
in addition to having some appealing properties of relevance in the context of 
education. 
As will be discussed shortly, the VES construct allows exploration of how 
institutional and cultural factors can influence the elasticity of substitution between 
public and private education expenditures experienced by an agent, which in turn has 
an effect upon the specific combination of public and private education expenditures 
she chooses, and consequently, the economy’s performance in the long run. This 
means that the VES form contains an important channel for determining long run 
macroeconomic outcomes that is not present in the CES case.  
 Clarifying this point, in the CES production function, the degree of 
substitutability between two inputs, as measured by the elasticity of substitution, 
remains static across different combinations of the two inputs and over time. While 
this feature may be reasonable in the context of a standard production function with 
capital and labour as the inputs, in the case of an education production function, the 
elasticity of substitution between public and private expenditures can be conditioned 
by the extent to which people perceive these two types of expenditures to be 
substitutable for one another, as well as the mix of public to private expenditures. In 
order to gain a deeper insight into these considerations, take the case of South Korea, 
 Chapter 4: Public and Private Education Expenditures, Variable Elasticity of Substitution and Economic 
Growth 91 
where the cultural emphasis on educational attainment and the intense competition for 
admission to top universities has led to the development of a massive private tutoring 
industry in the country (Kim & J. H. Lee, 2010). Institutional and cultural factors have 
therefore resulted in South Korean parents perceiving supplementary tutoring to be a 
vital complement to publicly provided school education, which leads to a lower 
elasticity of substitution between public and private education inputs. However, in 
recent years, policy reforms, such as improving the quality of public schooling, giving 
individual schools greater autonomy, and setting national standards for public exams, 
have been implemented in South Korea in an effort to reduce the demand for private 
tutoring (C. J. Lee, H. Lee, & Jang, 2010). Such policy reforms have the potential to 
reduce parental expenditure on supplementary tutoring by impacting on parental 
perceptions about the extent of substitutability between public and private education, 
and in the context of the VES production function, such changes can alter the mix of 
public and private expenditures chosen by them.   
In the VES form, the institutional and cultural factors that influence the 
representative agent’s ability to substitute between public and private education 
expenditures can be captured by a parameter labelled 𝑏, which we refer to as the 
“aggregate substitutability parameter”, as the elasticity of substitution between public 
and private expenditures is positively related to this parameter. Therefore, in our 
interpretation, it captures the relative uniformity of public education in comparison to 
private education, with a higher value of 𝑏 being associated with a greater degree of 
uniformity between public and private education expenditures. This uniformity is 
intrinsically related to the quality of both inputs, given that they are only perceived as 
“uniform” if they are of comparative quality. The parameter is therefore an indicator 
of the quality of the education system.  
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In practice, a higher degree of uniformity between public and private education 
is likely to be observed in developed countries where both the public and private 
education sectors are likely to be of a high quality. Notice that in Figure 4.1 below, the 
least developed countries have a higher percentage of private enrolments at the 
secondary level. Relating this observation to our notion of aggregate substitutability, 
a potential explanation for this could be the possibility that the quality of the public 
education system in these countries is of a relatively poor quality, which encourages 
parents to enrol their children in private schools. Although enrolling children in private 
schools results in those parents opting out of the public system, we wish to emphasise 
to the reader that in the present exercise, public and private education are not 
considered to be completely independent alternatives for one another. Rather, we 
abstract from the two extremes of perfect substitutes and perfect complements in the 
context of the public and private education expenditures and use the VES form to pay 
attention to a range of intermediate values of the elasticity of substitution that fall 
between these two extremes. In almost every modern society, parents can choose 
between sending their children to a public school or private school. Furthermore, they 
can choose how much to spend on supplementing their children’s school education 
with privately provided education services. The aggregate substitutability parameter, 
which is at the heart of our model, can be interpreted as a weighted average of all these 
individual decisions, which in turn are influenced by many cultural and institutional 
parameters. In our model, the representative agent takes this aggregate substitutability 
parameter as given when she maximises her utility. 
 At this point, it is worthwhile recalling another characteristic of the VES form 
discussed in Chapter 3 previously, which is that one input is “essential” for production. 
In other words, whatever the degree of aggregate substitutability may be, no output 
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can be produced without this essential input. In contrast, the CES production function 
admits a similar feature only in the special case when the two inputs are perfect 
substitutes, in which instance the cheaper input is used for production. In the context 
of the present model, we view public education expenditure as the essential input.21 . 
Hence, in our model, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the agent cannot opt 
out of public education. The choice of public education as the essential input is driven 
by the fact that in most countries and regions, public sector involvement in education 
is relatively higher than private sector involvement.22 For instance, data on private 
school enrolment at the secondary level published by the UNESCO Institute of 
Statistics shows that in many countries, private enrolments account for a very small 
percentage of the total, suggesting that assuming public education to be the essential 
input is of empirical relevance. Further evidence to support this view is provided in 
Figure 4.1, which shows that despite considerable variations in the proportion of 
private school enrolment at the secondary level in different parts of the world, private 
enrolments are always below 50% of the total enrolments, implying that public 
education may indeed be the relatively more important input.23   
                                               
21 The motivation underlying this choice is discussed shortly. We also considered the alternative, 
somewhat counter-intuitive and counterfactual paradigm in which private education is the essential 
input. This analysis yielded some intuitively unappealing results in addition to indeterminacies with 
respect to certain ranges of parameter values. The results of this analysis are available upon request. 
 
22 There are exceptions however. In the UK, private school enrolment at the secondary level was 66% 
in 2013, despite the government spending on secondary education accounting for around 2.30% of GDP 
(World Bank, 2016). A possible explanation for this high private enrolment may be that a significant 
part of the public funding goes towards subsidising private education, which provides further motivation 
to our view that public expenditure on education is likely to be the essential input even in some countries 
where private enrolment is very high. 
 
23 According to our interpretation, private education expenditure is incurred by parents on education 
services provided by third parties during a child’s formal school years. It does not involve the time and 
opportunity costs involved with parents educating their children. Private education provided by parents 
at home, such as teaching a child to walk and talk and guiding them to adopt good manners is an essential 
part of a child’s upbringing, especially during the formative years of a child’s life. However, this type 
of education is not considered in our model.  
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Figure 4.1 Private enrolment as a percentage of total secondary school enrolment 
                 Source: World Bank data 
As regards the key results of our paper, we are able to analytically prove that 
higher aggregate substitutability between public education expenditures, as captured 
by a higher value of the parameter 𝑏, yields better long run outcomes, in terms of 
higher steady state stocks of human and physical capital per capita, and also enables 
the economy to transition towards the steady state faster. In our model, we restrict the 
range of values for the parameter 𝑏 to ensure interior solutions for the agent’s decision 
problem and that the elasticity of substitution between public and private education 
expenditures is always positive. Within this restricted range, we conduct stability 
analysis of the two dimensional discrete dynamical system formed by the human and 
physical capital accumulation functions. This stability analysis reveals that the 
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economy can display monotonic or oscillatory convergence towards a stable steady 
state or display oscillatory divergence and subsequently display cyclic behaviour.  
Given that in our model, all tax revenue goes towards the provision of public 
education, another interesting consideration is the manner in which the degree of 
substitutability between public and private education can affect political economy 
outcomes. To this end, we examine how the optimal tax rate is affected by the 
aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏. We are able to analytically demonstrate that the 
optimal tax rate is rising in this parameter, implying the presence of greater support 
for tax financed education in economies where agents perceive public and private 
education expenditures to be closely substitutable for one another. This outcome is 
quite similar in spirit to the higher per capita public education expenditure that results 
when the relative efficiency of the private sector diminishes in Bearse et al. (2005). 
As the aggregate substitutability parameter yields higher stocks of human and 
physical capital in this economy and also enables faster transitioning towards steady 
state, this suggests that an economy is likely to benefit from policies aimed at 
improving the degree of aggregate substitutability between public and private 
education expenditures. In countries where private education is regarded to be of a 
higher quality than public education, providing better public education improves the 
comparability between the two types of expenditures, which improves the range of 
educational choices available to individuals and reduces the need for private 
expenditures.  
The rest of this essay is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents the model, 
Section 4.3 looks at steady states and stability, Section 4.4 considers optimal policy, 
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and Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. Several proofs and derivations are supplied in 
the Appendices.  
4.2 THE MODEL 
We consider a three period overlapping generations model where an agent 
spends her childhood studying, works in adulthood, and spends her old age in 
retirement. In adult age, the agent gives birth to a single offspring. The population is 
normalised to unity in each period. Time is discrete and is given by t=0,1,2,… At time 
𝑡 = 0, each adult is endowed with 
0
h  units of human capital and 
o
k  units of physical 
capital. There is a representative firm producing a single good, and a government that 
raises revenue for the purpose of financing public education. 
4.2.1 Human capital and education 
Public education expenditure 
G
t
e  and private expenditure on education 
P
t
e  
combine to form a child’s stock of education .
t
e  The “education production function” 
takes a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) form as follows: 
      aGtPt
aG
tt abeeee


1
     (4.2.1) 
The following standard parameter restrictions as discussed in Revankar (1971) 
hold: 10  a , and 
be
e
P
t
G
t 1  when 𝑏 < 0.24 
In (4.2.1) above, as we mentioned previously, 𝑏 is a catchall parameter that 
affects the aggregate degree of substitutability between public and private education 
expenditures. The parameter 𝑎 can be interpreted as the “pure” share of public 
education in the education production function. We abstract from technological 
                                               
24 As will be shown, in addition to these standard restrictions, further restrictions need to be imposed 
on the value of 𝑏 in our model to ensure interior solutions for decision variables. 
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progress in the education production function for simplicity and also assume that the 
education production function is characterised by constant returns to scale. It can be 
seen that when ,0G
t
e  .0te  Hence 
G
t
e  can be considered the essential input in the 
education production function. 
 The elasticity of substitution between private and public expenditures is: 
  






P
t
G
t
e
e
b1        (4.2.2) 
Note that in (4.2.2), if ,0b  1  and if ,01  b  .10   We can see that 
the agent’s elasticity of substitution between private and public education expenditures 
is positively and linearly related to the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏. Further, 
the elasticity of substitution is also impacted by the ratio of public to private education 
expenditures, with an increase in this ratio leading to a rise in the elasticity of 
substitution if 𝑏 is positive, and a reduction in the elasticity of substitution if 𝑏 is 
negative. As there is no empirical evidence regarding the link between the ratio of 
public-private expenditures and the degree of substitutability between them, the VES 
form allows the flexibility to explore both of these possibilities by varying the value 
of 𝑏. 
 The human capital production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, with 
education acquired in childhood and parental human capital forming an adult’s stock 
of human capital 1th  as follows: 
  ,1

ttt heh     ;1,0   1    (4.2.3) 
In (4.2.3), parental human capital affects the child’s human capital directly 
through the inclusion of parental human capital in the human capital formation 
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equation, as well as indirectly through education, as higher human capital enables the 
parent to earn more, thereby making it possible for the parent to invest more in her 
child’s education. We make the assumption of increasing returns to scale in the 
accumulation of human capital like in Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) and also abstract 
from time spent studying in order to improve analytical tractability.  
4.2.2 Production 
 Production in this economy follows a Cobb Douglas functional form with 
human and physical capital as the inputs like in Boldrin (2005), and takes the following 
intensive form: 
    1ttt hky        (4.2.4) 
The competitive interest rate and wage rate per unit of human capital are given 
by: 
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From (4.2.6) above, an adult’s earnings in period t  is her wage per unit of human 
capital 
t
w  times her stock of human capital th  which is accumulated according to 
(4.2.3). 
4.2.3 Government 
 The government imposes a proportional tax  in each period on the adult 
agent’s earnings to finance public education expenditure and runs a balanced budget. 
Hence,  
  
tt
G
t
hwe         (4.2.7) 
4.2.4 The agent’s problem 
 The agent’s utility at time t  is given by:  
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       221   ttt hvcucuU   , ,10    .0   (4.2.8) 
The agent derives utility from consumption in adulthood 
1t
c and consumption in 
old age .
2t
c  In old age, the agent also derives utility from her child’s human capital 
.
2t
h   is the discount factor. The parameter   is the product of the discount factor   
and another “warm glow” parameter, which measures the satisfaction a parent receives 
from her child’s human capital.  
 This agent faces the following budget constraints in adulthood and old age 
respectively: 
  
   111111 ttt
P
tt hwsec
    (4.2.9) 
  
122 

ttt
sRc        (4.2.10) 
According to (4.2.9) above, in adulthood, the agent inelastically supplies 
1t
h
units of human capital, and receives a wage of 
1t
w  per unit of human capital supplied. 
The government levies a proportional tax of  on her labour income to finance public 
education. Hence, her after tax income is  .111  tt hw  She utilises her after tax 
income on consumption ,
1t
c  private expenditure on her child’s education 
P
t
e
1
 and 
savings .
1t
s  According to (4.2.10), in old age, the agent uses her savings that have 
accumulated a gross real return of 
12
1


tt
rR to finance her consumption .2tc   
 Thus, the agent’s utility maximisation problem involves maximising (4.2.8) 
subject to (4.2.9) and (4.2.10). This yields the following FOCs: 
     2
'
11
'
  ttt cuRcU       (4.2.11) 
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     2
'
1
'
  tt hvcU        (4.2.12) 
(4.2.11) is the standard consumption Euler equation that captures the fact that 
the consumer cannot improve her utility by shifting consumption between periods 
when she maximises utility. (4.2.12) captures the idea that investing in her child’s 
education causes the agent to forego utility from adult age consumption in order to 
enjoy a higher utility from her child’s stock of human capital in old age. When the 
agent maximises utility, the marginal cost of a unit of private education spending in 
terms of the foregone adult age consumption should be equal to the marginal benefit 
the agent enjoys in terms of the additional human capital her child acquires.  
4.2.5 Competitive equilibrium 
 A competitive equilibrium in this environment is a sequence of consumption, 
savings and private education expenditure   

t
t
P
tttt
escc
01121
,,,  chosen by the agent that 
satisfies the FOCs (4.2.11) and (4. 2.12), taking factor prices  represented by (4.2.5) 
and (4.2.6) as given; a sequence of input and output choices   

t
tttt
hky
0,
,  made by the 
representative firm according to (4.2.4) so as to maximise profits, taking factor prices 
and government policy as given; a sequence of factor prices   

t
ttt
wr
0
,  as given by 
(4.2.5) and (4.2.6), such that the markets for physical and human capital clear; and a 
sequence of government policies   

t
tt
G
t
e
0
,  such that the government’s budget as given 
by (4.2.7) in each period is balanced.  
Assuming logarithmic preferences, equations (4.2.13) to (4.2.16) below are the 
optimal solutions to the agent’s decision problem.  
  
 
 a
abhw
c ttt


 
11
111
1      (4.2.13) 
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    
  






 
a
aba
hwe tt
P
t
11
111
111


   (4.2.14) 
  
 
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abhw
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
11
1
11
1
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     (4.2.15) 
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
11
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     (4.2.16) 
Let 
 


a
m


1
 and 
  
 
.
a
a
n





1
11
 Interiority of the above solutions 
occur only in the range .nbm   However, in any given period, the elasticity of 
substitution between public and private education inputs η, given by equation (4.2.2), 
should be bounded from below so that 𝜂 > 0. Hence, the above range of values for b  
needs to be modified to incorporate this constraint. Given  the 
range of values of 𝑏 necessary to ensure interiority and a positive elasticity of 
substitution between public and private inputs is: 𝑝 < 𝑏 < 𝑛. A detailed derivation of 
this range is provided in Appendix F. The analyses presented in the remainder of the 
paper assume that the parameter 𝑏 conforms to this range. 
         From (4.2.14), we can see that as long as 
 
 
,
1
1





a
a
b  public education 
expenditure crowds out private education spending. This is because a higher value of 
the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 means that there is a greater degree of 
similarity between private and public education inputs in terms of access and quality. 
Thus, as indicated by equations (4.2.13) to (4.2.16), a higher value of the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏 causes the agent to undertake lower private investment in 
education, causing consumption in both periods and savings to rise. Hence, from 
(4.2.8), we have: 
 
  
,
1
1




p
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Proposition 1: A higher value of 𝑏 results in a higher utility for the agent. 
 The intuition behind Proposition 1 lies in the idea that a higher value of the 
aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏, which impacts the elasticity of substitution 
positively, implies that private education spending is a closer substitute for public 
spending. This reduces the incentive for a parent who already supports the public 
education system by paying a mandatory tax to undertake private expenditure. 
Typically, parents would be keen to undertake more private expenditure on education 
only if private education services can augment a child’s learning experience because 
they are of a superior quality to public expenditure, implying a lower degree of 
substitutability between the two inputs. In such an instance, private education services 
play a critical role in enhancing and augmenting the child’s stock of education, and 
parents would therefore be keen to spend on such services in order to compensate for 
the low quality of public education their children receive. Therefore, when aggregate 
substitutability is high, the lower private education expenditure that results enables 
agents to undertake higher consumption and savings, leading to a higher level of utility 
from consumption during both adulthood and old age, thereby resulting in a higher 
lifetime utility.  
4.3 STEADY STATE AND STABILITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we first derive and explore the behaviour of the steady state 
values of per capita physical and human capital. Then we explore the dynamic 
properties of the model and the conditions under which the steady state is stable. 
4.3.1 Steady state analysis 
 First, note that savings in period 𝑡 + 1 are used to build the stock of physical 
capital in period 𝑡 + 2. Hence, in general equilibrium,  
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         (4.3.1) 
Using equation (4.3.1), and setting  the physical capital 
accumulation equation is: 
      
1
1111
1
2 , ttttt hjkhkk     (4.3.2) 
Similarly, using (4.2.3), the human capital accumulation function is:  
    
          aattttt jahkhkh   11111122 11,     (4.3.3) 
(4.3.2) and (4.3.3) constitute of a two-dimensional system of non-linear first 
order difference equations. A steady state equilibrium of this system is a pair of values 
 hk,  such that and .12 hhh tt    The steady state stocks of physical and 
human capital are therefore given by: 
  (4.3.4) 
  (4.3.5) 
 Before exploring the stability of this non-linear system, we examine the manner 
in which the steady state stocks of human and physical capital are affected by the value 
of the parameter 𝑏. The following proposition captures how the value of the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏 impacts on the steady state stocks of human and physical 
capital: 
Proposition 2: A higher value of b enables an economy to reach a higher steady 
state level of physical and human capital.  
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 Note that 𝑗 is monotonically increasing in 𝑏. As it is evident from equations 
(4.3.4) and (4.3.5) that the steady state stocks of human and physical capital are 
monotonically rising in 𝑗, it follows that they are also increasing in 𝑏.  In the case of 
the conventional CES production function typically embedded in growth models, a 
higher elasticity of substitution between labour and capital has been demonstrated 
theoretically and empirically as a means of achieving a higher output per capita (see, 
for instance, Irmen, 2011; Karagiannis et al., 2005; Klump & De La Grandville, 2000; 
Mallick, 2012a). Proposition 2 is a somewhat heuristic extension of this notion, in that 
a higher elasticity of substitution between public and private education expenditures 
impacts an individual’s stock of human and physical capital positively, thereby 
yielding a higher output per capita. As is evident from the education production 
function given by equation (4.2.3), the agent’s stock of education, and thereby human 
capital, is increasing in the aggregate substitutability parameter. In terms of physical 
capital, a higher elasticity of substitution means that it is easier for an agent to 
substitute between public and private education. This means that a given level of 
human capital can be achieved with lower private spending, thereby enabling agents 
to save more in adulthood as is evident from equation (4.2.15), which shows that 
savings are increasing in the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏, which yields a 
higher stock of physical capital in the next period. This implies that the economy can 
enjoy a bigger stock of physical capital at any given level of human capital, and this is 
made clear if we look at how the ratio of physical to human capital at steady state is 
affected by the value of the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏. Dividing (4.3.4) by 
(4.3.5) gives us the ratio of physical to human capital, which is given by:  
        (4.3.6)   




 1
11
jh
h
k
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As ℎ̅ is monotonically increasing in 𝑏, it is clear that  is also increasing in the 
aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏. Thus, higher aggregate substitutability between 
public and private education expenditures causes the stock of physical capital to rise 
relative to the stock of human capital in steady state. A possible explanation for this 
could be gleaned by considering the choice a parent has between investing in her 
child’s education and saving to finance old age consumption. When the value of the 
parameter 𝑏 is higher, the return to private education expenditures is lower, which 
encourages people to undertake more savings, which causes the stock of physical 
capital to rise relative to human capital.  
4.3.2 Stability analysis 
Now, we analyse the stability of the system characterised by (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) 
which is of the form )(
1 tt
XX 

 where 






h
k
X . We use the methods for studying 
the stability of non-linear first order discrete dynamical systems described in Galor 
(2007). First, we lag the two dimensional system characterised by equations (4.3.2) 
and (4.3.3) by one period, and we then employ a Taylor series expansion to linearise 
them around the steady state, which enables us to rewrite the system in the following 
form: 
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Upon evaluating the partial derivatives at the steady state values and substituting 
them into (3.7) and (3.8), and also setting      aa jal  111   , the linearised 
system in matrix form can be expressed as follows: 
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We have now approximated our original non-linear two-dimensional discrete 
dynamical system with a new system which is linear around the steady state that 
conforms to the form ,1 BAXX tt  where A is the Jacobian matrix of ϕ(X) evaluated 
at the steady state X . The eigenvalues of A  can be used to obtain a characterisation 
of the system.25 We capture the different characterisations of the steady state as 
follows: 
Proposition 3: Let   
 
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The eigenvalues 1 and 2  of the Jacobian matrix A are given by: 
 
2
4 2
2
11
1
sss 
        (4.3.10)
 
2
4 2
2
11
2
sss 
        (4.3.11) 
                                               
25 These characterisations derived from the linearised system provide an analysis of the local stability 
conditions. 
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Given these eigenvalues, the possible characterisations of the steady state are as 
follows: 
i. If ,4 2
2
1 ss    ,1
2
4 2
2
11 
 sss
 we have distinct, real eigenvalues 
,10 12    and the steady state is asymptotically stable, and there is 
monotonic convergence to the steady state. A sufficient condition for the 
emergence of this outcome is   .1    
ii. If ,4 2
2
1 ss   we have repeated, real eigenvalues such that ,10 12   the 
steady state is asymptotically stable, and both human and physical capital 
converge to the steady state at an equal rate.  
iii. If ,4 2
2
1 ss  1  and 2  are distinct complex eigenvalues with a positive real 
part since ,1
2
0 1 
s
 and the steady state is a clockwise spiral sink if 11 
and a clockwise spiral source if .11   
In Proposition 3 above, case (i) resembles a long run outcome akin to that which 
occurs in the Solow growth model. If the initial value of human or physical capital is 
below the steady state, its value would monotonically increase until its steady state 
value is reached, while an initial value below the steady state leads to a monotonic 
decrease in the value until steady state is reached. As 1 is the eigenvalue associated 
with physical capital per capita ,tk the eigenvalues 10 12    imply that physical 
capital per capita converges to its steady state value at a relatively faster rate than 
human capital per capita. However, once convergence to the steady state has occurred, 
the growth rate of physical and human capital per capita, as well as output per capita 
is 0, which is the outcome we observe in the standard Solow-Swan model. The phase 
diagram associated with this steady state is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Notice that in 
Figure 4.2, all the arrows point towards the steady state  h,k . The dotted straight lines 
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indicate that if the initial stock of physical or human capital is equal to the steady state 
value, the value of the other variable whose initial value is above or below the steady 
state value will monotonically converge towards the steady state. The curved solid 
lines show the trajectory of the equilibrium path when the initial stocks of both human 
and physical capital are above or below the steady state. The small arrows on the sides, 
which point towards the dotted and solid lines, indicate that the two equilibrium 
trajectories can take only one of these two forms depending on the initial stocks of 
human and physical capital. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Phase diagram for the stable steady state 
 
The steady state associated with the second case outlined in Proposition 3 is 
commonly referred to as a “focus.” In this instance, both human and physical capital 
converge linearly to the steady state. This convergence occurs at an identical rate for 
both variables. Hence, the only difference between cases (i) and (ii) is the speed of 
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convergence of the two variables to their steady state values. The phase diagram in 
this instance is depicted in Figure 4.3 below. In this instance, regardless of the initial 
stocks of human and physical capital, the family of straight lines surrounding the 
steady state combination of human and physical capital  hk,  indicates that there is 
systematic convergence to the steady state.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Phase diagram for the focus 
 
When the eigenvalues are complex, as stated in case (iii) of Proposition 3, the 
two possibilities that emerge are either a spiral source or a spiral sink. In the case of a 
spiral sink, both physical and human capital per capita are characterised by oscillatory 
convergence to the steady state. These oscillations create fluctuations in the stocks of 
human and physical capital over time as the economy converges to the steady state. 
However, the steady state is asymptotically stable in this instance, implying that as 
,t kkt  and .hht    We know that the spiral convergence to the steady state 
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in this instance occurs in clockwise motions as the real part 
2
1s of both eigenvalues is 
positive. The phase diagram depicting the manner in which human and physical capital 
converge to the steady state is given in Figure 4.4. As we can see, regardless of whether 
the initial stocks of human and physical capital are higher or lower than the steady 
state values, the arrows that point inwards indicate that they converge over time to the 
steady state. Therefore, this outcome is also quite similar to cases (i) and (ii). The only 
difference in this instance is the non-monotonicity of the convergence path. The 
converging spiralling motions indicate that although both the stocks of human and 
physical capital are characterised by oscillations, the size of these oscillations grow 
smaller over time, and decay off once the steady state is reached.   
 
 
                                    
 
 
Figure 4.4: Phase diagram for the standard spiral sink 
 
tk  
0 t
h  
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However, there is an aspect to the transitional dynamics that warrants further 
discussion. Recall that our model comprises of restrictions on the parameter 𝑏; as 
established earlier, for the elasticity of substitution between public and private 
education inputs to be positive and for interiority of the solutions to the agent’s lifetime 
utility maximisation problem, the range nbp   should hold. This range for 𝑏 also 
implies that there is a corresponding range of values for the stocks of human and 
physical capital in any given period given by equations (4.3.2) and (4.3.3). This implies 
that in any given period, both forms of capital should conform to certain ranges of 
positive values 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑘𝑡 < 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 and ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛 < ℎ𝑡 < ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 as determined by these 
bounds for 𝑏. 
While these bounds on human and physical capital are present across all the 
cases outlined in Proposition 3, they do not impact the convergence paths in the case 
of the stable steady state and the focus. The initial stock of human and physical capital 
should conform to these ranges, and the presence of these upper and lower bounds do 
not affect the monotonic convergence towards the steady state that occurs in these 
instances. However, with the spiral sink, as well as with the spiral source, which is 
considered shortly, these bounds create transitional dynamics that differ from the 
standard cases.  
With the spiral sink, the phase portrait given in Figure 4.5 shows how the upper 
and the lower bounds affect the economy’s convergence path. At point A, the standard 
convergence path falls outside the maximum human capital stock. Therefore, the 
economy moves along the upper bound until point B, where it meets the usual 
transitional path once again. Similarly, between points C and D, the standard path 
results in human capital stocks below ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛. Hence, the economy moves vertically 
along the bound given by ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛 until it meets the usual convergence path at point D. 
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Nevertheless, the changes to the transition path that occur due to the presence of the 
upper and lower bounds do not prevent the economy from converging to the steady 
state in the long run.  
 
 
 
 Figure 4.5: Modified phase diagram for the spiral sink 
 
Now we consider the final possibility, which is the spiral source. In the case of 
the standard spiral source, the capital and human capital per capita display oscillatory 
divergence from the steady state. In this case too, we can infer that these oscillations 
occur in a clockwise motion, as both eigenvalues have a positive real part. The standard 
phase portrait in this instance is given in Figure 4.6. The outward-pointing arrows 
indicate that the oscillations grow bigger over time, implying that the stocks of human 
and physical capital keep diverging from their steady state values.  
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Figure 4.6: Phase diagram for the standard spiral source 
 
In the case of the spiral source, it is possible that the large downward swings 
created by the oscillations may lead to negative values of the variables. In an economic 
context such as ours, however, negative values cannot occur for either of the variables 
in our two dimensional discrete dynamical system, or the other variables associated 
with consumption and production in the economy. Hence, in a context like ours, and 
indeed with most dynamical systems in economics, there should be restrictions 
preventing the occurrence of negative values. As a result of this boundedness of both 
human and physical capital from above and below, the occurrence of negative values 
in our system is avoided. However, the economy now follows a transition path that 
differs from the standard phase portrait for the spiral source. The modified phase 
portrait that takes into account the boundedness of the variables is given in Figure 4.7.  
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Figure 4.7: Modified phase diagram for the spiral source 
 
In Figure 4.7, observe that the standard oscillations that take place in the case of 
a spiral source occur till point A, when the minimum value of human capital is reached. 
Beyond A, the economy cannot move along the usual dynamical path, which is 
depicted by the broken grey line. Instead, human capital remains at its minimum value, 
but since physical capital is still growing, there is still an upward movement along the 
line bounded by this minimum value, as given by the arrows. This movement enables 
the economy to connect to the usual path at point B. Similarly, at point C, human 
capital reaches its maximum value. Hence, as denoted by the downward arrows, while 
the stock of human capital remains at the maximum level, the motion of the physical 
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capital stock still takes place until a connection with the oscillatory path occurs again. 
Once the diverging oscillations fall outside the bounds, the system can no longer 
connect to the spiralling movements along the dynamical path. The system will then 
move along the edges of the boundaries. This results in the system displaying periodic 
cycles in the long run along the path (𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 , ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛) → (𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛) → (𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥)→ 
(𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 , ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥). 
26 
A number of studies have demonstrated the possible emergence of endogenous 
cycles in overlapping generations models. For instance, Michel and Venditti (1997) 
show that endogenous cycles may emerge in overlapping generations models with 
non-separable utility functions, and also in those characterised by bequests and a 
discount factor that is close to 1. Another study by Kitagawa and Shibata (2005) 
reveals that in an overlapping generations models with an AK type technology, lags in 
investment gestation could lead to endogenous growth cycles. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of regular cycles after a period of oscillatory divergence is an interesting 
outcome of our analysis, and is one that is not typically observed in the growth 
literature. In our model, the regular cycles that emerge in the long run are the result of 
the bounds on the parameters created by the functional form of the education 
production function and the related need to restrict the elasticity of substitution 
between public and private education expenditures to values greater than or equal to 
0, as well as the need for interiority of solutions to the agent’s utility maximisation 
problem. Nevertheless, the emergence of permanent cycles in the long run creates 
                                               
26 A number of numerical experiments that were carried out to glean insights into transitional dynamics 
led to monotonic convergence towards a stable steady state. However, it is important to note that the 
inability to find such combinations does not negate the existence of oscillatory convergence and 
divergence since the analytical results clearly show that these cases are a theoretical possibility. 
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uncertainty in the economy and the spiral source is hence less desirable in comparison 
to the other outcomes.  
The variety of transitional dynamics revealed in our analysis shows that in the 
presence of concurrent public and private expenditures on education, as modelled by 
the VES form, monotonic convergence towards the steady state as observed in the 
standard neoclassical growth model may not always occur. The possibilities for 
oscillatory convergence and the emergence of permanent cycles after a period of 
oscillatory divergence demonstrates that our model is able to display some rich 
dynamics that are not frequently observed in the growth literature concerning 
investments in human capital.  
It is also interesting to observe that the eigenvalues are monotonically increasing 
in the parameter 𝑏 in the instances that monotonic convergences towards a stable 
steady state occurs, implying that a higher degree of aggregate substitutability between 
public and private education inputs enables an economy to converge to the steady state 
faster. This observation suggests that a higher degree of aggregate substitutability 
benefits an economy in two main ways. This observation is also consistent with extant 
literature that suggests that in the context of a standard production function with capital 
and labour, a higher degree of factor substitutability enables an economy to transition 
to the steady state faster (see Irmen, 2011 for a detailed discussion).  
4.4 OPTIMAL POLICY 
In this section, we look for the optimal value of   a benevolent social planner 
may select in order to enable the representative agent to attain maximum utility. This 
is done by substituting the utility maximising values of ,1tc
P
te 1 and 2tc  given by 
(4.2.13), (4.2.14), and (4.2.16) respectively into the agent’s utility function (4.2.8) and 
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differentiating it with respect to  (the derivation is outlined in Appendix G). This 
results in the following optimal solution for :  
    ab
a


11
*



     (4.4.1) 
For the solution to *  to be interior, the condition 
a
b
1
  must be satisfied. When  
a
b
1
  a corner solution where 0*   occurs. This leads to .02 th  On the other 
hand, if 
 
,
1
1 a
b 





.1*   However, in the range ,nbp   which was 
established previously, as required to ensure that the solutions to the decision problem 
are interior and the elasticity of substitution at steady state is greater than 0, neither of 
these corner solutions will emerge. Thus, from (4.3.1), in the range ,nbp   a higher 
value of 𝑏 results in a higher value of .*  Thus: 
Proposition 4: The tax rate which enables the agent to maximise utility is 
increasing in the value of 𝑏 and hence the elasticity of substitution. 
 Proposition 4 captures the idea that when public and private education inputs 
are closely substitutable, people are willing to pay more tax and strengthen the public 
education system. Given that public education expenditure is the essential input in the 
education production function, in a setting where both public and private education 
expenditures provide a similar benefit to the child, parents are willing to pay more tax 
and improve the public education system, as it is the relatively more important input, 
given that when public education is 0, the entire education production collapses to 0, 
while a certain level of education can still be produced even when private education is 
0, as long as .0b  If the public education system is of a poor quality, it would be an 
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inefficient substitute for private education, and this would encourage parents to 
supplement public education with private education services. In such an instance, 
parents would not be willing to pay high taxes towards the maintenance of the 
inefficient public education system, as this money would be better spent on buying 
high quality private educational services for the child.   
4.5 CONCLUSION 
We develop an overlapping generations model to explore how public and 
parental expenditures impact long run macroeconomic outcomes. Using a variable 
elasticity of substitution “education production function,” in which we assume public 
education to be the essential input, we show analytically that steady state utility, human 
capital, physical capital, output, and the human to physical capital ratio are increasing 
in the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏, and hence, the elasticity of substitution. 
This section presents the concluding remarks relating to these results and provides 
policy recommendations. 
 The model’s prediction that a higher elasticity of substitution between private 
and public education expenditures yields better macroeconomic outcomes is of 
practical relevance. A higher elasticity of substitution implies that the two types of 
expenditure are perceived as largely substitutable for one another, which means that 
even though public education has a stand-alone existence, there is a private sector that 
provides comparable services. As higher aggregate substitutability reduces parental 
expenditure on education, it also entails important implications in terms of access. 
Especially in developing countries, if public and private education are of comparable 
quality, it would encourage more children to attend public schools and thereby reduce 
parental expenditure on education. In a setting where the two inputs are less 
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substitutable for one another, sending children to public schools is likely to entail 
complementary private expenditures, such as out-of-school tutoring and facility fees.  
 Therefore, the results suggest that policymakers should aim to develop private 
participation in the education industry by offering greater support, possibly in the form 
of tax benefits, training educators in the private sector, and developing a common 
curriculum that can be used by both the public and private sectors. The quality of 
private provision can be ensured through arrangements such as registration, quality 
audits, and reviews undertaken by government authorities that provide parents with 
the confidence to consider the private education sector to be a close competitor to the 
public sector. Ultimately, developing public and private education that are of 
comparable quality is about giving parents a greater choice with regard to the type of 
education they wish to provide to their children. 
 There has been a move towards increased private funding of education in many 
countries in recent years (Levin & Belfield, 2003). Increasing private sector 
participation in the education industry and intense competition in the job market has 
led to a rise in the expenditure incurred by parents for educating their children in many 
countries. For instance, private expenditure accounted for 12.2% of total educational 
expenditure in the OECD in 2000, but this percentage rose to 16% by 2009 (OECD, 
2012a). Encouraging such increased private participation could encourage the public 
sector to be more competitive in the provision of education and increase the degree of 
uniformity between public and private education expenditures, yielding greater choice 
for parents and improving long run macroeconomic outcomes as a result.  
 As we do not explicitly include any quality considerations in the model, it is 
useful to consider our results in conjunction with a large volume of interdisciplinary 
empirical literature that evaluates the relative effectiveness of private education as 
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opposed to public education. While a large number of empirical studies demonstrate 
that private schools outperform public ones in terms of student performance and 
efficiency (see Coleman, Hoffer, & Kilgore, 1982; Jimenez & Lockheed, 1995; 
Wongsurawat, 2011; Zahid, Muhammad Iqbal, & Tariq, 2011, for instance), there are 
also some studies that are inconclusive on whether attending private schools leads to 
an improvement in student achievement (see, for example Alexander & Pallas, 1983; 
Sander, 1999). Thus, while the present study yields some interesting insights into the 
public-private mix of education expenditures, further extensions of the model 
presented in this paper may be able to yield deeper insights into these issues. In 
particular, as we consider a framework in which intra-generational heterogeneity is 
absent, we do not consider the impacts on inequality associated with greater aggregate 
substitutability. Distributional considerations are, however, an important dimension of 
this issue, and consequently an important direction of future research.  
The fact that the ratio of physical to human capital rises with the degree of 
aggregate substitutability is also an interesting result with implications for inter-
generational redistribution, as in our model, middle-aged agents own human capital 
and the old agents own physical capital. Therefore, despite a higher aggregate 
substitutability between public and private education expenditures directly 
contributing towards strengthening the stock of human capital, the model suggests that 
by helping to raise savings, it provides a greater contribution towards physical capital 
accumulation in the economy. As suggested by Bertola (1996), modelling these 
considerations in a continuous time OLG framework may enable one to explore these 
intergenerational redistribution concerns in greater depth. Thus, exploring both intra 
and intergenerational aspects of the model within a continuous time OLG framework 
might be a further extension of the model.   
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 Health Expenditures and 
Inequality: a Political 
Economy Perspective 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Public expenditure on health care is often considered to be a means of achieving 
equitable and efficient outcomes for an economy due to its redistributive nature. 
However, individuals can also undertake private investments in education and health. 
As suggested by Chakraborty and Das (2005), Deaton (2003), and Ray and Streufert 
(1993), unequal private investments in health, which arise from inequalities in the 
distribution of income and wealth, could lead to a persistence of income and wealth 
inequality in the long run. Given the importance of both public and private health 
expenditures, several extant studies have explored the manner in which the mix of 
these expenditures can impact macroeconomic outcomes (see for instance, 
Bhattacharya & Qiao 2007; Lahiri & Richardson 2009; Li et al. 2012; Varvarigos & 
Zakaria, 2013).     
 In this paper, we examine how the public-private mix of expenditures on health 
contributes towards mortality and wealth in the long run in the context of an 
overlapping generations model comprising of heterogeneous agents. Both public and 
private investments in health contribute towards the ‘production’ of an agent’s health, 
and consequently her mortality. Public expenditures on health in this economy are 
endogenous; they are determined by a political economy mechanism, whereby agents 
vote on the proportion of tax revenue to be used to finance public health care. The 
remainder of the revenue is allocated equally among agents in the form of a lump sum 
transfer. A key innovation in our approach, relative to previous studies, is our focus on 
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the distinction between individual and aggregate level factors that impact on an agent’s 
health. 
 Specifically, central to this paper is a “health production function” of the 
variable elasticity of substitution (VES) form, discussed in Revankar (1971), in which 
public and private expenditures on health are inputs that contribute towards an agent’s 
health and longevity.27 The VES form, in addition to having some intuitively appealing 
and relevant properties in the context of health, allows the degree of substitutability 
between public and private expenditures, as measured by the elasticity of substitution 
between them, to vary between agents.28 An agent’s elasticity of substitution is 
determined by her wealth and a parameter of the production function, labelled “ b ”, 
which we interpret as an aggregate measure of the ease of substitutability between 
public and private inputs. This means that the elasticity of substitution varies between 
agents and across time, introducing a richer set of dynamics that feed into the 
determination of the political economy outcomes and long run results. 
 As the notion of substitutability discussed above is germane to the 
interpretation of our framework and its results, it is worthwhile elaborating upon this 
point. In particular, we suggest that the “aggregate substitutability” parameter is 
conditioned by a number of institutional parameters, such as the quality of public 
health care and the regulatory framework governing the economy. For example, if the 
quality of public health care is inferior relative to private health care, then it is obvious 
                                               
27 The VES production function discussed in Revankar (1971) is of the standard, technological form 
that combines labour and capital as inputs to produce output.  
 
28 Our notion of “substitutability”, given that it enters the preference side of the economy, refers 
primarily to a personal trade-off between two types of goods (public and private health inputs), rather 
than substitutability in the sense of a market-induced trade-off created due to the differences in the price 
levels of the goods. However, the market trade-off enters in an implicit sense, as an agent’s wealth level 
impacts on her elasticity of substitution between the two goods. 
 
 Chapter 5: Health Expenditures and Inequality: a Political Economy Perspective 125 
that there is low substitutability between these services.29 Furthermore, if regulation 
prohibits the private provision of certain health goods and services, there is lower 
substitutability at the aggregate level in the sense that goods and services available 
under the public health care system have no private counterpart.30 In general, however, 
the degree of aggregate substitutability is likely to be relatively higher in developed 
countries, where public and private health services are of a comparable quality. 
 In relation to the individual level, Gouveia (1997), for example, suggests that 
an individual’s ability to substitute between private and public health inputs is a 
perception conditioned by several micro-level factors, which are likely to differ 
between various individuals, depending on their specific circumstances. These micro-
level factors could include income/wealth, location, and socio-economic status.31 In 
general, however, if the “aggregate substitutability” between these inputs is high, the 
individual substitutability will also be high. For example, if public and private health 
services were of a comparable quality and affordability, and had good coverage across 
locations, the aggregate substitutability would be high, and this would have a positive 
impact on individual substitutability. However, if they were not of comparable quality, 
with substantial differences in the prices and coverage across locations, aggregate 
substitutability would be low, and it would worsen individual substitutability.  
                                               
29 For instance, Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett (2000) refer to studies from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, and El Salvador that reveal a tendency for patients to “bypass” public facilities with poor 
equipment, inadequate staff, and a low level of accountability and efficiency in favour of private health 
care facilities capable of providing a higher quality of service, which reduces the aggregate 
substitutability between the two types of expenditures. 
   
30 In Canada, for example, the private sector is prohibited from providing surgery at a profit (Lülfesmann 
& Myers, 2010). This artificially restricts the degree of substitutability between public and private health 
expenditures.  
 
31 For instance, in many developing countries, the better equipped state hospitals and schools are likely 
to be located in the cities. In such a context, people living in rural areas may be compelled to seek 
private medical services due to the inability to travel long distances to the cities. Thus, a person’s place 
of residence could restrict his/her ability to substitute between public and private health expenditures.  
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 Key results of this paper—analytical and numerical—suggest that a higher 
degree of aggregate substitutability yields better long run outcomes in the form of 
higher average wealth levels and lower inequality. This occurs through the political 
economy mechanism—in the presence of higher aggregate substitutability, agents vote 
for a higher proportion of revenue to be allocated towards improving public health 
care. Given that aggregate substitutability between public and private health inputs is 
likely to be higher in developed countries, this result is of empirical relevance, as  
public health spending is much higher in developed countries when compared to 
developing ones. Taking into consideration the merits associated with a higher degree 
of aggregate substitutability, an obvious policy implication is that institutional reforms 
directed at improving aggregate substitutability will lead to better macroeconomic 
outcomes. Another interesting result of the paper is that a higher value of another 
parameter 𝑎, which can be interpreted as the ‘pure’ share of public health in the health 
production function, is also associated with higher average wealth levels and lower 
inequality in the long run. The underlying rationale for this result is that, in a setting 
where a person’s health capital is determined by both public and private health 
expenditures, greater efficiency of public health care results in individuals having to 
undertake lower private health expenditure, thereby enabling them to leave more 
bequests for their offspring.    
 The importance of these results is further motivated by the intuitive appeal of 
the VES construct, which, as discussed above, enables the degree of substitutability to 
be governed by aggregate factors, as well as the economic circumstances of the 
individual. Secondly, the outcome of this essay, that a greater “ease of substitutability”, 
as measured by a higher elasticity of substitution between public and private health 
expenditures, leads to better aggregate outcomes, is also intuitively plausible. The 
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parameter 𝑏, which captures all the aggregate-level factors that affect the ease with 
which an individual can substitute between private and public health care expenditures, 
is an indicator of the range of choices available to all agents in the economy at the 
aggregate level. This range is likely to be larger if goods and services provided by the 
public and private sectors are of comparable quality and availability. While the 
aggregate quality, efficiency, and accessibility of both the private and public 
components of any health care system are certainly important, ignoring individual 
micro-level heterogeneity amounts to ignoring elements that are of relevance in 
determining the overall effectiveness of the health care system, which in turn has a 
bearing on health inequality and macroeconomic performance. The VES form, due to 
its ability to distinguish between the individual and the aggregate, is therefore a more 
realistic framework to address issues in the health macroeconomics literature. 
 However, as recognised in the political economy literature, policies and 
institutions are essentially endogenous; economic agents influence their determination, 
either through the presence of vested interest groups, or by means of a voting 
mechanism (see for example, Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Krusell & Rios-Rull, 1996). To 
address this issue, we compare the proportion of tax revenue allocated towards public 
health care, determined through the political economy process, with that chosen by a 
benevolent social planner whose objective is to maximise the collective welfare of all 
agents in the economy. A natural question that arises is why we select the proportion 
of tax revenue allocated towards public health care as the parameter which is 
determined through a political economy mechanism rather than considering the 
parameter 𝑏 as the one agents vote on. While this matter is examined in greater depth 
in Section 5.4, it should be noted here that the parameter 𝑏 is a deeply ingrained 
institutional parameter that is difficult to measure. Furthermore, developing a 
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functional form for 𝑏 that enables it to be determined through the political economy 
process is difficult, as it is not possible to infer the manner in which the value of 𝑏 is 
affected by government spending. Hence, considering the proportion of tax revenue 
allocated towards public health care as the parameter which is determined through a 
voting process, rather than the parameter 𝑏, is a more realistic approach from a political 
economy perspective.  
We see that for a substantial range of parameter values, the political economy 
outcome converges to the welfare maximising outcomes under both the utilitarian and 
Rawlsian approaches in the long run, albeit it can be sub-optimal on the transition path. 
Even in the instances where the political economy outcome and the welfare 
maximising outcomes do not coincide, the winning proportion of tax revenue allocated 
towards public health care is always equal to either the utilitarian or Rawlsian social 
welfare maximising value, suggesting that the determination of the proportion of tax 
revenue allocated towards health care through a voting process is largely socially 
desirable in this context. During transition, we see that the winning proportion of tax 
revenue allocated towards health care is closer to the welfare maximising proportion 
under the utilitarian approach than that under the Rawlsian approach. 
The utilitarian outcome, which weighs all agents’ utilities equally, is likely to be 
closer to the political economy outcome, which weighs each agent’s vote equally. The 
Rawlsian outcome attaches the highest weight to the utility of the poorest agent. The 
poor agents in this economy prefer redistribution in the form of the lump sum transfer; 
given that it is a perfect substitute for consumption, it is a necessity for all agents in 
the economy. Hence, poor agents are likely to prefer a bigger share to tax revenue to 
be allocated towards the lump-sum transfer, which enables them to enjoy higher 
consumption. Considering the utilitarian, Rawlsian, and political economy paradigms 
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in the context of the issues addressed above is another useful contribution of the paper, 
as it broadens the scope of the framework to provide potential explanations for the 
diversity in health outcomes across different countries. In practice, the determination 
of public health expenditure could occur through political economy or social planner 
focussed approaches. While in reality, social planning approaches that exactly 
resemble either the Rawlsian or the utilitarian viewpoints do not exist, these paradigms 
provide the outer limits of a spectrum within which such approaches may fall.  
 This essay is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides a background and 
motivation for the study where we present the VES health production function and 
discuss its features. Section 5.3 introduces the benchmark model and presents 
analytical results. Section 5.4 looks at a political economy extension to the benchmark 
model. Section 5.5 presents the results of the numerical experiments and the related 
discussion, and finally Section 5.6 comprises of concluding remarks and policy 
implications. A number of proofs and derivations are provided in the Appendices. 
5.2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Contemporary developments in medicine have bestowed upon people an 
enhanced ability to influence their health, and as a consequence, individuals are 
increasingly regarded to be the ultimate producers of their own health, which is the 
essence of the concept of the “health production function” (Zweifel, Breyer, & 
Kifmann, 2009, pp 75-76). The health production function is a concept introduced to 
mainstream economics by Grossman (1972) to capture the preferences of individuals 
towards factors that have an impact on their health (Johannesson, Johansson, Kriström, 
Borgquist, & Jönsson, 1993). Guided by this idea, we use a simplified health 
production function of the VES form in which public and private health expenditures 
are the inputs needed for creating a person’s health capital. Attempts in the extant 
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literature to measure the idea of substitutability between public and private health 
inputs in the manner we interpret it are limited. The use of the VES health production 
function enables us to capture the idea of aggregate substitutability, as well as 
individual variations in the elasticity of substitution, which is an aspect extant studies 
such as Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) and Lahiri and Richardson (2009) have not 
taken into consideration. In order to explain this point, we first provide a brief 
overview of these studies.   
 Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) develop an overlapping generations model with 
homogeneous agents within a particular generation, where an agent’s survival 
probability in old age is a function in which public and private investments aimed at 
enhancing longevity appear as interactive, complementary terms. The authors justify 
this formulation by suggesting that the marginal increase in longevity resulting from 
additional out-of-pocket expenditure on health rises when the state health care system 
is bigger and more efficient. However, the types of complementary private inputs 
discussed by these authors usually entail out-of-pocket expenditures, which may not 
be affordable to a majority of the population in developing countries. Hence, whilst 
complementarity between public and private inputs might be a reasonable assumption 
at the macro-level in the context of a developed country, it is not necessarily 
appropriate as an a priori assumption for developing or transitional economies.  
 On the other hand, Lahiri and Richardson (2009) develop an overlapping 
generations model with heterogeneous agents, with a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) health production function. The authors explore the long run wealth 
distributions and the political economy outcomes associated with different values of 
the elasticity of substitution. The health production function used by these authors 
offers greater flexibility when compared to the longevity production function used in 
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Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007), as it allows the exploration of the macroeconomic 
impacts associated with a range of elasticity of substitution values. Li et al. (2012) also 
develop a similar model with a CES health production function to explore the public-
private mix of health care expenditures.32 However, it is difficult to distinguish 
between aggregate and individual substitutability using a CES health production 
function, as the elasticity of substitution parameter in such a function is constant across 
individuals. As such, the meaning of substitutability in our paper is distinct from the 
notion of substitutability in the above-mentioned papers.33 
 In light of the above discussion, we can now examine how to distinguish 
between aggregate and individual substitutability using a VES health production 
function, which takes the following form: 
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In (5.2.1), 
t
h  is an individual’s health capital, 
G
t
h  is public health spending per 
person and 
P
t
h  is private health expenditure incurred by an individual. The parameter 
restrictions given above are required to ensure that (5.2.1) satisfies the standard 
properties of a production function. In the VES form, public expenditure is the 
essential input, because if ,0G
t
h .0
t
h  Such an assumption may generally be 
                                               
32 To our knowledge, the first attempt at examining the long-run impact of substitutability between 
public and private health inputs using a CES construct for the health production is by Lahiri and 
Richardson (2009). Li et al (2012) follow a very similar approach, albeit with a different set of 
objectives. 
 
33 We emphasise that this difference is not only of relevance to the meaning and interpretations of the 
features of our model, but also its results. For example, Lahiri and Richardson (2009) show that greater 
substitutability, as per their interpretation, can have harmful implications for inequality.  
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justifiable on the grounds that public spending on health care is instrumental towards 
the improvement of a person’s life expectancy (Glomm & Ravikumar, 1997).34  
 The elasticity of substitution between public and private inputs is:  
         (5.2.2) 
In (5.2.2), the parameter 𝑏 captures the degree of aggregate substitutability, 
which has a direct influence on the individual’s elasticity of substitution. Although the 
values of 𝑏 and  are common to all individuals, the value of would differ 
between agents as it is positively related to wealth in our model. If 𝑏 > 0, wealthier 
individuals have a lower elasticity of substitution than their poorer counterparts, but if 
𝑏 < 0, the elasticity of substitution of wealthier individuals would be higher.  
As emphasised earlier, the meaning of substituability between public and private 
health inputs varies depending on the framework in question. Subject to this caveat, 
extant literature provides different perspectives on this issue. For instance, 
Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) suggest that in developed countries where people are 
generally wealthier, public and private health expenditures are likely to be 
characterised by a greater degree of complementarity. On the other hand, Bidani and 
Ravallion (1997) argue that wealthier people find it easier to substitute public health 
care with privately provided alternatives and would therefore have a higher elasticity 
of substitution. Fabbri and Monfardini (2009) also support the latter assertion by 
                                               
34 In the case of health, considering public expenditure as the essential input is reasonable, as issues 
such as ageing populations and obesity in developed countries, and disease, war, and malnutrition in the 
case of many developing countries are challenges the private sector cannot typically address. 
Furthermore making public expenditure the essential input ensures that even the poorest members of 
society, who are unable to incur much private health expenditure, would be able to enjoy a fair level of 
health capital.   
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noting that richer people are in a better position to substitute public health care with 
private health services due to their ability to afford private health insurance. Hence, by 
varying the value of 𝑏 in the health production function we can capture both of these 
possibilities suggested in the literature.  
 Another interesting feature associated with equation (5.2.2) is that an 
individual’s elasiticity of subsitution between public and private health expenditures 
is affected by public health spending per person, Gth . Generally, 
public health 
spending per person is positively related to an economy’s level of development. This 
is illustrated in Figure 5.1, which shows the public health spending as a percentage of 
total health spending is higher in regions comprising of developed countries. This is 
also demonstrated in Table 5.1, which shows that although public spending on health 
per capita has increased over time in all the country groups considered, it is higher in 
regions where countries are more developed.  
 
Figure 5.1: Public spending on health as a percentage of total health expenditure 
   Source: The World Bank 
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Table 5.1: Public spending on health care per capita 
Region 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Sub-Saharan Africa 38.03 33.48 42.03 72.18 94.60 
Heavily indebted poor countries 14.01 16.08 17.59 33.25 47.19 
Least developed countries 11.37 11.58 14.11 26.86 42.05 
OECD members 2097.44 2237.04 2913.05 3866.02 4593.01 
European Union 1646.05 1620.59 2165.89 3188.71 3530.23 
 
Source: World Bank data  
 
The above stylised features of public health spending provide some further 
motivation for considering the VES construct of this paper. Firstly, in the context of 
health, the data is suggestive of a strong link between individual and aggregate health 
outcomes. The VES provides a way of explaining this link and interpreting the 
mechanisms underlying it.  
 Furthermore, we wish to emphasise that unlike in the case of a traditional 
production function, where the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital at 
the firm level is primarily determined by the technology used in the production 
process, the determinants of an individual’s elasticity of substitution between public 
and private expenditures in the health production function have a bearing upon the 
preferences of an individual. In short, one has to appreciate that the health production 
function differs from a traditional production function as “health production” in the 
framework to follow does not take place in a market—it is something that is 
“produced” as an end result of an agent’s and the government’s expenditures on health 
 Chapter 5: Health Expenditures and Inequality: a Political Economy Perspective 135 
goods and services/health care systems. Bearing this in mind, we look the benchmark 
model in the next section.  
5.3 THE BENCHMARK MODEL 
We consider a two period overlapping generations model where each generation 
consists of N agents. Time is discrete and given by t=1,2,…. All agents safely survive 
through youth, but an agent’s probability of survival into old age is determined by 
health investment in youth, which in turn comprises of private health expenditure 
undertaken by the agent during youth, as well as health care services provided by the 
state. During youth, the agent gives birth to a single offspring, whose wealth 
endowment, as in Chakraborty and Das (2005), depends on whether her parent 
survives safely through old age or not. In the former case, the parent leaves bequests 
for her child, while in the latter case, the child inherits her parent’s savings, which can 
be considered as unintended bequests. We assume an imperfect wealth market such 
that interest on savings can be enjoyed by the individual only if she survives safely 
through old age. If the parent dies prematurely, her child inherits only the gross value 
of her savings as an unintended bequest.35 Public health care services are financed by 
a proportional tax of rate   imposed on the heterogeneous wealth endowments 
t
W  of 
the young agents in the economy. These wealth endowments have a probability density 
function  tt Wg in the support  ,0 , so that average tax revenue collected by the 
                                               
35 Such unintended or accidental bequests arise only in the absence of perfect annuities markets. In an 
environment where lifetime is uncertain, agents save in order to finance consumption in the event they 
live to reach a very old age (Abel, 1985; Strawczynski, 1993). Yaari (1965), whose work pioneered a 
large volume of research on bequests, uses the term “actuarial note” to capture the concept of a life 
insured annuity that pays the buyer an allowance during her lifetime and is cancelled off once she dies, 
and shows that, in the absence of altruism, an agent would annuitise all her savings. In this model, we 
assume that if the parent dies prematurely, the child inherits the gross value of her parent’s savings 
without interest, which requires the assumption that annuities markets, although present, are imperfect, 
as interest accumulated on savings can only be enjoyed by the individual and not by her offspring.  
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government in period t is   .WdWWgW ttttt


0
  Of this average tax revenue, the 
government allocates a proportion  towards the provision of equitable public health 
care and the remainder is paid to the young individuals as a lump-sum transfer.  
To improve analytical tractability, and without any loss of generality, we ignore 
youthful consumption, so that an individual derives utility from consumption and 
bequests left to her offspring. Thus, in period , the agent’s utility function is: 
        11   tttt mVcUhU       (5.3.1) 
where  is old age consumption, 1tm  denotes bequests, 0  is a parameter 
capturing the degree of parental altruism, and )(
t
h  represents the probability of 
surviving to old age, which depends on the individual’s health capital th . As 
mentioned in Section 5.2, this “health” output is determined by both public and private 
investments in health and is captured by the VES health production function, which is 
reproduced below for convenience: 
      aGtPt
aG
tt abhhhh


1
     (5.3.2) 
 As in Chakraborty and Das (2005), we assume that the survival probability 
 
t
h has the following functional form: 
   
t
h =   th  for 





hh ,0      
       otherwise,  
where 1   , and 𝜒 and 𝜀 are constants with 0 and 0 1    
          (5.3.3) 
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The above survival probability function is concave in health capital 
t
h for values 
below  which is the maximum survival probability an agent is capable of achieving, 
but additional health capital cannot increase one’s survival probability once  is 
reached. As such, unlike a strictly concave survival probability function of the type 
presented in Chakraborty (2004) and Leung and Wang (2010), a survival probability 
function of this form allows for heterogeneity in health capital to arise from the initial 
distribution of wealth, because in a particular time period, there are some people with 
health capital below  who achieve a survival probability in the concave section of 
the survival probability function, while there are others who achieve the maximum 
survival probability of  by accumulating a health capital equal of  where 
.
1













h  Furthermore, we later show that this survival probability function, when 
combined with the VES health production function, results in a bimodal wealth 
distribution.  
As everybody has access to the same value of public health care services, an 
agent has to adjust her private health expenditure so as to attain the health capital 
 associated with the maximum survival probability . Denoting this critical level 
of private health expenditure by 

P
th we have: 
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Recall that the parameter b  in the above expression comes from the VES health 
production function (5.3.2). In our model, we refer to this parameter as representing 
“aggregate substitutability”. It can be seen that a higher value of the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏 causes the critical level of private health spending to 
decline. In other words, if public and private health expenditures are closely 
substitutable, it reduces the incentive for an individual to undertake private health 
spending. 
 Given heterogeneous wealth endowments, agents with wealth endowments 
below a critical level ,Wt

who cannot afford the critical level of private health 
expenditure ,hPt

 are located on the concave section of the survival probability function 
presented in (5.3.3). On the other hand, those with wealth levels greater than or equal 
to 

tW  who can afford the critical private health expenditure of 

P
th are capable of 
achieving the maximum survival probability of .  This critical wealth level 

tW  is 
derived in Appendix K. For a complete characterisation of optimal choices, we need 
to consider the optimal decisions of agents with wealth levels below 

tW as well as those 
with wealth levels above .Wt

 
 The agent maximises (5.3.1) subject to the following budget constraints:  
      ttt
p
t WWwsh   111     (5.3.5) 
  ttt sRwmc   211        (5.3.6) 
Equation (5.3.5) above is the budget constraint the agent faces in youth. The 
individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour to earn a subsistence wage of 1w  in 
youth and inherits a wealth of  from her parent, of which, as described above, a tW
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proportion is charged by the government as tax. Out of the government’s tax revenue 
a proportion is allocated towards the provision of public health services, which 
results in each agent receiving public health care with an approximate value of ,Wt  
while the remaining tax revenue is divided equally amongst the population in the form 
of a transfer. During youth, the individual divides her total after-tax earnings between 
private health inputs and savings . In old age, the agent uses her subsistence wage 
of 2w  and her savings, which have accumulated a gross interest of R  to finance 
consumption and bequests. As explained before, if the parent survives safely through 
old age, the child’s wealth is equal to the intended bequest from the parent, so that 
,tt mW   and if the parent dies prematurely the child inherits the gross value of her 
parent’s youthful savings, so that .sW tt 1  The agent’s utility maximisation problem 
involves maximising (5.3.1) subject to equations (5.3.2) to (5.3.6). We assume that the 
agent’s utility functions are of the familiar iso-elastic form. Thus,  and 
 where .10  36 We assume a small open economy setting where 
the interest rate is exogeneously given. 
 For agents with wealth levels ,

 tt WW the first order conditions are: 
     1
'
1
'
  tt dVcU        (5.3.7) 
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36 This type of cardinal assumption is typically made in models with endogenous time preference. 
While Chakraborty and Das assume ,10   others, such as Lahiri (2002), assume it to be 
negative. 
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Equation (5.3.7) captures the fact that the marginal utility from consumption 
needs to be equal to the marginal utility from bequests at utility maximisation. 
Equation (5.3.8) captures the need for the marginal benefit of spending on private 
health services measured in terms of a higher survival probability to be equal to the 
marginal cost, which is the potential old-age consumption she foregoes. 
As an agent with a wealth level 

 tt WW  incurs private health expenditure of 

P
th  
and achieves the maximum survival probability of ,  the only first order condition 
associated with her utility maximisation problem is given by (5.3.7).  
 Upon setting , 
 a


1
1


  and 
R
w
W)(W)(wY ttt
2
1 11   , 
the analysis of both sets of first order conditions yield the following closed form 
solutions for consumption, savings, bequests, and private health expenditure for the 
entire wealth distribution: 
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  From (5.3.9) to (5.3.12) we have: 
Proposition 1: For all agents, consumption, bequests and savings are increasing 
in 𝑏, while private health spending is decreasing in 𝑏.37 
 Proposition 1 above captures a key characteristic of the model and is the basis 
for interpreting most of the results that follow. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is 
that a higher value of the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 implies a greater 
degree of similarity, in a qualitative sense, between public and private health 
expenditures. Hence, this would result in an agent needing to undertake lower private 
                                               
37 It is obvious that this is the case, as 𝑏 enters linearly into all the expressions above. Note also that 

P
th
is given by (3.4) above, which establishes that private health spending both above and below the critical 
level of wealth is decreasing in 𝑏. 
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expenditure on health to achieve a certain level of health capital and thereby survival 
probability. Lower private health expenditure allows the agent to save more and enjoy 
more consumption and leave more bequests in old age. Thus, an agent’s utility is 
clearly increasing in 𝑏. 
 Somewhat heuristically, this observation is analogous to the intuition in the 
context of a general production function in which a higher elasticity of substitution 
between the two inputs leads to a lower cost of production. Figure 5.2, in which   
represents the elasticity of substitution, presents a standard, “textbook” comparison of 
the linear, Cobb-Douglas and Leontief production functions. It is clear that the linear 
production function, which has an infinite elasticity of substitution, is associated with 
the lowest cost of production. This is because a higher elasticity of substitution enables 
the firm to produce the assumed output with the least inputs as a higher degree of 
substitutability between inputs allows the firm to save costs by using the cheaper input. 
Relating this observation to the context of the health production function, the lower 
expenditure on private health services resulting from a higher value of the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏 represents a similar “cost saving” for the agent, which she 
can utilise on consumption and bequests.  
 
Figure 5.2: Comparison of the effects of the elasticity of substitution  
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 Going back to our analysis of equations (5.3.9) to (5.3.12), the effect of average 
wealth tW  on the optimal values of the decision variables is less clear. For agents with 
wealth levels ,WW tt

  if 
 


a
b


1
, , * 1tm  and  increase when tW  increases. 
Furthermore, for these agents, 
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, and 
negatively related otherwise. For agents with wealth levels ,WW tt
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  it is clear when 
,0b consumption, bequests and savings are increasing in tW while private health 
spending is decreasing in tW  since 0

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
t
P
t
W
h
 given 𝑏 > 0. Hence, the utility of all 
agents is increasing in average wealth tW  as long as 𝑏 > 0, implying that the ability 
for average wealth levels to contribute towards the improvement of individual utility 
is crucially dependent upon a high aggregate substitutability parameter.  
  Recall that an individual inherits a bequest if her parent survives safely through 
old age, but if her parent dies prematurely, she inherits an unintended bequest, which 
is her parent’s savings. Hence, we can provide the following characterisation for 
intended and unintended bequests for the entire wealth distribution: 
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Given that for any agent i, the parent’s probability of surviving into old age is 
determined by her health capital, the thi agent’s expected wealth is given by: 
          ittitittititEt WhWhW 2 11 111 1       (5.3.16) 
             It is also important to note that individuals may benefit more from their parents 
surviving into old age and leaving them intended bequests, as opposed to parents 
facing an early demise and leaving them unintended bequests (Chakraborty & Das, 
2005). This requires that bequests should exceed savings even when income in the 
second period is 0. In this model, the condition under which this holds true for all 
individuals in this economy is ,R 1  which simplifies to the condition in 
Chakraborty and Das (2005), which is: ,
1

 






r
 where r  is the interest rate. 
Chakraborty and Das (2005) also discuss the conditions under which there is a 
likelihood of polarisation of long run wealth of agents. In our model, we can 
characterise this result more explicitly, given its analytical tractability.38 We are, in 
fact, able to prove the following proposition: 
                                               
38 Note that unlike in our paper, in the Chakraborty and Das (2005) framework, bimodality is not 
inevitable as suggested in their discussion on pages 173-174. In their model, it is an artifact of the shape 
of the bequest function and whether the bequest function intersects the 
45 line in two places rather 
than 1. This point is discussed further in Appendix L.  
 Chapter 5: Health Expenditures and Inequality: a Political Economy Perspective 145 
Proposition 2: Long run wealth distributions are bimodal. 
In Appendix L, we prove the existence of two unique steady states for both 
intended and unintended bequests. The existence of two steady states for both the 
intended and unintended bequests functions implies that these functions will intersect 
the 45  line in two places, resulting in a bimodal wealth distribution, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.3 below: 
 
                           Figure 5.3: Bimodality of long run wealth distributions             
                                                                                      
The bimodality feature results in the division of individuals into two groups in 
the long run depending on the initial wealth endowments of their ancestors, and is 
similar in spirit to the bimodal long run wealth distributions observed in Galor and 
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Zeira (1993). However, unlike in Galor and Zeira (1993), where twin-peakedness 
emerges due to heterogeneous investments in education that divides the workforce into 
skilled and unskilled workers in the long run, in the present model model it occurs 
through a different mechanism—differences in health investments undertaken by 
people leads to disparities in bequests left to progeny, yielding a bimodal wealth 
distribution in the long run. 
5.4 POLITICAL ECONOMY EXTENSION 
 In this section, we consider a political economy extension to the benchmark 
model introduced in Section 5.3. Decision-making by agents in this economy is now 
considered to be characterised as a two stage game. At the beginning of each period, 
there exists a first stage where young agents vote on the value of ,  which is the 
proportion of tax revenue to be allocated towards providing public health care (recall 
from Section 5.3 that the remaining proportion  1  is divided equally among the 
agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer). Given that the aggregate substitutability 
parameter 𝑏 is the focal point of our discussion, one might expect political economy 
considerations to be centered around the determination of the the optimal value of 𝑏. 
However, it is important to apppreciate that 𝑏 is a deeply ingrained “sticky” 
institutional parameter, which cannot be altered in the short run. Hence, it has a more 
abstract, non quantifiable nature. Furthermore, most academic and political 
discussions on institutional reforms in health care are centered around the quality, 
availability, and accessibility of public health care. One would expect that the 
population of any country would be able to influence an important parameter such as 
the proportion of tax revenue allocated towards public health care through the political 
economy process. As such, our choice of ,  rather than 𝑏, as the parameter determined 
through a voting process, is more relevant and realistic from a politcal economy 
 Chapter 5: Health Expenditures and Inequality: a Political Economy Perspective 147 
perspective. Hence, whilst we stress the need to develop institutional reforms to 
influence the value of this parameter over the long term, we suggest that the political 
economy determination of the proportion of tax revenue allocated towards public 
health care is likely to be an effective means of attaining improvements in agents’ 
utility in the short run.  
We assume that only the young agents vote on the value of  , because our focus 
is on intra-generational, rather than inter-generational heterogeneity. Essentially, old 
agents are not concerned with this vote as they got the opportunity to vote on the 
proportion of tax revenue they preferred to be allocated towards health care and the 
lump-sum transfer respectively during youth.39 Once the winning value of  is 
determined, agents make their consumption and bequest plans in the second stage 
taking the value of   as given. Thus, in Section 3, we considered the second stage of 
this game.  
 We now consider the first stage by optimising the indirect utility function of 
individuals with wealth levels 

 tt WW  and those with wealth levels .WW tt

 We obtain 
this indirect utility function by substituting the optimal values given by (5.3.9) to 
(5.3.12) in the previous section into the agent’s utility function. For both groups of 
agents, i.e., those below and above the critical level of wealth 
t
Wˆ , optimising the 
indirect utility function yields analytical solutions for 
* . Proposition 3 characterises 
the preferred proportion of tax revenue to be allocated towards health care for agents 
below and above this wealth level. 
                                               
39 This assumption is based on the grounds that a given agent votes for public expenditures on health 
care at the time the health system serves her, which is only during youth. We admit that such a strong 
assumption restricts us from presenting a complete characterisation of intergenerational heterogeneity, 
and further work on refining this modelling aspect is likely to be an interesting direction for future 
research. 

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Proposition 3: Let 
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 
  









11
1
2
1
abW
R
w
WWwa
t
tt
           if qb      
1 if 
a
bq
1
  
                                    0                                    if 
a
b
1
  (5.4.1) 
 
For all agents with wealth levels, 

 ,WW tt  the preferred proportion of tax 
revenue to be allocated towards health care is given by: 
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   (5,4.2)   
 An interesting observation relating to Proposition 3 is that in the range of 
interior solutions, the preferred proportion of tax revenue allocated towards public 
health care is increasing in ,
W
W
t
t which can be regarded as a measure of inequality in 
society. Therefore, when the extent of inequality in the economy is high, the poorer 
individuals prefer redistribution through greater public spending on health care. Note 
that although inequality and the optimal value of  for the individual are positively 
 
* = 
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related, the political economy outcome need not be characterised by this feature, as the 
value of q  differs from individual to individual, and the political equilibrium crucially 
depends on the manner in which q  interacts with the parameters in the model. To gain 
an idea about how these parameters determine the political economy outcome, we need 
to resort to numerical experiments, which are presented in the subsequent section.   
From propositions 3 we have:  
Proposition 4: In the range of interior solutions, for all agents in this economy, 
the preferred proportion of tax revenue allocated towards health care is increasing in 
the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏. 
To understand the rationale underlying Proposition 4, we need to recall that 
public expenditure is the essential input in the health production function considered 
in this study. As a higher value of the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 implies 
that the two inputs are of comparable quality, people opt to strengthen the component 
of expenditure they consider to be relatively more important. As mentioned earlier, 
aggregate substitutability between public and private health inputs is likely to be higher 
in developed countries. Furthermore, as we noted previously noted, these countries are 
characterised by relatively higher public health expenditures. Proposition 4 builds a 
link between these two observations by suggesting that higher aggregate 
substitutability encourages agents to vote for a higher proportion of tax revenue to be 
allocated towards public health care. 
5.5 NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS 
 This section is based on some numerical experiments carried out by varying 
the values of the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 and the “pure” share of public 
spending 𝑎. Although we were able to analytically establish that a higher value of the 
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aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 impacts wealth and utility positively in the 
benchmark model, and individuals’ preferred proportion of revenue allocated to health 
care in the political economy extension, in this section we carry out numerical 
experiments to gain insights into political economy outcomes and the long run 
behaviour of the model, particularly in relation to the wealth dynamics created through 
the political economy process. We do not report the results of additional experiments 
carried out by reducing the variance of the initial wealth distribution and varying other 
parameters in the model, as these changes do not affect the general pattern of the 
results. We emphasise that this section is not intended to be a comprehensive 
calibration exercise; we only wish to illustrate some qualitative features of the model 
using a reasonably plausible (rather than exact) parameterisation of the model.40 
  For the experiments reported in this section, we assume that the economy is 
populated by 501 agents and that the initial wealth distribution is lognormal with mean 
4.2 and standard deviation 0.8, which results in an initial sample-mean wealth of 
91.0988 and a Gini coefficient of 0.4259. In addition, we assume the following 
parameter values:  ,225.0   ,3217.0r  
,01.0
1









r
231 w  and 
1
2 2.0 ww  .41 The values of x and   are chosen such 
                                               
40 As we have conducted comprehensive sensitivity analyses for various parameters, we are confident 
that the results presented below are indeed representative of the qualitative features of the model. We 
do not present these here; however, they are available upon request. 
 
41 Although Chakraborty and Das (2005) assume that the agent earns a wage of w in each period, we 
assume that the agent earns a lower wage in old age. While this assumption is essential to prevent the 
emergence of negative bequests in our model, it is also reasonable in light of empirical evidence. For 
instance, according to Fernández-Ballesteros et al. (2011), older workers are mostly involved in 
volunteering and helping family members, and rewards for such activities are typically very low or non-
existent. Furthermore, Verhaeghen and Salthouse (1997) reveal through a meta-analysis incorporating 
91 studies that speed, reasoning ability, spatial ability, and memory generally deteriorates sharply after 
the age of 50. Skirbekk (2004) shows that there is a decrease in productivity with age in jobs where the 
main skills required are problem solving, the ability to learn and performing activities speedily, but 
older workers can still be productive in jobs that demand verbal skills and experience. 
 
,03.0x ,8.0 ,96.0 ,88.0
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that the minimum survival probability resulting from the experiments is 0.3043.42 The 
top marginal tax rate levied on gifts and bequests earned by children varies between 
0% and 45% in the OECD (OECD, 2013, p. 80) and the value of  used in these 
experiments is the mid-point of these two values. Given that in this model, endogenous 
time preference entails ,1  and further noting the suggestion by Prescott (1986) that 
the value of   “cannot be far from 1”, we use 88.0  in our experiments. Taking  
an agent’s average lifetime to be 80 years, if we assume that decision making 
commences at the age of 20, each period in the model corresponds to 30 years. 
Therefore, we take the interest rate r  to be equal to the OECD average return on 
savings after 30 years, which is approximately 32.17% (OECD, 2013, p. 78). The value 
of  is roughly equal to 1 minus the 50-59 mortality rate in the United Kingdom in 
2010 (Whitlock, 2012). We carry out experiments on three values of :a  0.8, 0.5 and 
0.3 and the values of we consider are: -0.8, -0.3, 0, 0.2, 0.7 and 1.2.43  
5.5.1 Wealth dynamics 
 In this section we examine how average levels and inequality of wealth in the 
political economy model evolve over time. Generally, we observe that a higher value 
of the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 is associated with a higher average wealth 
level and lower inequality in the long run. Furthermore, as suggested in Proposition 2, 
the long run wealth distributions resulting from all experiments are bimodal.  
                                               
42 This survival probability is very close to 1 minus the average adult mortality rate in the African region 
(IHME, 2014). As this is a model with heterogeneous agents, we calibrate the lower end of the spectrum 
of mortality based on developing country data, while the maximum survival probability is defined from 
developed country data. 
43 In Section 2, we demonstrated that 
a
b
1
  is necessary to prevent a health capital and survival 
probability of 0. The values of 𝑏 chosen for the experiments adhere to this upper bound across all three 
values of 𝑎 considered. 
 

b
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5.5.1.1 Long run average wealth 
The experiments reveal that a higher value of the aggregate substitutability 
parameter 𝑏 generally yields a higher long run wealth level.44 This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.4, which shows the evolution of long run wealth for different values of 𝑏 
given .8.0a  An interesting observation relating to the result that a higher degree of 
aggregate substitutability between public and private health inputs is associated with 
higher long run wealth levels, is that it bears a resemblance to the positive association 
between long run income per capita and the elasticity of substitution between labour 
and capital in the production function proposed by authors such as Klump and De La 
Grandville (2000), Klump and Preissler (2000); and Palivos & Karagiannis (2010).45 
Despite the similariy of outcomes, such a comparison needs to be viewed with caution, 
as the results of this study refer to the elasticity of substitution between public and 
private health expenditures, which, as noted previously, has a bearing upon preferences 
and is conditioned by factors quite different to those that determine the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour.   
  
                                               
44 For a small range of values of the parameter 𝑎, the relationship between average long run wealth and 
𝑏 is mildly non-monotonic. For the values of 𝑎 considered in the experiments reported in this section, 
this occurs when 𝑎 = 0.3. However, even in this instance, we observe a high correlation of 0.9 between 
the values of 𝑏 and average wealth levels. 
 
45 For instance, Klump and De La Grandville (2000) demonstrate that in a Solow-Swan model with a 
normalised CES production function, a country with a higher elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labour is able to grow at a faster rate and also enjoy a higher income and capital stock per capita at 
steady state. 
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 Figure 5.4: Behaviour of average wealth over time for different values of 𝑏 given 8.0a  
 
In addition to the value of 𝑏, long run average wealth is also affected by the value 
of ,a  which we interpret as the “pure” share of public spending in the health production 
function. Figure 5.5, which plots the long run wealth against 𝑏 for different values of 
𝑎, shows that in general, a higher value of 𝑎 is associated a higher long run average 
wealth level. The intuition for this result is rather straightforward, in that a higher value 
of the pure share of public spending 𝑎 implies that public expenditure can have a bigger 
impact on a person’s health capital, which enables an individual to achieve a given 
level of health capital by incurring less private health expenditure. Lower private 
health expenditure allows an individual to leave higher intended or unintended 
bequests for progeny, thereby yielding higher long run wealth levels.  
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Figure 5.5: Long run average wealth for different values of 𝑎 and 𝑏 
 
5.5.1.2 Long run wealth inequality 
 In addition to exploring the manner in which the degree of aggregate 
substitutability and the pure share of public spending influence the long run average 
levels of wealth, it is also of interest to examine how they affect the long run inequality 
of wealth where inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient.46 While inequality 
tends to decrease over time, which one would expect, since there is redistribution 
through public spending on health in this economy, a higher value of the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏 is generally associated with a lower level of inequality. 
Thus, a higher value of 𝑏, in addition to yielding a higher average level of wealth, can 
also lead to lower inequality in the long run. This is illustrated in Figure 5.6, which 
shows the evolution of the Gini coefficient over time when .8.0a  Although a clear 
negative association between the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 and long run 
wealth inequality is present for a large range of values of 𝑎 for the relatively lower 
                                               
46 We measure inequality using the formula for the Gini coefficient supplied in World Bank (2011) 
which is: , where :G  Gini coefficient, 
i
Y income/wealth of household i , mean 
income/wealth and rank of household i (0 for poorest, 1 for richest).   
 
Y
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value of ,.a 30  the relationship between 𝑏 and long run inequality is non-monotonic, 
with a correlation coefficient of -0.1469 between the Gini coefficient and 𝑏 when 
30.a  , suggesting the presence of a weak negative linear association between the 
two variables. 
 
Figure 5.6: Behaviour of the Gini coefficient over time for different values of ,b  given 8.0a    
 
Figure 5.7 illustrates that a higher value of the pure share of public spending a  
is also generally associated with a lower level of inequality. This is created by the 
obvious tension in the production function created by the parameter 𝑎. Being the 
exponent of public health spending, a higher value of 𝑎 provides a bigger boost to the 
efficiency of public health spending whilst reducing the exponent of the combined 
public and private term, and its efficiency. Hence, a higher value of 𝑎 reduces the value 
of private health expenditures agents undertake to complement public healthcare, and 
this, in turn, augements the redistributive role of public health care spending by 
enabling even the poorer agents in the economy to leave more bequests for progeny. 
Hence, higher values of the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 and the pure share 
of public spending 𝑎 have a beneficial impact upon the economy, as they result in 
higher average wealth levels and lower wealth inequality in the long run. However, 
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the non-monotonicity we observe when 3.0a  suggests that the beneficial outcomes 
associated with a higher aggregate substitutability parameter are dependent upon the 
pure share of public spending in the health production function being sufficiently high.  
 
Figure 5.7: Long run Gini coefficient for different values of 𝑎 and 𝑏 
5.5.2 Political economy versus socially optimal results  
 It is often the case that the political economy outcome is not ‘optimal’ relative 
to a policy that maximises the welfare of agents in the economy, where social welfare 
can be measured in different ways. Hence, in this section, we explore the behaviour of 
the winning value of the , which is the proportion of tax revenue allocated towards 
public health care over time for the different values of the aggregate subsitutability 
parameter 𝑏 and the pure share of public spending 𝑎. We also compare these winning 
values of   against the welfare maximising values of   under the utilitarian and 
Rawlsian approaches.47 For a large range of parameter values, the voting outcomes are 
majoritarian, and indeed, in large number of instances, they are unanimous.48 In most 
                                               
47 The utilitarian or Benthamite welfare function maximises the sum of utilities of all agents in the 
economy, while under the Rawlsian or maxi-min criterion, the utility of the least well off member/s of 
society is maximised. These two approaches represent two different ideologies to the maximisation of 
welfare, with the first maximising the sum of utilities and the second maximising the utility of the worst-
off individual (Ng, 2003, pp 128).  
 
48 In instances where a winning value cannot be found through the majority rule, the plurality rule is 
employed, where the outcome with the highest number of votes is considered the winning one. 
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cases, the winning values correspond to the welfare maximising values in the long run, 
although there are a few instances where the Rawlsian and utilitarian welfare 
maximising values differ from one another and the political economy result converges 
to one of them in the long run.   
 When ,8.0a  numerical experiments reveal that there is a unaminous vote in 
favour of a proportion of   equal to 1 in all periods for all values of the aggregate 
substitutability parameter and that the welfare maximising value of   under both the 
utilitarian and Rawlsian approaches is also equal to 1. When ,5.0a  for ,0b  all 
agents vote unanimously for a value of   equal to 1 in all periods and this winning 
value is consistent with welfare maximisation under both the utilitarian and Rawlsian 
approaches in all periods. With regard to the negative values of b considered when 
,5.0a for 8.0b , the winning and the welfare maximising values values converge 
to 0.75 in the long run. However, when ,3.0b  the winning value of   converges 
to the Rawlsian welfare maximising value of 0.9, but the welfare maximising value 
under the utilitarian approach converges to 0.95. Hence, when ,5.0a  we see a 
tendency for the winning value of the proportion of tax revenue allocated to health 
care to increase with the value of the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏. 
 This positive relationship between the winning value of  and the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏 is even more prominent when ;3.0a  with the winning 
value of value of   gradually changing from 0.5 when 8.0b  to 1 when .2.1b  
The typical behaviour of the winning and welfare maximising values of  over time 
is illustrated in Figure 5.8, where the path of the winning value is compared to the 
paths of the utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare maximising values when .7.0b  Figure 
5.8 shows that in the transition path, the winning value of   falls between the the 
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utilitarian and Rawlsian outcomes. Recall that the remaining proportion  1  of tax 
revenue is distributed among individuals as a the lump-sum transfer. Given that this 
lump sum transfer is a perfect substitute for consumption, it is natural that the poorer 
agents in the economy would benefit more from this lump sum transfer. This results 
in the Rawlsian welfare maximising value being relatively lower than that obtained 
under the utilitarian criterion. It is also important to note that public health care is 
characterised by an externality, in that it impacts the survival probability of all 
individuals in the economy positively. The utilitarian approach, which weighs the 
utilities of all individuals equally, is able to capture this externality, thereby 
contributing towards internalising it. This provides an explanation for the 
comparatively higher social welfare maximising value obtained under the utilitarian 
criterion. As the individual takes into account only her own welfare when voting on 
the value of ,  the political economy outcome does not capture the externality effect, 
nor does it attach any particular importance to the utility of the poorest members of 
society, and one would therefore expect it to lie between the Rawlsian and utilitarian 
values.  
  
Figure 5.8: Behaviour of the winning and welfare maximising values of  over time for 7.0b
given 3.0a  
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It is also worth noting that in the interim periods, the winning value is usually 
closer to the utilitarian welfare maximising value rather than the Rawlsian value. An 
explanation for this is the similarity between the utilitarian approach, which weighs 
each individual’s utility equally, and the political economy outcome, which is derived 
by weighing each agent’s vote equally, where the vote depends on the agent’s utility. 
The fact that the political economy outcome is closer to the utilitarian outcome also 
suggests the possibility that in the transition path, the middle and the upper classes, 
who desire greater public spending on health care, combine to defeat the poor agents 
in the economy who prefer a comparatively lower proportion of tax revenue to be 
allocated towards health care. Consequently, the resulting voting outcomes in the 
transition path, although sub-optimal from a social welfare maximising point of view, 
are relatively more favourable towards the middle and the upper classes rather than the 
poorest agents in the economy. This resulting outcome is quite different from the “ends 
against the middle” result presented in Epple and Romano (1996a), who show that in 
the presence of private alternatives to a publicly provided good, middle-income 
households will vote for increased public provision, as opposed to the rich and poor 
households who prefer reduced private provision. Recall that in our model, the 
government’s tax revenue is divided between public health spending and a lump sum 
transfer. A possible reason for the emergence of this “middle and upper versus poor” 
scenario is the higher probability of premature death of the poor agents. As a result of 
this, they prefer the lump-sum transfer and the associated increase in consumption it 
can bring about over public expenditure on health care.  
 Although the winning and the welfare maximising values converge in the long 
run for most parameter values considered, in a few instances, the long run utilitarian 
and Rawlsian welfare maximising values of   differ from each other, and the winning 
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value of   converges to one of them. One such case occurs when 2.0b  given 
.5.0a  In this instance, the winning value converges to the Rawlsian value. We 
observe such non-convergence when 3.0b  given 3.0a  as well, but as illustrated 
in Figure 5.9, the long run political outcome converges to the utilitarian value rather 
than the Rawlsian one in this instance. The other instance with non-convergence that 
occurs when ,3.0a  also illustrated in Figure 5.9, is when ,2.0b  where the winning 
and Rawlsian welfare maximising value converges to 0.65, while the long run 
utilitarian value is 0.7. It is difficult to provide an intuition for the behaviour depicted 
in these instances, especially the “cross-over” we observe in the case of .2.0b  
However, in all these cases, the differences in the long run Rawlsian and utilitarian 
values are very small.  
 
 Figure 5.9: Behaviour of the winning and welfare maximising values of  over time for 
2.0b  and 3.0b  given 3.0a  
b=0.2 
b= -0.3 
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The tendency for the winning value of   to increase with the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏 is consistent with Proposition 4, which sugggests that the 
preferred value of  is increasing in 𝑏 for all agents. The fact that the preferred value 
of   for all agents in the economy is positively related to the aggregate susbtitutability 
parameter 𝑏 manifests itself through the political economy outcome. One would expect 
the aggregate substitutability parameter 𝑏 to be high in developed countries where 
health services offered by both the public and private sectors are of a comparable 
quality. However, in developing countries, the degree of aggregate substitutability is 
likely to be lower, as private health services tend to be of a superior quality to public 
health care. Hence, the results suggest that people in developed countries, where 
aggregate substitutability is higher, prefer a higher proportion of tax revenue to be 
allocated towards the provision of public health care when compared to citizens of 
developing countries.49  
 Indirect empirical support for the positive association between the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏 and the proportion of tax revenue allocated towards public 
health care is provided by studies such as Hardie and Critchley (2008), Soroka (2007) 
and Wilson and Rosenberg (2004), which demonstrate the presence of strong public 
support for continued public provision of health care services in some of the richest 
countries in the world, such as Australia and Canada. Indeed, in the EU as a whole, 
                                               
49 Studies have revealed that in some countries, private hospitals are more efficient that public ones. For 
instance, a study by Masiye (2007) reveals that in Zambia, government owned hospitals have a lower 
mean efficiency score when compared to private and mission owned hospitals. In the case of Taiwan 
too, H. Chang, Cheng, and Das (2004) use non-parametric data envelopment analysis to show that 
private hospitals outperform public ones. When private hospitals are comparatively more efficient than 
public ones, the aggregate substitutability between public and private health expenditures is likely to be 
lower. 
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public health expenditure accounts for 14.9% of total government expenditure and 
represents a massive 7.3% of the region’s GDP (European Commission, 2014), 
suggesting that people in developed countries prefer a high degree of state involvement 
in the funding of health care. In contrast, in a number of African countries, public 
health spending accounts for less than 5% of total government expenditure, and in 
many of them, public health care spending per capita is well below the minimum of 
34 US dollars recommended by the World Health Organisation to supply people with 
basic health care facilities (KPMG, 2012).   
As discussed earlier, the notion of substitutability in our model has a connection 
with the relative quality of public versus private health care. In that sense, the results 
of our model provide a potential explanation for the above mentioned differences in 
public health spending between developed and developing countries. Essentially, the 
model provides a political economy argument for the small degree of state involvement 
seen in developing countries. Agents in these economies do not vote for a high 
proportion of tax revenue to be allocated towards public health care, as it is a relatively 
ineffective substitute for private health services.50  
  While we observe a positive relationship between the value of the aggregate 
substitutability parameter 𝑏, we also notice that the winning value of   is increasing 
in the value of 𝑎, which we interpret as the pure share of public spending in the health 
production function, This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5.10, which shows the 
winning values of  against values of 𝑏 for different values of 𝑎. Recall that the 
preferred proportion of tax revenue to be allocated towards public health care for  
                                               
50 However, it is also important to appreciate that in reality, low public spending on health care in 
developing countries may not occur due to voting outcomes that occur within a democratic setting, but 
could instead be the result of decisions made by corrupt and authoritarian governments.    
 
 Chapter 5: Health Expenditures and Inequality: a Political Economy Perspective 163 
agents below and above the critical wealth level 

t
W  was given by (5.3.14) and (5.3.15). 
If one observes these values, it is clear that they are increasing in the parameter 𝑎, 
which leads to the observed positive association between the pure share of public 
spending 𝑎 and the winning value of the proportion of tax revenue to be allocated 
towards health care .  The rationale for this outcome is that a higher value of 𝑎 means 
that public health spending can make a greater impact upon a person’s health capital 
and thereby survival probability, it then follows that agents would wish for a high 
proportion of government revenue to be dedicated towards the provision of health care.  
 
 
Figure 5.10: Long run winning value of  against b for different values of a  
 
Across all of the experiments considered, we observe that the winning value of 
  ranges between a minimum of 0.5 and a maximum of 1, suggesting that a sizeable 
proportion of tax revenue is allocated towards health care in this economy. This result 
may be rather “artificial” because in our health production function, public health care 
is the essential input and this means that voting for zero public funding of health care 
is not an optimal decision for any agent in this model. A value of 0 would cause 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
-0.8 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.2
lo
n
g 
ru
n
 w
in
n
in
g 
va
lu
e 
o
f 
p
si
b
a=0.8
a=0.5
a=0.3
 Chapter 5: Health Expenditures and Inequality: a Political Economy Perspective 164 
the level of health capital to collapse to 0, thereby yielding a survival probability and 
utility of 0. In the VES construct, there are only two possibilities—either public or 
private health can be considered as the essential input. Our choice is motivated by the 
considerations outlined earlier about the relative importance of the public health care 
system.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 This paper examines the impact of the aggregate degree of substitutability 
between public and private health expenditures on long run macroeconomic outcomes 
using an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents, in which the 
probability of survival into old age depends on health capital accumulated in youth 
The novelty of this paper lies in the use of a variable elasticity of substitution “health 
production function”, in which a person’s health capital is determined by public and 
private health expenditures, and each individual’s degree of substitutability between 
public and private health expenditures is influenced by a parameter 𝑏, which interpret 
as the degree of aggregate substitutability, as well as her wealth. Hence, with 
heterogeneous wealth endowments, this functional form results in the degree of 
substitutability between public and private health inputs to differ between individuals.   
 We have shown that a higher value of the aggregate substitutability parameter 
𝑏 leads to higher average wealth levels, as well as lower wealth inequality in the long 
run. We also demonstrate that a higher value of another parameter ,a which we refer 
to as the “pure” share of public spending in the health production function, is also 
generally associated with a higher average level and lower inequality of wealth in the 
long run. Political economy outcomes generally reveal that agents in this economy 
vote for a higher proportion of tax revenue to be allocated towards public health care 
spending when the degree of aggregate substitutability and the pure share of public 
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spending in the health production function are higher, and that in most cases, the 
winning values are consistent with social welfare maximisation. As aggregate 
substitutability is likely to be higher in developed countries where public and private 
health services are of a comparable quality, the fact that public spending is relatively 
much higher in these countries when compared to developing ones lends empirical 
support for this result.  
The results of the paper carry several policy implications. As discussed above, a 
greater degree of substitutability and a larger share of public health expenditures in 
determining an individual’s health capital yield better long run macroeconomic 
outcomes. Therefore, policies aimed at improving institutional aspects that improve 
the degree of substitutability between public and private health inputs are likely to 
have beneficial effects on economic growth and development. In many developed 
countries, there is a large state sector that generally provides high quality health care 
services to the population. Usually, a parallel private sector providing comparable 
services exists in many of these countries (Atella & Deb, 2008; Cheng & Vahid, 2010), 
leading to a high degree of substitutability between public and private health inputs at 
the aggregate level. However, in some developed countries, the private sector is 
focussed on serving small niches of the market (Tuohy, Flood, & Stabile, 2004), may 
face various regulations (Lülfesmann & Myers, 2010), and is relatively more 
expensive when compared to public health care, which is usually free or is covered by 
state insurance (Fabbri & Monfardini, 2009). These factors restrict the degree of 
substitutability between public and private health care. Therefore, strengthening 
private finance and deregulating the health sector, which would improve availability 
and affordability of private health services, would help raise the degree of aggregate 
substitutability between public and private health services in these countries.  
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 In the case of less developed countries, a low degree of aggregate 
substitutability may stem from low service quality and poor facilities in the public 
sector that encourage people to opt for private health services that are of a 
comparatively higher quality. Therefore, in the context of a developing country, 
making public health care a viable competitor to private health care through better 
funding, service quality, and geographical coverage is a possible policy option to 
improve the aggregate substitutability between public and private health services.  
 Given that a higher “pure” share of public spending in the health production 
function also has a positive impact on long run outcomes, policies aimed at improving 
this dimension could also be considered. The pure share of public spending in the 
health production function captures the ability of public spending to influence an 
individual’s health capital, and could therefore be regarded as a measure of the 
effectiveness of public health care. Thus, possible policies to improve the pure 
contribution of public health care could include technological improvements in the 
public health care system, dedicating more resources towards training public health 
care workers in order to raise their productivity, a greater focus on state-funded 
medical research, and investment in new equipment. 
 The results of the paper are also amenable to empirical research. Given the 
important influence of aggregate substitutability on long run macroeconomic 
outcomes revealed in the study, a direction for future research suggested by the paper 
is the possibility of developing cross-country measures of aggregate substitutability by 
using aspects such as the relative quality of public health care and the regulatory 
framework in the health care sector as proxy variables. 
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 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis provides some diverse insights into several macroeconomic issues 
such as growth patterns, wealth inequality, policy, and welfare using dynamic general 
equilibrium models. A brief summary of the key results of the three studies that 
constitute this thesis and discussion of the policy recommendations and other 
implications emanating from them conclude the thesis. The limitations of the studies 
and the directions for future research emerging from the outcomes of these studies are 
also briefly discussed. 
At the heart of the three essays constituting this thesis is the variable elasticity 
of substitution (VES) production function, a form of production function originally 
discussed by Sato and Hoffman (1968) and Revankar (1971). In the VES form, the 
elasticity of factor substitution is an endogenous variable. Although the growth 
literature often assumes that production follows a CES or Cobb-Douglas technology, 
there is substantial empirical evidence that has raised doubts about the primary 
assumption underlying these forms, which is that the elasticity of factor substitution 
remains constant across input combinations and over time. In light of such 
observations, the VES production function is an intuitively appealing alternative to 
these production functions. In the VES form, the elasticity of factor substitution is 
linearly related to the capital stock per worker through a technology parameter that we 
refer to as 𝑏. Endogeneity of the elasticity of factor substitution in the VES from stems 
from the fact that the capital stock per worker is closely associated with the rate of 
economic growth. 
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In the first essay, we  explore the properties of the VES production function and 
apply it in the context of an otherwise standard Diamond overlapping generations 
model. The exploration of the properties of this form yields several interesting results. 
Among them are the following: a higher value of the technology parameter is 
associated with a higher return to capital, a more capital intensive long run expansion 
path, as well as a declining share of labour in total output. The parameter 𝑏 also affects 
the direction of technical change  in the economy, as a higher value of it causes greater 
capital bias in production. When the VES form is applied to a Diamond model, we 
observe that there could be several possible long run growth trajectories. The economy 
could converge to a unique and stable steady state akin to that in the standard Solow-
Swan model, regress towards a poverty trap, or diverge towards an upper limit of 
capital per worker hinging upon the parameter restrictions associated with the VES 
form.    
There is potential to strengthen these findings through further empirical work. 
Empirical work on the VES production function has emerged only sporaidically up to 
now, and in our view, they have not deployed the inherent flexibility offered by the 
construct effectively. For instance, Karagiannis et al (2005) use cross-country panel 
data to estimate a single value for the elasticity of factor substitution using the VES 
production function. However, by deploying the variable nature of the VES form, one 
could obtain different estimates of the technology parameter 𝑏, and hence, the 
elasticity of substitution for different countries, as well as explore how the elasticity 
of factor substitution has evolved over time within countries. From the point of view 
of the results of this thesis, as well as recent empirical growth literature, such a study 
can shed light on the mechanics behind directed technical change. This exploration is 
a potentially attractive offshoot of the work presented in the first essay. Furthermore, 
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a comparison of the growth dynamics emerging from different frameworks, possibly 
the Solow, Diamond, and Cass-Coopmans models is also an interesting theoretical 
extension to the first study.    
The public-private mix in the provision of public goods such as health and 
education is an issue that has attracted considerable attention in the economics 
profession in recent decades. Given that the individual plays the primary role in the 
creation of her own human capital, we assume that she combines public and private 
inputs in health care or education to “produce” these goods. The degree to which these 
inputs are substitutable for one another can be a key determinant of long run 
macroeconomic outcomes. Furthermore, government spending on public health care 
and education is typically determined through a voting mechanism. Hence, the degree 
to which public and private inputs are considered by individuals to be substitutable to 
one another is likely to be an important determinant of an economy’s political 
economy outcomes. The flexibility of the VES form and its associated properties 
makes it an appropriate construct to employ in the exploration of such issues. To this 
end, in the second and third studies, we apply the VES form to study the 
macroeconomic ramifications emerging from the degree of substitutability between 
public and private inputs in the contexts of education and health respectively. In the 
context of such human capital production functions, 𝑏  can be interpreted as a 
substitutability parameter that captures institutional and cultural aspects that affect the 
combination of public and private inputs that the individual selects. 
In the second study, we develop an overlapping generations model with a VES-
type education production function with public and private inputs. Education acquired 
in youth, coupled with parental human capital, are the determinants of an agent’s adult 
age human capital, which she combines with physical capital to produce output. This 
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framwork yields a number of possible dynamics for the evolution of human and 
physical capital in the economy. We observe that the economy could display 
oscillatory or monotonic convergence towards a stable steady state or display 
oscillatory divergence followed by permanent cycles. Optimal policy considerations 
point in the direction that a higher value of the parameter 𝑏 is associated with a higher 
tax rate to finance public education. 
Along a similar vein, the third essay looks at these considerations in the context 
of health. However, the fundamental difference in this study is that it considers a 
heterogenous agents framework where agents have different initial endowments of 
wealth. The health capital the agent acquires is primarily determined by the wealth  she 
inherits from her parent. This health capital, in turn, is the key determinant of her 
probability of survival into old age. Unlike in the case of a homogenous agents 
framework, such as that considered in the second study, in the case of the heterogenous 
agents framework developed in this study, the VES form enables a distinction to be 
made between substitutability between public and private health inputs at the 
aggregate level, captured by the parameter 𝑏, as well as individual substitutability, 
represented by the elasticity of substitution value corresponding to each individual, 
which hinges on the ratio of public to private inputs she selects.  
The analytical and numerical results reveal that a higher value of the parameter 
𝑏 is associated with higher average wealth levels, as well as lower inequality in the 
long run. In terms of political economy considerations, we observe that higher the 
value of this parameter, agents vote for a higher rate of wealth tax to finance public 
health care.  
We argue that the level of aggregate substitutability between public and private 
inputs in the case of both health care and education is likely to be higher in developed 
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economies, due to both sectors providing services of comparable quality. Hence, the 
results of the second and third studies provide a potential, albeit indirect explanation 
for the higher government expenditures on health and education in these countries.  
With regard to the directions for further research emerging from the second and 
third studies, the estimation of the hypothesised VES health and education production 
functions is one possible offshoot of the work presented herein. Specifically, an active 
possibility would be to employ productivity and efficiency analysis to estimate the 
efficient “frontier” using the VES production functions used in these studies and 
compare efficiencies across and within countries. Given that much of the extant 
research on productivity and efficiency analysis uses the CES production function, the 
use of the VES form would be an innovative contribution in itself. Possible theoretical 
extensions include the use of different frameworks, for instance, a two sector model, 
and the combination of health and education considerations into a single framework. 
The thesis contains several limitations. The first of these is the VES form itself;  
the boundededness of capital per worker from above results in the inability of the form 
to create unbounded growth, thereby limiting the range of trajectories the VES form 
can capture. Furthermore, the strict linearity of the elasiticity of substitution with 
respect to the capital stock per worker (or in the context of the second and third studies, 
the ratio of public to private inputs) is also considered to be another problem inherent 
to the VES form, as it limits its flexibility, although in the contexts of education and 
health considered in Chapters 4 and 5, this feature actually improves, rather than 
diminishes, flexibility. Neverthless, these limitations call for further refinement of the 
VES form.  
Another problem, particularly in the case of the second and third essays, is the 
fact that “aggregate substitutability” is not directly measurable. Given that the bulk of 
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these results hinge on this parameter, there is a need to quantify this construct in 
practical terms. Hence, we hope that the theoretical results of these studies will serve 
as a basis for further, more specific efforts to quantify this notion. 
Overall, this thesis makes some interesting contributions to several spheres in 
the area of dynamic macroeconomics. However, as noted earlier, it is possible to  
develop many possible extensions and offshoots, both theoretical and empirical, based 
on the work presented herein. We hope that our work will provide a motivating 
foundation for further research in this area.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1 in Chapter 3  
From (3.2.3), the derivative of 
KMP  with respect to 𝑏 is given by: 
  
  11
11






a
a
K
abk
abkaaak
b
MP
     (A1) 
From (A1) above, we can see that the interest rate is increasing in 𝑏 when .0b  
When ,0b  the interest rate is increasing in 𝑏 if 
 
.
1
ba
a
k

  This condition is always 
satisfied in the range 
b
k 1  which was established earlier.  
From (3.2.5), it is clear that a higher elasticity of substitution, captured by a 
higher value of the parameter 𝑏 yields a lower LMP  and thereby a lower wage rate.  
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Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 1 in Chapter 3 
First, we derive the condition for stability of a given steady state. We linearise 
equation (3.3.11) around the steady state. The linearised system can be approximated 
by:  
    kkkfkfk tt  '1       (B1) 
 
From (3.12), we have: 
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Therefore, the linearised system can then be written as: 
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For the steady state capital stock to be locally stable, the following condition 
must be satisfied: 
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By rewriting (3.3.12) as: 
   
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The local stability condition simplifies to:  
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akab 1         (B6) 
When ,0b (B6) simplifies to: 
 
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a
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1
        (B7) 
The inequality given by (B7) is always satisfied because .0k  So, when 0b
, the resulting steady state is always locally stable.   
When 0b , the local stability condition simplifies to: 
 
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Before looking at when this local stability condition is satisfied, the number of 
steady states associated with different parameter values must be examined. From (B5), 
let    
 
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The first and the second derivatives of M are given by: 
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When ,b 0  (B9) is always positive, while for ,b 0 the function M  has a 
stationary point when .
ba
a
k


1
 Regardless of the value of 𝑏, the second derivative 
given by (B10) is always negative. So, when 0b , the positive first and negative 
second derivative implies that M  is increasing and concave in k , and as depicted in 
Figure B1, the steady state occurs at point A. 
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Figure B1: Depiction of the unique steady state when 0b  
 
 
When ,b 0 the negative second derivative implies that the stationary point is a 
maximum. In this instance, if 
 
,
a
a
ba
a
M a
a
max










 
 
1
11 1
there will be no non-
trivial steady state, as depicted in Figure B2. Otherwise, there are two steady states, 
one to the left of the stationary point and one to the right. These steady state capital 
stocks, denoted by 
*
k 1  and 
*
k 2 are depicted graphically in Figure B3.  
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Figure B2: Depiction of a situation where there is no steady state when 0b  
 
Figure B3: Depiction of the two possible steady states when 0b  
 
 
Recall that the condition necessary for stability of the steady state when 0b  
was given by 
 
.
ba
a
k


1
 So, evidently, 
*
k 1  is a stable steady state while 
*
k 2  is not.  
Recall that the elasticity of substitution at any given steady state value must 
satisfy the condition .kb 01   When ,b 0  this condition is always satisfied. 
However, recall that when ,b 0  the condition results in an upper bound for any steady 
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state such that .
b
k 1  This implies that the economy’s capital stock can never rise 
above 
b
1 . This also means that, although we are able to demonstrate that there may 
be two possible steady states, they can only exist if they are below this bound. Firstly, 
when 
2
1
a , 
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11
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11*
1 
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 , it clearly exists, and is a stable 
steady state. When ,
2
1
a  
*
k 2  exists only if it falls in the range: 
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 If 
it falls within this range, if the economy starts with an initial capital stock such that 
b
kk 10
*
2  , capital stock will increase until it reaches .1
b
 On the other hand, if 
b
k 1
*
2   it is non-existent as it violates the upper bound. Hence, we can conclude 
that at least one steady state exists when 
2
1
a .  
Similarly, when 
2
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existent. When ,a
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1
  if 
b
k 1
*
1  , it is still the unique and stable steady state, but it 
is non-existent if it falls in the range 
 
ba
a
k
b


11 *
1 .  Hence, when 
2
1
a , it may be 
possible that both steady states depicted in Figure B3 may not exist. Under such 
circumstances, the economy will regress towards the trivial steady state 0k . Hence, 
when 
2
1
a , the economy may fall into a poverty trap.  
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Appendix C 
Proof of Proposition 2 in Chapter 3 
 
Recall from equation (3.3.12) that the steady state is given by the following 
implicit function: 
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From (C1) above we have 
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From the implicit differentiation theorem, we have: 
 
     (C4) 
It is clear that, when ,b 0  .
b
k
0


 Recall that when ,b 0 the unique steady 
state that emerges is always stable. 
When ,b 0  0
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 From Proposition 1, this upper bound on k  
is also the condition necessary for a stable steady state. Thus, when ,b 0 for any 
stable steady state, there is a negative relationship between k  and 𝑏. 
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Thus, when ,b 0 the conditions under which 0


b
k
 are analogous to the 
conditions under which the steady state that emerges when 0b  is locally stable. 
Hence, when ,b 0 any locally stable steady state capital stock is decreasing in the 
parameter 𝑏. 
At steady state, 
  aa kabky  11        (C5) 
 
   















 







 















 







 


kaa
k
kb
db
kd
a
k
kab
db
kd
abka
k
kab
a
db
kd
k
kab
a
db
yd
aaa
1
111
1
1
1
          (C6) 
The condition necessary for 0
db
yd
 is therefore:  
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Substituting for db
kd  and simplifying gives: 
  1221  akaab        (C8) 
When ,b 0 this yields: 
,
ab
k
1
  which is always satisfied because 0k . 
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When ,b 0  we get ,
ba
k
1
  which is always satisfied for any feasible steady 
state. Hence, for any feasible steady state .
db
yd
0   
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Appendix D 
Optimal solutions to the agent’s decision problem in Chapter 4 
Under the assumption of log utility, (2.11) simplifies to: 
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Using (2.1), (2.3) and (2.8), and assuming logarithmic preferences, we get: 
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Simplifying (D2) and substituting into (2.12) yields: 
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(D3) can be rearranged to yield: 
   
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P
t
hwabcae       (D4)  
Using equations (D1) and (D4), we can derive the optimal solutions to the 
agent’s decision problem given by equations (4.3.13) to (4.3.16). 
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Appendix E 
Proof of Proposition 1 in Chapter 4 
From (4.2.13), we get: 
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Then, 
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Similarly, from (4.2.16) we get: 
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In the case of human capital, substituting (4.2.7) and (4.2.14) into (4.2.1) and 
then substituting into (4.2.3) gives us: 
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Differentiating (E3) with respect to b gives us: 
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As all three components of the utility function are increasing in 𝑏, the 
consumer’s entire utility is increasing in 𝑏. 
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Appendix F  
Derivation of the upper and lower bounds on 𝒃 
First, note from (4.2.13), (4.2.15) and (4.2.16) that for ,ct 1  1ts  and 2tc  to be 
interior, the condition 01   ab  should hold. This simplifies to ,mb   where 
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From (4.2.14), for 01 
P
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condition simplifies to: ,nb   where 
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To get the modified upper bound for 𝑏 that is needed to ensure that in any given 
period, the elasticity of substitution between public and private education expenditures 
is positive, we first substitute the expression for 
G
t
e
1  from (4.2.7) and the optimal value 
for 
P
t
e
1  given by (4.2.14) into (4.2.2) which yields the following inequality: 
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Noting that 0 and making 𝑏 the subject of the resulting inequality yields the 
lower bound of pb  . However, note that in Section 2, the condition necessary for 
interior solutions for the optimal values of the decision variables was  mb ,1max  . 
Given 
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1
, 𝑝 is binding if 𝑝 > 𝑚. The required 
condition for 𝑝 > 𝑚 is: ,1  a which is always satisfied since .10  a  
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Therefore, the range of values for 𝑏 yielding interior solutions and satisfying the 
condition 0  is 𝑝 < 𝑏 < 𝑛. 
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Appendix G 
Derivation of the eigenvalues 
The eigenvalues 
1  and 2 are given by the following equations. 
 trA 21          (G1) 
 Adet21         (G2) 
Upon substituting the expressions for the trace and the determinant of the 
Jacobian matrix A  into (G1) and (G2), we get: 
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By combining the expressions and setting 
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get the solutions for 
1  and 2  given in (4.3.10) and (4.3.11). 
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Appendix H 
Proof of proposition 3 in Chapter 4 
 
To limit the possible characterisations of the steady state to cases (i) to (iii), we 
need to prove that .1,0 21  ss   
Note that 1j  if 
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which was derived earlier to be 
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n this condition is always satisfied. 
Now, it is clear that all the coefficients of the expressions in (3.4) and (3.5) are below 
1. Hence, .1,0  hk  As ,10  h it is clear from (3.6) that .10 
h
k
 Hence, it 
follows that .1,0 21  ss  This limits the number of possible characterisations of the 
steady state to cases (i) to (iii) outlined in Proposition 3.  
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Appendix I 
Derivation of the sufficient condition for the emergence of case (i) of proposition 
3 in Chapter 4 
Expanding the term inside the square root in equation (4.3.10) or (4.3.11), we 
get: 
  
     




















 111
2
11
1
41 hkljhkl
h
k
j (I1) 
If we ignore the squared terms, the following is a sufficient condition to ensure 
that (I1) is positive:  
  
       
0412
111111

 
 hkljhklj  (I2)  
This simplifies to   .1    
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Appendix J 
Derivation of the optimal value of  in Chapter 4 
Let I be the indirect utility function. 
     *
2
*
2
*
1 

ttt
hVcUcUI        (J1) 
From (4.3.13), (4.3.14) and (4.3.16) we have: 
  
   
 ab
abcUcU
tt









1
1*
2
*
1
    (J2) 
  
    













 ab
abaahV
t
1
11*
2
    (J3) 
Substituting these expressions into the derivative of (J1), we can obtain the 
optimal value *  given by equation (4.4.1).  
The second derivatives associated with (J2) and (J3) are negative, which 
confirms that at *  indirect utility is maximised. 
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Appendix K  
Derivation of the critical wealth level 

tW  in Chapter 5 
If ,


tt
WW  .

 P
t
P
t
hh  
Substituting for 
P
t
h and 

P
t
h in the second inequality above yields: 
 
    t
a
a
t
tt Wab
WA
xWabY


































1
1
1
1
    (K1) 
Substituting for 
t
Y and rearranging yields: 
 
 
    
)(
R
w
W)(wabW
WA
x
W
ttt
a
a
t
t



 





























1
1111 2
1
1
1
 (K2) 
Thus, any agent with wealth (received as intended or unintended bequests) greater than 

tW  can afford the critical private health expenditure .

P
t
h  
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Appendix L 
Proof of Bimodality in Chapter 5 
 
 In any period 𝑡, the offspring’s wealth is equal to the intended bequest 
such that tt mW  if the parent survives through old age, and the offspring’s wealth is 
equal to the parent’s savings such that 
1 tt sW  if the parent dies prematurely. At 
steady state, *
1 WWW tt  . 
 First, using the characterisation of intended bequests given by equation 
(5.3.14), for agents with wealth levels 
tt WW
ˆ , steady state wealth is: 
 
 
    










111
1
2
1
*
R
R
w
WabwR
W
   (L1) 
For agents with wealth levels 
tt WW
ˆ , steady state wealth is given by: 
 
 
   





11
1
2
1
*
R
h
R
w
Ww
W
p
t
    (L2) 
 In the case of unintended bequests, using equation (3.15), for agents 
with wealth levels 
tt WW
ˆ , steady state wealth is: 
 
 











1
1
22
1
* R
w
R
w
Wabw
W
   (L3) 
For agents with wealth levels 
tt WW
ˆ , steady state wealth is given by: 
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 
   





11
11*
R
hWw
W
p
t
     (L4) 
  
 For these steady states to be stable, it is necessary that the intended and 
unintended bequest functions for both types of agents in the economy should have 
slopes less than 1. To demonstrate that this is indeed the case, first we consider the 
slope of the intended bequest line for agents with wealth levels 
tt WW
ˆ , which, from 
(5.3.10) is given by: 
 
 
  



11
1 R
       (L5) 
Recall that the condition  1 R  was imposed to ensure that intended bequests are 
higher than unintended bequests for all agents. Thus, for 
 
  
,1
11
1
0 




 R
we need 
 
 
 
.
1
1
1
0


 




R
 As we know that 
 
,1
1


R
it follows that the condition 
necessary for the slope to be below 1 is 
 
 
,1
1
1





which is always satisfied. 
 For agents with wealth levels 
tt WW
ˆ , from (5.3.10), the slope of the 
intended bequests line is:  
 
 
 1
1



R
       (L6) 
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Given that 
 
,1
1


R
 the condition 
 
 
1
1
1
0 




R
 is satisfied as long as  
 
,
1
1
1  


R
 which is indeed the case, since the ratio 
 1
R
 is only marginally 
higher than 1.  
 In the case of unintended bequests, it can be seen from (5.3.11) that for 
agents with wealth levels tt WW
ˆ , the slope is given by 
 
 
,
1
1




 which is clearly 
always below 1. For agents with wealth levels tt WW
ˆ , from (5.3.11), the slope of the 
unintended bequests line is simply equal to  ,1   which is clearly less than 1. 
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Appendix M 
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4 in Chapter 5 
Proposition 3: For agents with 

 ,
tt
WW   we derive  by obtaining the indirect 
utility function which we get by substituting optimal values of  and * 1tm  into 
(3.1), which yields: 
          * 1* 1*   tt mVcU      (M1) 
Differentiating (M1) yields the FOC: 
             0
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1**
1
*
1
*
*
*







 









d
dm
dm
mdV
d
dc
dc
cdU
mVcU
d
dh
dh
d t
t
tt
t
t
tt
t
t
          (M2) 
Noting that: 
 
    aPtat WabhWh


1** 
     (M3) 
 
  
  









WabY
abaWa
h
h
t
t
t



11*
*
     (M4) 
We get: 
     (M5) 
Further,  
       
















1
1
1*
1
*
1
*
1 ttt mmVcU     (M6) 
and, 
*
,
1t
c
 
  
  








WabY
abaWad
dh
dh
d
t
t
t







11
*
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      
  












11
1 1* 1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1 abWRm
d
dm
dm
mdV
d
dc
dc
cdU tt
t
tt
t
t  (M7) 
Substituting these expressions into (M2) and substituting the functional form for 
 yields:  
 
  
 
    



 







 11
11
abWWabY
WabY
abaWa
ttt
tt
 (M8) 
Substituting for  and rearranging the above expression yields the optimal 
solution: 
 
 
  











11
1
2
1
*
abW
R
w
WWwa
t
tt
     (M9) 
The second derivative is: 
 
 
2
2
1

 






R
w
WWwa ttt
     (M10) 
This expression is always negative, which confirms that at the indirect utility 
function reaches its maximum value. 
Given 10  and ,1  .01    So, for * to be positive, it is 
necessary that: 01  ab  which yields .
1
a
b   However, for an interior solution (i.e. 
),10 *  the required condition is:      
    ,111 21  





 abW
R
w
WWwa tt  
which yields the following upper bound for 𝑏: 
*
1tb
tY
*
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b  
 
 
.
W
R
w
WWw
a
t
tt











1
1
1
2
1
  
For agents with ,


tt
WW  the first order condition is: 
 
   
0
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1 





 








d
dm
dm
mdV
d
dc
dc
cdU t
t
tt
t
t     (M11) 
Substituting for the expressions in (M7) and noting that:  
 
 
 
t
a
a
t
a
p
t
Wab
W)a(
a
x
h





















1
1
1
1
1
   (M12) 
We obtain the derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to :  
 
   
 
    
0
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
*



















































t
a
a
t
a
t
P
ttttt
Wab
Wa
a
x
WR
hWWwRw
U











          (M13) 
From (M13), we get: 
   
a
a
tWaba
a
x




















1
1
1
*
11 



     (M14)  
If we assume 
 
 
,
W
R
w
WWw
a
q
t
tt











1
1
1
2
1
 the optimal solutions can 
be characterised as in equation (5.3.14). 
Proposition 4: From equations (M9) and (M14) it is clear that *  is  rising in 𝑏 for all 
agents in the economy 
